Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NICOSIA669
2007-08-17 09:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

PRESIDENTIAL CHALLENGER KASOULIDES SEES OUTLOOK

Tags:  KDEM PGOV PREL CY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2874
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0669/01 2290921
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 170921Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8076
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0925
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000669 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2022
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL CY
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CHALLENGER KASOULIDES SEES OUTLOOK
IMPROVING

REF: NICOSIA 136

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, reason 1.4 (b)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000669

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2022
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL CY
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CHALLENGER KASOULIDES SEES OUTLOOK
IMPROVING

REF: NICOSIA 136

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, reason 1.4 (b)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ebullient and outgoing as ever,
DISY-supported presidential candidate Ioannis Kasoulides
displayed a new air in a recent meeting with EmbOffs:
confidence. Just two months ago, certain he faced a
Herculean challenge in defeating incumbent Cypriot President
Tassos Papadopoulos, Kasoulides considered the July "coming
out" of AKEL candidate Dimitris Christofias -- and the
subsequent collapse of Papadopoulos's three-party coalition
-- an unbelievable boon to his chances. Now, both
DISY-commissioned and public polling show the three
candidates in a near-dead heat, and Kasoulides plans to take
advantage of the positive momentum. Working in his favor is
a Cyprus Problem strategy different and superior to his
competitors'. Not all is rosy, however; Papadopoulos
continues to wield considerable sway with Cyprus's media
barons, vital to a successful campaign, and Christofias
enjoys AKEL's impressive machinery and party discipline. The
race should be grueling and tough to call. END SUMMARY.

--------------
POLL RESULTS BUOY KASOULIDES'S CONFIDENCE
--------------


2. (C) Kasoulides asserted August 10 that DISY supporters
were rallying to his candidacy faster than expected.
Traditionally, DISY backers did not close ranks until just
before the election, he explained, but recent
party-commissioned polls showed internal support for
Kasoulides already reaching 75 percent. As to the general
public's support for the candidates, the polling showed him
holding steady, Christofias rising, and the President
sinking. Kasoulides anticipated that more DISY supporters
would back his candidacy as the election approached, and he
expected to reach the second round having garnered at least
one-third of the popular vote. Should his opponent in Round
2 be the Communist leader, he predicted an easy victory; a
runoff campaign against Papadopoulos looked far harder.
(Note: A recent "Politis" newspaper poll predicted results
very similar to DISY's.)

--------------
CHALLENGERS CLOSING

--------------


4. (C) Papadopoulos remained the man to beat, Kasoulides
admitted, but his lead was dwindling fast. He suspected the
President's decline stemmed from his lack of a reliable base.
Aside from his own DIKO party -- whose size was dwarfed by
DISY's and AKEL's -- Papadopoulos had only the stated backing
of smaller parties EDEK and EUROKO; summed, and assuming a
small number of turncoats, they weren't sufficient to get him
to the second round. Working in Papadopoulos's favor,
however, was his near-total command of Cyprus's largest media
outlets. Kasoulides claimed some progress with the DIAS
Group, and MEGA TV so far had resisted part-owner Archbishop
Chrysostomos's pressure to support Papadopoulos's run, but
ANTENNA1 and several prominent Cyprus Broadcasting
Corporation journalists continued to back the incumbent.
Further, the President could still offer political pork,
exploit the July 8 Agreement, and manage the oil exploration
process for political gain. All, however -- especially the
oil matter, were Turkey to react strongly -- were
double-edged swords, exploitable as well by the opposition.


5. (C) Unabashedly, Kasoulides admitted his newfound
prospects were purely a product of Christofias entering the
race, resulting in the collapse of Papadopoulos's three-party
coalition. AKEL's announcement had split Papadopoulos's
support and opened the door for his candidacy to achieve
relevancy and legitimacy. In Round 1, Kasoulides expected
Christofias to level criticism at Papadopoulos's inflexible
post-referendum stance and to stick to AKEL's "wooden,"
unimaginative language on the Cyprus Problem. The Communists
held a great advantage with their legendary party machinery
and discipline, however. Such assets alone gave Christofias
a valid chance at a second-round appearance.

--------------
ALL CYPRUS PROBLEM, ALL THE TIME
--------------


6. (C) Despite a wealth of other issues to tackle, from
tourism woes to the euro's onset, Kasoulides expected the
Cyprus Problem would dominate the election campaign. Here he

NICOSIA 00000669 002 OF 002


took pains to differentiate his program from his
competitors'. To jump-start the stalled July 8 process and
bring meaningful progress to the local negotiations,
Kasoulides proposed to shrink the list of committee/working
group discussion topics and focus more on day-to-day,
practical matters. Believing that July 8 was the only
process capable of returning leaders from both communities to
the negotiating table, Kasoulides requested that the USG push
T/C leader Mehmet Ali Talat to meet with Papadopoulos and not
attempt to interfere with the Greek Cypriot elections. In
light of Papadopoulos's recent failures to secure meetings
with Talat, Kasoulides vowed to meet the T/C chief as his
first act as president. Further, he would propose that each
side undertake unilateral goodwill measures for the other's
benefit. As an example, he would be willing to offer "trade"
and recognition of Turkish Cypriot universities if Talat
reciprocated by returning the closed city of Varosha or
declaring a moratorium on G/C property development in the
north. Kasoulides would also push for an immediate opening
of the Ledra Street crossing, overcoming the impasse over
where the "border" actually lay by requesting both sides to
delay its resolution until after related final settlement
negotiations had commenced.

--------------
THE BREAKUP: MANNA FROM HEAVEN
--------------


7. (C) COMMENT: Had AKEL remained a coalition partner,
Kasoulides would have faced near-certain defeat in February.
As evidenced by the early polling, however, the three-party
breakup in July has made the opposition candidate a bona fide
contender, at least to advance to the second round. His
prospects for success in Round 1 hinge on securing 90-plus
percent support from DISY voters and garnering a big chunk of
the undecideds, which currently number around 10 percent (he
likely will peel off few committed DIKO and AKEL voters).
Kasoulides's main weakness remains his earlier support of the
2004 Annan Plan reunification effort -- although the
candidate does not espouse a return to Annan, both
Papadopoulos and Christofias are sure to refresh the
electorate's memory of his "YES" vote at every opportunity.
END COMMENT.
SCHLICHER