Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NICOSIA685
2007-08-22 15:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

TALAT WILL MEET, BUT IS WARY OF PAPADAPOULOS'S

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU 
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221534Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8095
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0928
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000685 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: TALAT WILL MEET, BUT IS WARY OF PAPADAPOULOS'S
INTENTIONS

REF: A. NICOSIA 675

B. NICOSIA 674

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000685

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: TALAT WILL MEET, BUT IS WARY OF PAPADAPOULOS'S
INTENTIONS

REF: A. NICOSIA 675

B. NICOSIA 674

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Domestic political concerns -- mainly the
need to show Greek Cypriot voters that their president sought
a Cyprus Problem solution -- was driving Tassos
Papadopoulos's push for a meeting of community leaders, "TRNC
President" Mehmet Ali Talat told the Ambassador August 20.
Despite reluctance to tender Papadapoulos any electoral
assistance, Talat had agreed to meet, and Turkish Cypriot
negotiator Rashit Pertev would attempt August 21 to negotiate
a date with counterpart Tasos Tzionis (Note: they agreed to
September 5). Turning to the August 18 hijacking of a
Turkish jetliner flight that originated in northern Cyprus,
Talat concurred that T/C aviation experts should revisit
procedures at Ercan airport, and that T/C law enforcement
should cooperate with USG counterparts to confirm or disprove
the hijackers' alleged al-Qaeda connection. On petroleum
exploration in Cypriot waters and the recently-concluded
first bidding round (Ref A),Talat again argued that
Papadopoulos was playing electoral games; worse, the "Greek
Cypriot President" had no right to represent the entire
island in negotiating international treaties.


2. (C) His visage grew even grimmer when discussing
interfaith dialogue and Cyprus's most visible religious
leaders. South of the Green Line, the Archbishop had dropped
all attempts at cloaking his hard-line political leanings and
in essence had become Papadopoulos's second spokesman, Talat
claimed (Septel). He himself had erred in nominating the
now-departed Mufti, a reputed hard-partying womanizer and
world-class name-dropper whose activities had brought shame
on his community (Ref B). On domestic T/C politics, the
"President" avoided showing his cards on the future of the
CTP-OP coalition and downplayed possibilities the "TRNC"
would swap out its parliamentary system for a presidential
one. Talat concluded the conversation with assurances the
"government" would protect the pristine Karpass Peninsula

from unbridled development, a growing fear now that
high-voltage electrical power has nearly reached its tip
(Septel). END SUMMARY.

--------------
Agreement to Meet, but Doubts Over Usefulness
--------------


3. (C) Talat remained skeptical of RoC President
Papadopoulos's intentions vis-a-vis a possible meeting of
community leaders. "Papadopoulos needs this meeting to show
his electorate and the international community he has not
abandoned the bizonal, bicommunal solution," he declared to
the Ambassador. Despite his desire not to throw the
hard-line President an electoral lifeline, Talat -- no doubt
trying to mitigate the damage to his international reputation
wrought by the last several months of clear obstructionism in
the UN process -- had agreed to meet, instructing negotiator
Pertev to seek an early date. "The closer we get to the UN
General Assembly, the more spin he'll put on the
get-together," he asserted. Talat doubted any substantive
breakthroughs would occur, but agreed with the Ambassador's
assertion that the high-level gathering offered an
opportunity to improve the negative climate currently
characterizing bicommunal relations. (Note: Meeting under
UNFICYP auspices August 21, community representatives Tzionis
and Pertev set a September 5 date for their respective
leaders to meet; UN SRSG Michael Moller will host the
widely-anticipated gathering at his Nicosia residence.)


4. (C) Talat plainly hoped Papadopoulos would lose the
February's RoC presidential elections. The candidacy of AKEL
General Secretary Dimitris Christofias had resulted in the
first "truly democratic" campaign in Greek Cypriot history,
he argued. "Before, it was all coalitions. Kyprianou,
Vasiliou -- what support did they have individually, 10
percent?" he questioned. Now, however, G/Cs would enjoy a
real choice, and Talat hoped they would cast their ballot
against the incumbent. He particularly appreciated
DISY-supported challenger Ioannis Kasoulides's announcement
he would seek to meet Talat as his first official duty.

