Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NICOSIA856
2007-10-26 09:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

DIKO CHIEF CONFIDENT OF PARTY GROWTH, PAPADOPOULOS

Tags:  PGOV PREL CY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHNC #0856/01 2990931
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 260931Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8269
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0983
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000856 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY
SUBJECT: DIKO CHIEF CONFIDENT OF PARTY GROWTH, PAPADOPOULOS
RE-ELECTION

REF: A. NICOSIA 849


B. NICOSIA 839

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000856

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY
SUBJECT: DIKO CHIEF CONFIDENT OF PARTY GROWTH, PAPADOPOULOS
RE-ELECTION

REF: A. NICOSIA 849


B. NICOSIA 839

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In trumpeting his party's double-digit
growth and asserting that "his" presidential candidate --
incumbent President Tassos Papadopoulos -- would win easy
re-election in February 2008, Democratic Party (DIKO) chief
Marios Karoyian oozed confidence in his October 22 meeting
with the Ambassador. Karoyian that day was celebrating his
one-year anniversary at DIKO's helm, and he boasted of recent
polls showing the party narrowing the gap with leading
parties AKEL and DISY. Once the party implemented his
long-sought social programs, the difference might disappear
completely, he added. Turning to the presidential race, the
DIKO leader predicted Papadopoulos would face AKEL Secretary
General Dimitris Christofias in the February 24 run-off, with
DISY-sponsored candidate Ioannis Kasoulides failing to
advance. Nearly 20 percent of AKEL supporters would support
the incumbent, Karoyian argued, owing both to the President's
proven competence and to the respect he earlier showed AKEL
during its four-plus years in government. Socialist EDEK and
nationalist EUROKO constituted the coalition's weaker links,
Karoyian admitted, but the President should still secure
two-thirds of their votes, enough to advance and win office
in February. A re-elected Papadopoulos would not shut the
door to participation from oppostion parties, however, even
AKEL. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Fortunes Rising, One Year In
--------------


2. (C) Party business had Karoyian away from his desk often,
he informed the Ambassador, visiting the provinces in hopes
of building more grass-roots DIKO support. One year exactly
after defeating rival Nikos Kleanthous for the party
presidency, he had good news to report: recent polling in
widely-read daily "Politis" showed DIKO the party of choice
for 22 percent of Cypriot voters, a significant jump from
year-earlier totals. The figure might rise further with the
implementation of his pet project, a type of "social
contract" with the Cypriot electorate.



3. (C) In comparison to leading Cypriot parties DISY and
AKEL, DIKO lacked a definable ideology, Karoyian admitted.
Its support came mainly for its hard-line stance against the
2004 Annan Plan reunification effort, and President
Papadopoulos's vows never to permit similar plans to take
effect. Karoyian aimed to create a party identity with his
nascent (and still very fuzzy) "contract," which would target
Cyprus's elderly population, youth, and other, underserved
groups. Responding to the Ambassador's follow-up query, the
DIKO leader insisted the initiative did not ape AKEL policies
nor was intended to co-opt that party's voters. "With this
effort my dreams will become reality," Karoyian proclaimed
(Comment: his dreams are to grow the party, not serve
Cyprus's underprivileged, we think.)

--------------
Smiles and Confidence Regarding Elections
--------------


4. (C) Spawning similar positive vibes were internal studies
showing DIKO cohesion rates running at 84-86 percent (Media
have reported figures in the 71-74 percent range, however.)
Such performance was surprising, Karoyian revealed, since the
presidential elections lay four months ahead. DIKO staff
already had identified dissatisfied supporters and developed
action plans to return them to the fold, meaning cohesion
might rise even higher come February.


5. (C) Handicapping the presidential race, Karoyian thought
Papadopoulos would face Dimitris Christofias in the run-off
February 24. DISY-supported candidate Ioannis Kasoulides
looked increasingly weak, he asserted. Elaborating, nice-guy
Kasoulides lacked the toughness necessary to succeed at this
level. Further, DISY President Nikos Anastassiades, who
viewed a successful Kasoulides campaign as a threat to his
party position, regularly withheld key support (Ref A). DISY
ought now to be considering which opponent to support in
Round 2, Karoyian offered.


6. (C) Asked to comment on AKEL's traditionally sky-high
cohesion and the advantages it wrought, the DIKO leader
confidently predicted his candidate could steal 20 percent of
Christofias's rank-and-file (Ref B). During four and 1/2

NICOSIA 00000856 002 OF 002


years in the government coalition, a sizable swath of AKEL
voters had become accustomed to the trappings of power. They
considered their Secretary General's decision to abandon
Papadopoulos and run alone a quixotic affair destined to
return the party to opposition status; as such, they
preferred to support the President, albeit quietly. Worse,
Christofias had presented his candidacy as a fait accompli,
imperiously at that. Papadopoulos had "treated AKEL with
respect during the period of co-governance," Karoyian
countered, winning him additional party goodwill.


7. (C) Karoyian acknowleged a couple of weak spots in the
re-election campaign. Socialist EDEK, the second-largest
party backing Papadopoulos, lagged far behind DIKO in terms
of cohesion, for example. Partisans thought EDEK might
eventually convince 80 percent of its base to support the
President, but Karoyian dismissed the figure as overly
optimistic. Another small party allied with Papadopoulos,
EUROKO, controlled just 50-55 percent of its voters, with the
remainder likely to back Kasoulides. Still, Karoyian liked
the President's re-election chances.

--------------
AKEL to Return Some Day?
--------------


8. (C) A student of mainland politics, Karoyian wondered if
AKEL might soon face an accession struggle similar to that
plaguing Greek Socialist party PASOK in the wake of its
latest defeat at the hands of New Democracy. Seemingly loyal
lieutenants likely would confront Christofias with "you've
had your chance, now give us ours" demands. If he were
smart, Karoyian ventured, Christofias would cover his
internal flanks now, re-assigning certain challengers,
sacking others, and generally adopting a divide-and-conquer
strategy.


9. (C) Karoyian even envisioned a limited role for AKEL in a
second-term Papadopoulos administration, especially if
post-election polling were to show that party's supporters
backing the President in high numbers. Despite its newcomer
status -- AKEL never before had participated directly in
Cypriot cabinets -- AKEL-affiliated ministers (there had been
four) had acquitted themselves well during Papadopoulos's
tenure, Karoyian emphasized. Divergent political ideologies
never posed problems, as the officials "had been Communists
in name only."

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) With a booming economy to exploit, an electorate
comfortable with the Cyprus status quo, and a Teflon shell
impervious to scandal, Papadopoulos looks tough to defeat in
February; Karoyian's confidence over his boss's re-election
prospects seems spot-on to us. Less convincing was his
depiction of DIKO as a rising political force capable of
challenging AKEL and DISY for supremacy here. A shared
ideology still draws individuals to parties and ensures their
long-term survival, and here the Big Two are miles ahead of
DIKO, popularly known as the "party of opportunists."
Karoyian's organization continues to stake its reputation on
then-leader Papadopoulos's "saving of the Republic" via the
Annan Plan "No," but how long can this message remain
relevant? Further, in the post-1974 era, a large, fickle
tranche of Cypriot voters have "followed the power" by
buoying the sitting president's party's performance in
parliamentary and municipal elections, only to abandon the
organization once he leaves office. We would expect that
pattern to repeat in the post-Papadopoulos era, whenever that
occurs, with DIKO returning to its familiar third-wheel role.
SCHLICHER