TWO OF THE PRESIDENTIAL HOPEFULS OUTLINE THEIR CYPRUS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000777

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY
SUBJECT: TWO OF THE PRESIDENTIAL HOPEFULS OUTLINE THEIR CYPRUS
PROBLEM POLICY


1. (SBU) Summary: In televised press conferences on September 11
and 14, President Tassos Papadopoulos and Democratic Rally
(DISY)-backed presidential candidate Ioannis Kasoulides outlined
their Cyprus problem policy - the top issue of every national
election campaign. Papadopoulos confirmed that his rejection of the
2004 Annan Plan will be the cornerstone of his campaign. Though he
recognized that the "July 8 process" of 2006 is yet to take off, he
insisted that it was the only way forward and squarely blamed the
Turkish side for the lack of progress. In stark contrast,
Kasoulides focused almost exclusively on the future and on what
Cypriots should do to tackle the problem. He proposed upgrading and
fast-tracking the UN-sponsored July 8 process in order to start
comprehensive talks as soon as possible. Highlighting the need for
unanimity among Greek Cypriot parties, he suggested that the
National Council undertakes the task of formulating a commonly
acceptable solution framework which would serve as the Greek Cypriot
proposal at the intercommunal negotiations. End Summary.

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Papadopoulos Promises No Change to his Cyprus Policy
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2. A week after his meeting with Turkish Cypriot Mehmet Ali Talat,
which failed to get the UN-brokered July 8 Agreement off the ground,
President Papadopoulos told viewers during a televised press
conference on September 11 that he intended to continue the same
policy on the Cyprus issue. He stressed that he will insist on the
implementation of the July 8 Agreement encouraged by the
determination of the UN Security Council and other important
countries to make this process work. He also revealed that he was
"aware of initiatives already undertaken in this direction." He
admitted that his September 5 meeting with the Turkish Cypriot
leader did not yield a positive result but blamed this squarely on
the Turkish Cypriot side's lack of political will to implement the
July 8 Agreement. He quashed criticisms that his insistence on the
"stalled" July 8 process prolonged the deadlock and essentially
consolidated the de facto partition of the island, saying that the
international community does not favor partition but on the contrary
strongly supports the July 8 process. He emphasized that the July 8
process was important because it was designed to bring about a new
basis for a comprehensive Cyprus solution and thus cast away the
Annan Plan. It is for this reason, he said, that Turkey and the
Turkish side are doing all they can to get rid of the July 8
agreement. He lashed back at the opposition asking whether it would
be wise to abandon a process that is strongly supported by at least
four of the USNC Permanent Members. He went on to charge that the
fifth member, thought its representatives in Cyprus, argues that
since the process has failed, it should be abandoned and replaced
with a new one. A day later, the state-run Cyprus Broadcasting
Corporation (CyBC),"disclosed" that it is Britain that was less
than stalwart in its support of the July 8 process. Since this
press episode, the British have made clear that HMG indeed does
support July 8, but believes that the process is sufficiently
flexible that both sides should be able to find a mutually-agreed
way forward.


3. In an apparent attempt to draw from the 76 percent cent "no"
vote pool, Papadopoulos repeatedly stressed the correctness of the
decision to reject the Annan Plan. He asserted that "the worst has
been avoided with the rejection of the Annan Plan" in April 2006 and
"reminded" the electorate that acceptance would have resulted in the
dissolution of the Cyprus Republic. He painted a rosy picture of the
current state of the Cyprus issue claiming that he succeeded in
overcoming prejudices against the Greek Cypriot side created
internationally as a result of the rejection of the UNSYG's plan,
and at the same time averted the Turkish plans of securing
international recognition of the "pseudostate."


4. Responding to criticisms that the status of Turkish Cypriot
leader Talat was improving as evidenced by his meetings with senior
officials internationally, Papadopoulos angrily responded that Talat
"never" received an official invitation nor had he any official
meetings in a ministry or government office. He retorted that most
of Talat's meetings take place in restaurants. The following days,
opposition papers carried photographs of the Turkish Cypriot
leader's meetings with Secretary of State Rice, President Musharraf
of Pakistan, and EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn.


