Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NICOSIA932
2007-11-19 15:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

ELDER STATESMAN TROUBLED BY ELECTORAL THEMES,

Tags:  PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHNC #0932/01 3231501
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191501Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8343
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1016
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000932 

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DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY
SUBJECT: ELDER STATESMAN TROUBLED BY ELECTORAL THEMES,
NEGOTIATIONS IMPASSE

REF: A. NICOSIA 896


B. NICOSIA 898

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000932

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY
SUBJECT: ELDER STATESMAN TROUBLED BY ELECTORAL THEMES,
NEGOTIATIONS IMPASSE

REF: A. NICOSIA 896


B. NICOSIA 898

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The possible re-election of incumbent
Tassos Papadopoulos deeply concerns former President and DISY
founder Glafcos Clerides. In a November 14 meeting with the
Ambassador, the octogenarian Clerides noted that many
Cypriots realized the dangers "five more years of Tassos"
would bring -- without a change in government policy and
leadership, he fretted, the prospect of permanent partition
loomed large. Regrettably, Papadopoulos had succeeded in
framing the campaign debate around past actions and not
future plans, a negative development that hurt challengers'
chances. Clerides voiced similar pessimism over the
short-term prospects for inter-communal Cyprus Problem
negotiations. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Reading the Election Tea Leaves
--------------


2. (C) Former President Clerides initiated the November 14
tete-a-tete and appeared in reasonable health despite a
recent bout of illness and the death of his wife earlier this
year. He turned first to Cyprus's presidential campaign,
which will culminate with elections in mid-February.
Papadopoulos had succeeded in turning the race into a
backwards-looking affair, Clerides lamented. Instead of
focusing on issues and the future, the President talked only
of the 2004 Annan Plan and his "saving of the nation" via the
"No" vote he had espoused. And his challengers, AKEL
Secretary General Dimitris Christofias and DISY-sponsored

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Ioannis Kasoulides, had fallen into Papadopoulos's trap.


3. (C) Should Papadopoulos survive Round 1 -- a probable
scenario, Clerides ventured -- his defeat would depend on
historic enemies AKEL (Communist) and DISY (right-wing)
cooperating to some degree. Numerous AKEL leaders shared his
negative opinions of Papadopoulos and were dismayed that
certain AKEL rank-and-file supported the incumbent's
candidacy. But they had few ideas on how to stop his
re-election, Clerides revealed.


4. (C) Cyprus needed a "wider government" to accommodate

both DISY and AKEL, he reasoned. Yet both parties were
loathe to admit publicly the need that one throw its weight
behind the other to defeat Papadopoulos. The ex-President
expressed interest in facilitating formation of this grand
coalition, and hinted that he was seeking to broker contacts
toward this end. While no official meetings had taken place,
officials of both parties were mulling possible contacts.
All involved feared losing ground to the other side,
unfortunately.

--------------
Time Running Short to Reunify Island
--------------


5. (C) Regardless of who won the election, the Greek Cypriot
leadership must push hard to re-start Cyprus Problem
negotiations in early 2008, Clerides asserted. The July 8
Agreement and its envisioned technical committees/working
groups provided one vehicle of getting the sides talking, but
direct talks between community leaders also were essential,
the former President believed. Committees had failed in the
past because members hesitated to make concessions or take
action for fear of looking weak to their superiors. Further,
they tended to draw "redder lines" than the leaders engaged
in direct talks. In response, the Ambassador, while agreeing
the July 8 process had drawbacks, believed that Papadopoulos
and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat needed to give
the process a go, since they freely had signed the agreement
sixteen months ago, making July 8 "the only game in town" for
the UN and the parties.


6. (C) The United Nations must help to push the sides
forward, Clerides and the Ambassador agreed. Yet there were
hotter conflicts demanding UN attention, and neither man saw
UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon devoting greater attention to Cyprus as
long as the island's communities remained at loggerheads.
Further, Ban likely would not want to get burned in the way
that former SYG Kofi Annan had. The U.S. would also have a
key role to play, Clerides maintained, even if
behind-the-scenes. To illustrate, he remarked that Annan
would never have invested such efforts (referring to the
2001-2004 period) in Cyprus without the assumed backing of

NICOSIA 00000932 002 OF 002


the United States and Great Britain.

--------------
Impressions on Doings North of the Green Line
--------------


7. (C) Internationally, the Greek Cypriot side was
foundering, Clerides insisted, and the Turkish Cypriot
community on the rise diplomatically. Turkey's hand looked
to be improving as well. As that country became more
involved in Middle East peace talks, Clerides even envisioned
Israel or the Palestinian Authority somehow upgrading
relations with the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" out
of gratitude to Ankara. Close relations between the Republic
of Cyprus and Israel likely would preclude such a move
anytime soon, the Ambassador countered.


8. (C) Clerides revealed that he maintains contact with
Talat. The T/C leader had visited him during his last
hospital stint, for example. From their discussions, the
briefings of his advisors, and media reporting, it was clear
to the former President that Talat was losing popularity
amongst his constituents, and increasingly appeared to be
under Turkey's thumb, with little real maneuvering room on
the Cyprus Problem.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) COMMENT: While Clerides offered some insight into
the upcoming elections, perhaps more telling was what he
neglected to say. The founder of DISY failed to talk up or
show support for his former FM and current DISY candidate,
Kasoulides. By focusing on the need for a Papadopoulos
defeat and not a Kasoulides win, Clerides seems to be
validating conventional wisdom here that the DISY candidate
has little chance of advancing into the second round.
Efforts would be better spent, reasoned Clerides, on creating
a DISY-AKEL coalition to defeat the incumbent -- comments
recently echoed by opposition newspaper Alithia, and
fringe/pro-Annan Plan candidate Costas Themistocleous.
Others take the position one step further by stating that the
Cyprus problem will be solved only when DISY and AKEL
cooperate, since such an arrangement would allow whomever
held the presidency to act in a forward-leaning way without
worrying about his electoral back. Unfortunately, the elder
statesman and "seen it all" Clerides did not offer any ideas
for how this cooperative arrangement might work. As it
stands now, the two parties are still sniping at each other
publicly, to Tassos Papadopoulos's advantage. END COMMENT.
SCHLICHER