Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NICOSIA804
2007-10-03 12:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

DEMANDS OF MFA POSITION TO HARDEN SOFT-LINER?

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5304
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0804/01 2761202
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 031202Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8216
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0963
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000804 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: DEMANDS OF MFA POSITION TO HARDEN SOFT-LINER?

REF: A. NICOSIA - EUR/SE EMAIL 09/22/07 AND OTHERS


B. UNGA/EUR - EMBASSY EMAIL (09/26/07)

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000804

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: DEMANDS OF MFA POSITION TO HARDEN SOFT-LINER?

REF: A. NICOSIA - EUR/SE EMAIL 09/22/07 AND OTHERS


B. UNGA/EUR - EMBASSY EMAIL (09/26/07)

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign Ministry dissatisfaction over our
concept of "consultations" -- translated, the Embassy's
continuing attempts to brief and respect the sensitivities of
the MFA on our assistance to Turkish Cypriots (T/Cs) in
northern Cyprus -- dominated the DCM's September 25 courtesy
call on new Cyprus Question Division Chief Minas
Hadjimichael. Well-briefed despite just two weeks on the
job, Hadjimichael sought a bilateral Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU),similar to that covering
UNDP-administered USG assistance, for the T/C aid package as
well, a definite non-starter for us (Ref A). U.S.-Cyprus
relations had improved recently, he ventured, but might
deepen even further if both sides could identify "commonality
of interests;" as the RoC's ambassador to France, he had
orchestrated a similar campaign and thought certain tactics
might apply to our bilateral dealings as well. Turning to
the Cyprus Problem, Hadjimichael voiced the RoC's fear that
the then-imminent "gathering of like-minded nations" on the
UNGA margins seemed almost conspiratorial, since it excluded
Cyprus and UNSC allies Russia and France (Ref B). The MFA
diplomat, despite evincing great charm throughout the call,
nonetheless appeared to have adopted all his predecessors'
CyProb-related hard lines and undoubtedly will prove a
challenging interlocutor. Biographical information begins in
Paragraph 10. END SUMMARY.

--------------
One of Their Finest for a High-Profile Slot
--------------


2. (SBU) The Cyprus Problem Division Director ranks Number 3
on the MFA's organizational chart, below only the Foreign
Minister and Permanent Secretary and parallel to the
Political Director (P-equivalent). Vacant since July, the
position has proven a springboard to greater things:
President Tassos Papadopoulos promoted former Director Erato
Marcoullis to run the MFA in July, and current RoC chief

negotiator and Presidential Diplomatic Coordinator Tasos
Tzionis held the job during the prior presidential
administration. Minas Hadjimichael's nomination therefore
portends a promising future for the experienced but
youthful-looking diplomat, lately the RoC's ambassador in
Paris. Accompanied by PolChief, the DCM September 25 paid a
courtesy call on the still-unpacking and reading-in
Hadjimichael.

--------------
And Not Averse to Tackling the Tough Ones
--------------


3. (C) After exchanging pleasantries and praising the sound
relationship the Embassy and Ministry currently enjoyed,
Hadjimichael dove directly into substance and proved himself
both well-connected and a quick read. A recent Embassy
headache and bilateral dispute -- a hold on USG assistance to
the T/C community by U.S. Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) --
looked to be resolved, he understood, the result of a recent
meeting between the Senator and EUR Assistant Secretary
Daniel Fried.


4. (C) Not exactly, replied the DCM. Menendez's hold
remained in effect for over $1 million in FY06 supplemental
monies destined for the Embassy's Cyprus Program for Economic
Growth (CyPEG),an initiative aimed at improving the Turkish
Cypriots' economic lot in order to facilitate a smoother
reunification of the island. Despite its T/C focus, however,
CyPEG greatly benefited the Greek Cypriot (G/C) community,
she continued. Cultural preservation efforts in the
T/C-administered areas targeted prominent Orthodox sites like
St. Mamas Church, for example, while CyPEG efforts to assist
Turkish Cypriot farmers aimed to protect agricultural land,
some G/C-owned, from commercial development.


5. (C) With CyPEG and the bi-communal aid programs, the
Embassy hoped to break down barriers to the island's eventual
reunification, the DCM continued. Yet our efforts were
hampered by continued Republic of Cyprus attempts to exert
control over American assistance. The MOU the UN Development
Program had signed with the Foreign Ministry, governing
implementation of our Action for Cooperation and Trust (ACT)
initiative, had proven especially problematic for the
Embassy. As proof, the DCM cited the RoC's refusal to engage
Turkish Cypriot NGOs solely because "North" or "Northern
Cyprus" figured in their formal names. Realizing the

NICOSIA 00000804 002 OF 003


imperative of close coordination with the Ministry, however,
the Embassy regularly had offered consultations and briefings
to Marcoullis in her former guise as Cyprus Problem director.
She had turned down most.