5. In a statement that caused a sensation as it is out of his
character to admit a mistake, Papadopoulos said that he regretted
accepting the UNSYG's arbitration on the Annan Plan in February

2004. He was quick to shift blame, though, saying that the UNSYG
did not honor the three conditions that Papadopoulos had put forward
and the UN official had accepted in writing. He commented with a
sigh "I guess the UN is not what it used to be." Papadopoulos also
charged that past concessions made by President Vassiliou and
President Clerides to the Turkish demand that a solution be approved
in a referendum left him with no choice but to put the plan to a
referendum. Explaining the reason he disagrees with the holding of
a referendum, he said this was an issue of fundamental importance
because a referendum is a system of establishing a new state.
Without a referendum, a solution would constitute an evolution of
the existing state, he said.


6. Asked to clarify his position on a bizonal, bicommunal
federation, Papadopoulos said that he is committed to this form of a
solution but added that there is a disagreement on the
interpretation of the term bizonal. He said this term does not
exist legally and went on to say that the Greek Cypriot side does
not accept that the term bizonal means the creation of two
ethnically-pure areas. His remarks disturbed Papadopoulos' former
coalition partner AKEL, which warned that Papadopoulos risked
damaging the Greek Cypriot side's credibility by casting doubt over
its commitment to a bizonal, bicommunal federation.

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Kasoulides Advocates Pro-active Cyprus Policy
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7. DISY-backed, independent presidential candidate Kasoulides
analyzed in a press conference on September 14 his proposal for
breaking the current deadlock and opening the way for a
comprehensive Cyprus settlement. Emphasizing the need for practical
ways to promote unanimity among the Greek Cypriot parties, he
proposed an intra-Greek Cypriot process to formulate a widely
acceptable solution framework which he dubbed "National Agreement on
a Solution Framework". At the same time, he stressed the importance
of injecting new life in the July 8 Agreement by simplifying,
upgrading and speeding up its implementation, in order to allow the
start of comprehensive talks.


8. Elaborating on his proposal for an intra-Greek Cypriot agreement,
Kasoulides said that if elected he would appoint for this purpose a
team of prestigious constitutional and international law experts and
economists who would work under his political supervision and within
a fixed timetable. He envisaged an agreement based on the
following: 1) the 1977 Makarios-Denktash, 1979 Kyprianou-Denktash,
and July 8, 2006 Papadopoulos-Talat agreement; 2) the positive
elements of the various UN proposals of the past; 3) UNSC decisions;
and 4) experiences gathered from federal systems in other parts of
Europe and the rest of the world. The product of their work would
then be discussed at the National Council to be turned into a
"national agreement" and eventually presented as the Greek Cypriot
position at the intercommunal negotiations.


9. To make his Cyprus solution proposal a success story, Kasoulides
said it should be supported by the four pillars, which are the basic
planks of his platform: unity of the people which could be achieved
by turning the "yes" and "no" of the past to "together"; restoration
of Cyprus' credibility abroad and establishment of the Cyprus
problem as a problem of occupation of EU territory; "correct"
utilization of Turkey's relations with the European Union and its
desires for accession by engaging the EU in the effort for a Cyprus
solution; and the immediate pursuit of a Cyprus-origin solution plan
that would result from substantive negotiations with the Turkish
Cypriot side on the basis of the "National Agreement on a Solution
Framework."


10. Kasoulides stated that he intended to involve Greece in the
efforts for a solution and would also seek powerful international
and European guarantees for the implementation of a Cyprus solution
without any deviations. He stressed that the agreement should
provide for mechanisms that would guarantee the return to the
current status should Turkey fail to meets its obligations emanating
from the solution.


11. Predictably, Kasoulides's proposal was quickly dismissed by his
opponents. GOC spokesman Vassilis Palmas described it as "vague to
the point that it sounds like an oracle" and pointed out that a
Cyprus solution remains elusive due to Turkey's refusal to
cooperate. AKEL reacted even more strongly branding his proposal as
dangerous and potentially catastrophic. AKEL spokesman Nicos
Katsourides said the process proposed by Kasoulides could have grave
consequences since it constituted a deviation from the UN framework
and marginalized the role of the UN but also of Russia and China
which played a crucial role in the UNSYC in favor of the ROC.

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Comment
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12. As expected, in this first presentation of their Cyprus
problem positions, Papadopoulos and Kasoulides tried to pull the
electorate in exact opposite directions: the former to pin them down
to the past and the latter to force them to peek into their future.
The state of the Cyprus issue in the months leading up to the
February 2008 elections will be an important factor in vindicating
each candidate's positions and determining people's choice. The
lack of progress towards a solution, coupled with developments in
northern Cyprus and in the EU perceived by Greek Cypriots as actions
consolidating the partition of the island, favor to some extent
Papadopoulos' two main opponents.