PAPADOPOULOS CONFIDENT ON RE-ELECTION PROSPECTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000664

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2022
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: PAPADOPOULOS CONFIDENT ON RE-ELECTION PROSPECTS


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reason 1.4 (b)


1. (C) During the course of a visit to Cypriot President
Tassos Papadopoulos and his family at their beach house in
Protoras, Ambassador asked Papadopoulos for his thoughts on
the looming campaign. Papadopoulos,s first reply was that
"of the three of us, I think that my chances are best,
because the other two have already reached their maximum in
their ability to appeal to voters outside their party bases."
Papadopoulos added that AKEL's Christofias and DISY's
Kasoulides were doing relatively well in energizing their
respective party bases and creating "syspirosi8 (i.e.,
organizational elan and enthusiasm),but that a high degree
of "syspirosi" within these large parties actually hindered
their ability to attract votes outside these "clubs".


2. (C) Papadopoulos then commented that he thought he would
be able to hive off a significant percentage of AKEL voters,
though he acknowledged that the current polling did not augur
well in this respect; AKEL has a vocal "so-called peace
camp", said Papadopoulos, but this camp is much smaller than
the large segments of the rank-and-file who actually support
Papadopoulos's Cyprus policy. He predicted that, in the
coming months, we would see significant AKEL defections
toward his candidacy; while some such defections may be
high-profile, there would be many more in the privacy of the
voting booth in February. Papadopoulos also predicted that
he would pick up some DISY votes as well, not so much because
these voters liked him or his policy, but rather due to
internal jostlings inside DISY: "Just imagine", said
Papadopoulos, "Kasoulides,s campaign manager (DISY deputy
chair Averof Neophytou) is well-known as the person who tried
hardest to make sure that Kasoulides was not the party's
candidate." At the same time, continued Papadopoulos, his
own DIKO party would be strongly united, and defections
within his electoral ally EDEK would be minimal.


3. (C) Papadopoulos did not explicitly put the UN-led July 8
process in the context of the presidential campaign, but did
say that Turkish and Turkish Cypriot stalling on Cyprob
diplomacy worked to his political benefit. "When they send
the impression that somebody else would give them a better
deal, what message does this give the Greeks (note: by which
he means Greek Cypriots)? And when they talk endlessly of
the Annan Plan, they remind the Greeks of the many
fundamental things that the Greeks hated about the Plan."


4. (C) Ambassador noted to Papadopoulos that we are trying
to make sure that the U.S. is not the focus of the
presidential campaign; in particular, we want to avoid
encouraging or being dragged into the debate. We would look
strongly negatively on any candidate who seeks to campaign
against us, though we will try not to rise to the bait that
might be dangled in the next six months. Such campaigning,
continued the Ambassador, would be a clear substitute for a
debate on political ideas actually aimed at facilitating
reunification of the island. Ambassador, noting that he was
making the same points to all electoral camps, strongly hoped
for a campaign in which the three candidates sought to
discuss their ideas of where to go in and after 2008, not who
voted "yes" and who voted "no" in 2004, or who did what to
whom in 1974 or 1963. Papadopoulos in reply addressed one of
the Ambassador's points by declaring that he had no intention
of running against Washington; on the contrary, he was often
attacked by the opposition for being too close to the
Americans via his support for the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI),counter-terrorism cooperation, etc.


5. (C) Comment: Papadopoulos is tanned, rested, and ready
for the campaign. Despite several reports that suggest that
his in-house polling shows that he will have significant
trouble hiving off enough voters from the largest parties to
make it into the second round, Papadopoulos's confidence did
not seem feigned. Our guess is that Papadopoulos is still
betting that he is more clever and adept than his opponents,
and, more fundamentally, that he will somehow be able to
"nationalize" the campaign in a manner that turns what should
be a debate about the future course of the Cyprus problem
into a re-hash of the "yes" and "no" of the 2004 referendum.
End comment.
SCHLICHER