6. (C) Perhaps Marcoullis believed the Embassy presentations
did not constitute consultations on program/project
direction, but faits accomplis, Hadjimichael surmised. Would
the Embassy have honored her objections? If not, the
then-Director had reason to boycott future sessions as
unproductive, he asserted. And contrary to our perception,
the ACT MOU was functioning satisfactorily, according to his
MFA colleagues. In response, the DCM offered to bring the
USAID director for a follow-up "briefing" with Hadjimichael
if that would help ease his concerns about consultations.

--------------
Bettering a Good Relation
--------------


7. (C) Sensing the conversation could turn tense, the
butter-smooth Hadjimichael returned to the overall improving
U.S.-Cyprus relationship. He saw room for further growth,
however, and emphasized his desire to find "commonality of
interests;" his tenure in France could hold the key. Upon
arrival in Paris, Hadjimichael claimed, the French considered
Cyprus little more than a Mediterranean rock whose political
impasse would bring the European Union only problems. Partly
the result of his "common interests" campaign, however, Paris
had learned that France and Cyprus often saw eye-to-eye, and
had come to view Cyprus for the assistance it could deliver:
in many EU fora, its vote counted the same as France or
Germany's. While the RoC could not engage in similar
back-scratching with the United States, Hadjimichael still
believed the nations enjoyed numerous shared values and aims,
and thought tactics he had implemented with Paris might work
with Washington as well.

--------------
Latest Scandinavian Initiative in Bad Faith
--------------


8. (C) Hadjimichael next raised the ongoing Cyprus Problem
negotiations. The government saw little positive emerging
from Sweden's September 26 effort, on the margins of the UN
General Assembly, to gather "like-minded nations" for a
Cyprus brainstorming session. "Why exclude us?" he
questioned "and where are France and Russia?" The effort
seemed a personal crusade of Swedish Foreign Minister Carl
Bildt, a "friend of Turkey" and strident supporter of
Ankara's EU accession. Swathed in secrecy and anything but
transparent, this latest "Scandinavian Plan" troubled the
government and President Papadopoulos in particular, he
concluded. In response, the DCM clarified the U.S. would
attend in listening mode and had no new initiative to
introduce in that forum.

--------------
Comment: A Product of the System?
--------------


9. (C) Long-serving Mission staff remember Hadjimichael as a
close contact during his tenure as FM Kasoulides's chef du
cabinet. A regular attendee at Embassy dinners and
receptions hosted by then-U.S. Ambassador Bandler
(1999-2002),Hadjimichael espoused the progressive,
pro-solution opinions then commonplace. His comments and
tone September 26 showed a man in the midst of a ideological
U-turn, however. Was he cloaking his natural hard-line
tendencies a half-decade ago to serve his Minister and
advance his career? Or is he now grudgingly adopting the
Turk-baiting tactics of the current administration in order
to do the same? We might ask the same questions of FM
Marcoullis, frankly, whose son reportedly constructed and
operated a pro-Annan Plan website during his mother's period
as ambassador in Washington. Regardless of which direction
Hadjimichael truly tilts, the position of Cyprus Problem
Director demands its incumbent defend Republic of Cyprus
(read, Greek Cypriot) interests at all costs. We therefore
expect to enjoy plenty of time on Hadjimichael's carpet,
justifying U.S. policies and programs. End Comment.

--------------
Biographical Snapshot
--------------


10. (U) Minas Hadjimichael, the MFA's Cyprus Problem Division
director, was born in Famagusta in 1956. After studying law
at the University of Athens, Hadjimichael continued his

NICOSIA 00000804 003.2 OF 003


postgraduate studies in the United States, receiving an M.A.
in Science and International Relations from Georgia Southern
University. He entered the Republic of Cyprus Foreign
Service in 1984, commencing work in the Cyprus Problem
Division. Rising quickly through the ranks, he became
Minister-Counselor and Deputy Chief of Mission at the RoC
embassy in Athens in 1995. In 1998, he returned home to
serve as director of the Foreign Minister's office under
then-FM (and current presidential candidate) Ioannis
Kasoulides. He subsequently participated in the
inter-communal, UN-brokered Cyprus Problem negotiations. By
2002 he had earned an ambassadorial rank, and later that year
won a dream posting as Cypriot ambassador to France.


11. (C) In addition to his U.S. graduate school education,
Hadjimichael in 1999 participated in a USIA-sponsored
visitor's program titled "The U.S. Federal System.8 During
his tenure as Kasoulides's office director, he proved a
regular and close Embassy contact. His posting to Paris may
not have been simply reward for great performance as chef du
cabinet. Scuttlebutt here says the (still) married
Hadjimichael was caught en flagrante with his Minister's
secretary, hastening his transfer to the overseas position.

SIPDIS
SCHLICHER