--------------
Ercan Hijacking: Relief Over Outcome
--------------


5. (C) Ercan Airport had returned to normal after the August
18 hijacking, Talat revealed. Relieved that Turkish police

NICOSIA 00000685 002 OF 004


in Antalya had reported the "plastique" the hijackers carried
in reality was Playdough -- indicating no security breach had
occurred at Ercan -- he now was directing his attention and
ire at the "know-it-all" Turkish Cypriot journalists who had
leveled charges of incompetence at T/C aviation authorities.
The Ambassador shared his relief, but pressed Talat to
exploit the hijacking by reviewing aviation security
procedures in north Cyprus; even if existing procedures were
effective, cautioned the Ambassador, such incidents provided
an opportunity to review whether measures could be further
improved. Further, while personally skeptical, the
Ambassador voiced great concern over reports of the
Palestinian suspect's alleged al-Qaeda links, and urged
seamless cooperation between USG and relevant law enforcement
in investigating whether the reports had any basis in fact.
Talat agreed the allegation merited further checking and
close coordination.

--------------
On Oil, Obliged to Seek Own Deal
--------------


6. (C) "For inter-communal political gain" also described
Papadopoulos's motivations for exploitation of Cyprus's
offshore oil and gas reserves, Talat reasoned, alleging the
President would manage the bidding process to eke out every
last vote. Under the current state of affairs, with Turkish
Cypriots excluded from the Republic of Cyprus machinery, G/Cs
had no right to negotiate treaties on behalf of the entire
island, he emphasized. "Regrettably we don't have the
military to stop them," a rather odd comment given the
balance of forces on the island. On the other hand, Turkey
would act decisively in defense of Turkish Cypriot interests.
Talat offered no convincing argument why his "government's"
own hydrocarbon agreement with Turkey passed muster, while
the RoC's with Egypt and Lebanon did not. "Ours was
negotiated by a previous 'administration' and never
implemented," he lamely offered. Nonetheless, were the RoC
to continue with the tendering and exploitation process,
Talat felt obliged to reciprocate.


7. (C) Continuing the negative run, the T/C leader protested
the Embassy's alleged statements of support for the RoC's
gas/oil decisions. The USG had voiced a narrow opinion
solely on the legality of sovereign states to negotiate
international instruments, the Ambassador retorted; our
alleged "broader support" was the product of Commerce
Minister Antonis Michaelides and other RoC officials
publicizing (and altering the content of) private
conversations. He reiterated the Embassy's fundamental
message: that any plans and activities to exploit Cyprus's
mineral wealth should benefit all Cypriots and serve to edge
the sides closer together, and that all parties should chart
their actions according to how the possibility of new mineral
wealth could facilitate reunification, not deepen divisions.
Talat dismissed out of hand the Ambassador's suggestion to
Michaelides that the RoC deposit a percentage of possible
future energy royalties into a separate fund for T/Cs. "We
would never accept it," he assured. "Neither did
Papadopoulos," the Ambassador responded.

-------------- --------------
Will No One Rid Me of this Priest...and this Mufti?
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Talat's Communist roots emerged in discussing the
island's two most-prominent clerics. "By shining spotlights
on religious leaders and emphasizing their importance," Talat
accused, "the U.S. created people like (Orthodox Archbishop)
Chrysostomos," leader of the Church of Cyprus. Concentrating
such power in spiritual figures seemed anachronistic in
modern times, he thought. Conversely, in the Turkish Cypriot
community the position of "Mufti" held real power only during
the British colonial period (1871-1960); the last Mufti,
Ahmet Yonluer, was in fact only a mid-level civil servant in
the Religious Affairs department. Talat admitted to having
erred in naming the ambitious, unpredictable, and
anything-but-pious Yonluer to the position last year.
Claiming that interfaith dialogue actually had deteriorated
during the Mufti's tenure despite the latter's high-profile
meeting with Chrysostomos, Talat was untroubled by his August
resignation.


