Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NICOSIA849
2007-10-23 13:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

CAUTIOUS CHRISTOFIAS REVEALS LITTLE ON CAMPAIGN

Tags:  PGOV PREL CY TU 
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Amy Marie Newcomb 01/22/2008 04:23:33 PM From DB/Inbox: ECO-POLShare

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 00849

SIPDIS
CXNICOSI:
 ACTION: DCM EXEC
 INFO: POL RAO ECON PAS

DISSEMINATION: EXEC
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:RSCHLICHER
DRAFTED: POL:GMACRIS
CLEARED: DCM:JZ

VZCZCNCI880
PP RUEHC RUEHZL RUEHBS RUCNDT
DE RUEHNC #0849/01 2961342
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231342Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8262
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0978
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000849 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY TU
SUBJECT: CAUTIOUS CHRISTOFIAS REVEALS LITTLE ON CAMPAIGN

REF: NICOSIA 839

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L.Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000849

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY TU
SUBJECT: CAUTIOUS CHRISTOFIAS REVEALS LITTLE ON CAMPAIGN

REF: NICOSIA 839

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L.Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In clear contrast to DISY leader Nikos
Anastassiades (Reftel),AKEL Secretary General Dimitris
Christofias avoided tactical discussions and stuck to
electoral generalities in his October 18 meeting with the
Ambassador. February's presidential elections were distant,
Christofias counseled, and AKEL's legendary "syspeirosy" --
its party discipline and ability to get out the vote -- would
reach or surpass historic norms, quelling alarmists' worries.
Nonetheless, defeating Tassos Papadopoulos looked difficult,
what with an incumbent's natural advantages and this
president's near-complete control over Cypriot media.
Turning to the Cyprus Problem, Christofias welcomed the
President's newfound flexibility but wondered whether his
horrible image amongst Turkish Cypriots precluded real
movement. The AKEL candidate claimed to enjoy closer ties
across the Green Line, owing to his efforts to cultivate
contacts with T/C leaders, not villainize them publicly.
Christofias expected little short-term movement on CyProb
negotiations; to blame were the Cypriot electoral calendar
and Turkey's preoccupation elsewhere. END SUMMARY.

--------------
What...Me Worry?
--------------


2. (C) Christofias the candidate had not abandoned his day
job completely, he asserted. "I'm trying proceed on the
campaign while also continuing contacts with Turkish Cypriots
and seeking movement on the Cyprus Problem." In response to
the Ambassador's queries over recent polling results that
showed the AKEL SG trailing Tassos Papadopoulos, Christofias
cautioned the race had barely begun. AKEL cohesion rates
would rise as Election Day neared, he confidently predicted,
and opponents who believed large numbers of Communist voters
would abandon the party's candidate were indulging in wishful
thinking. AKEL intended to shake the trees for every
possible vote; last year, it had flown 5000 Cypriots home
from Athens in the elections run-up, an operation it intended
to repeat in February. Five thousand voters equated to three
percent of the Cypriot electorate, a significant sum, he

reminded.


3. (C) Christofias admitted that Papadopoulos looked tough
to beat. Defeating a sitting president never was easy, but
one with almost Stalinesque control over the media (our
appraisal, not his) was particularly challenging, he
continued. The AKEL SG took solace in noting that Dias Group
head Costas Hadjicostis, one of Cyprus's most potent media
barons, had declared his neutrality in the presidential race.
"Hadjicostis normally hammers AKEL, so this is a victory of
sorts," Christofias reasoned.

--------------
Using the CyProb for Political Gain
--------------


4. (C) Papadopoulos's ability to dictate the pace and nature
of Cyprus Problem negotiations comprised an additional
electoral advantage, Christofias contended. In response to
the Ambassador expressing his satisfaction that the President
and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat had met September
5 but also his doubt that serious negotiations would commence
before the elections, he only half-jokingly responded "I hope
you're right!" Christofias's contacts in the north rarely
concealed their scorn for the Greek Cypriot leader, whom they
considered an untrustworthy, intransigent interlocutor.
Interestingly, Christofias chose not to label the President's
recently-unveiled CyProb initiatives (Septel) as political
sleight-of-hand, as he has alleged recently in public fora.
Rather, the AKEL leader voiced hope that Papadopoulos's
efforts might spur some negotiating movement and convince
T/Cs to scale back their all-out efforts at securing
political recognition, evidenced most recently by the
seemingly-successful wooing of Syria to establish sea links
between Famagusta and Latakia.


5. (C) In Dimitris Christofias the Turkish Cypriots would
find a reasonable negotiating partner, the AKEL candidate
asserted. He beamed over his long-term contacts with T/C
party leaders, and recounted how United Cyprus Party chairman
Izzet Izcan recently had accompanied him to the Karpass
Peninsula for meetings with Greek Cypriot enclaved.
Politicians from numerous parties on both sides continued to
meet under the auspices of the local Slovak Embassy, and
Christofias insisted that a bizonal, bicommunal federation
remained the desired end-state, not partition or
confederation. Regrettably, Talat faced pressures no G/C
politician must endure, namely, those of the Turkish Army.
--------------
Island Not High on Mainland Priority List
--------------


6. (C) Ankara's demands likely underpin the T/C leader's
growing stubbornness and hardening line, Christofias wagered;
he refused to believe his former comrade had "turned" on his
own. Despite its historic, heavy hand in the north, however,
he predicted Turkey would back off slightly, due mainly to
leaders' focus on the Kurdish problem, a potential Iraq
cross-border operation, and the U.S. Congress's Armenian
Genocide Resolution. Ankara should also return its gaze to
European Union accession negotiations, Christofias argued. A
Turkey squarely on the EU membership track benefited no
country more than Cyprus, he acknowleged. Yet Ankara must
change to fit the Union, not demand that Brussels compromise
to meet the demands of one, albeit large, applicant.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) We had hoped Christofias would drop his guard and
discuss AKEL's thoughts on recapturing the 15 percent of its
membership allegedly favoring Papadopoulos's candidacy; the
Communists' mistrust of U.S. intentions dies hard, however,
and meetings with AKEL rarely venture into the weeds like
similar sessions with DISY. Shoring up the base must
constitute Christofias's Job 1, since without high cohesion
and turnout, his chances of advancing to the second round
look low. Papadopoulos won't make this easy. In floating
his recent proposals on CBMs and the July 8 process, for
example, the President undoubtedly took aim at that chunk of
the "AKEL 15" who, while opposed to his hard-line policies,
are politically risk-averse and unsure a Communist can win in
February. Christofias's response to the measures -- calling
on Papadopoulos not to table CyProb initiatives during the
election run-up, lest the T/C side and/or international
community deem them electorally-motivated -- predictably
fell flat and drew an immediate, successful RoC rebuttal.
He'll need better talking points in the future.

SCHLICHER