9. (C) Talat reserved his harshest appraisal for the
Archbishop's recent rantings. "It is simply not possible to
cooperate with this Church," he stated matter-of-factly,
pointing to Chrysostomos's hard-line interventions into Greek
Cypriot politics. He disparaged the Archbishop's intentions

NICOSIA 00000685 003 OF 004


to rehabilitate every Orthodox site in northern Cyprus as a
thinly-veiled attempt to re-exert authority there, promising
to fight the effort. Nonetheless, "TRNC officials" would
continue to preserve religious properties and ensure that
Christian minorities enclaved in the north could freely
practice their faith. "At the same time, the Greeks are
bulldozing mosques and entire T/C villages in the south, yet
the international community punishes us," he decried. The
Ambassador, after declaring that religious freedom issues are
vital in any case, told Talat that Turkish Cypriots had a
very strong interest in cooperating with Church figures in
the preservation of churches and other cultural heritage
sites, and that they should also seek to maintain their own
sites in the south. Such actions helped to mend relations
between the communities and help to address in foreign
capitals a very potent weapon that T/C enemies used against
them.

--------------
Coalition Holding, for Now
--------------


10. (C) Dodging the Ambassador's inquiries over the health
and continued viability of the CTP-OP coalition, Talat
claimed such political maneuverings lay squarely in "Prime
Minister" Ferdi Soyer's lap. The OP arrangement had proven a
mistake, he offered, but the alternative -- bringing DP back
into "government" -- was worse. "I do not trust (DP leader)
Serdar Denktash's intentions, Talat explained. As to
recently-floated plans to seek "constitutional" changes that
would exchange the "TRNC's" parliamentary system for a
presidential one, the T/C leader acknowledged a possible
positive outcome: reducing the impact of internal party
politics on governance. Entrenched leaders across the
political spectrum likely would oppose the move, Talat
surmised, and the exigencies of changing the "TRNC
Constitution " -- a two-thirds majority in "Parliament," and
a referendum decision on every article -- looked impossible
to meet.

-------------- ---
Karpass: Serve the Citizens, not the Developers
-------------- ---


11. (C) Turkish Cypriot media had inflated the negative
effects on the environment of the "government's" decision to
bring high-voltage power to Karpass's tip, Talat alleged.
One specific complaint, that the line's current vastly
exceeded the needs of the few T/Cs residing there, was
explained on technical grounds: high voltage was required to
transmit electricity great distances. "Environmentalists
should not doubt my credentials," he asserted, pointing to
his efforts in 1995 when, as acting "Minister of Agriculture"
and "Minister of Environment," he had pushed the "Council of
Ministers" to declare parts of Karpass a "national" park.
Now, his "government" sought to upgrade the "COM" decision
into "law" in order to safeguard the area's fragile, unique
ecosystem. Casting some doubt on his green intentions,
however, Talat noted that authorities concurrently were
crafting a "balanced" development plan that weighed the needs
of preservationists, Karpass residents and land owners, and
developers alike.

--------------
Comment
--------------


12. (C) Mehmet Ali Talat appeared drained August 20, whether
from normal "presidential" stress or something worse
(persistent rumors claim he suffers from prostate or another
form of cancer). We have no better guess than his weak
constitution to explain Talat's self-contradictory, off-base
arguments over negotiating rights for oil and gas
exploration, for example. Not so illogical were his
observations on Papadopoulos's intentions at the upcoming
leaders' meetings -- undoubtedly the President seeks to
burnish his pro-solution ("but a solution that benefits Greek
Cypriots, unlike the Annan Plan") credentials in hopes of
winning more votes. Our most recent response to Talat echoed
the Embassy's recommendations the moment July 8 was signed:
walk in prepared to talk substance. If Papadapoulos engages
seriously, both sides win. If not, you'll have smoked out
the President's true intentions and can hang the intransigent
label on him. Talat seems to be thinking similarly; our UN
contacts report that T/C representative Pertev voiced his
boss's eagerness to meet Papadopoulos September 5, sans
preconditions.


NICOSIA 00000685 004 OF 004



13. (C) Talat's commentary on the state of interfaith
dialogue troubles us. Not that he's wrong on Chrysostomos,
whom we suspect desires to replace "Archbishop" with
"Ethnarch" on his calling cards. Talat has failed, though,
to see real ideological divisions within the Church that he
could exploit to bring the communities closer together. We
see similar naivete (or worse, obfuscation) in his conviction
that a "government" promise alone will prevent Kyrenia-style
development from following the voltage to Karpass.
SCHLICHER