Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NICOSIA585
2007-07-12 11:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:
LILLIKAS ON PAPADOP'S POLITICAL FUTURE (AND HIS
how-toVZCZCXRO0521 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHNC #0585 1931133 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 121133Z JUL 07 FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7984 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 4993 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 3887 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0897
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000585
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2017
TAGS: CY PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: LILLIKAS ON PAPADOP'S POLITICAL FUTURE (AND HIS
OWN)
REF: A. NICOSIA 583
B. NICOSIA 579
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher for reason 1.5 (b).
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000585
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2017
TAGS: CY PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: LILLIKAS ON PAPADOP'S POLITICAL FUTURE (AND HIS
OWN)
REF: A. NICOSIA 583
B. NICOSIA 579
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher for reason 1.5 (b).
1. (C) In a one-on-one conversation on the evening of July
11, Foreign Minister Giorgos Lillikas, who earlier that day
had submitted his resignation to President Papadopoulos,
offered the Ambassador comments on the collapse of the
governing coalition and the upcoming presidential race.
Lillikas noted that, like the other ministers who had
submitted their resignations, he had been asked by
Papadopoulos to keep doing his job until a replacement had
been identified.
2. (C) Lillikas claimed that he and Papadopoulos had been
surprised that AKEL actually went ahead with plans to put
forth Christofias as a candidate. Objectively, said
Lillikas, the administration had been a success -- he cited
Cyprus,s accession to the EU, acceptance into the Eurozone,
strong economic growth rate, and "normalization" of AKEL in
Cypriot political life as proof. Yes, admitted Lillikas,
there had been differences over the Cyprus problem, but
Christofias had never raised these differences "in a profound
way" directly with the President or himself. Lillikas said
that, in the last two months, he had had several
conversations with Christofias aimed at keeping the coalition
together; in one conversation, said Lillikas, he had offered
to support Christofias in 2013 (instead of running himself).
Lillikas added that he had warned Christofias that those
within the party who were pushing him to run had neither
Christofias,s interest nor AKEL,s in mind. Rather,
continued Lillikas, those pushing for a Christofias candidacy
knew that Christofias could not win, but were betting that a
disastrous Christofias candidacy would force Christofias to
step down from the leadership of the party, thus giving the
"candidacy cheerleaders" the chance to grab the leadership
themselves. Lillikas said that Christofias seemed to
understand the downsides, but that, in the end, "ego" tilted
Christofias in favor of running.
3. (C) Ambassador asked how President Papadopoulos, with his
main coalition partner now fielding its own candidate, could
get the percentages necessary to get into a second round next
year. Lillikas replied that DIKO, the President's party,
would give him around 16 percent. Papadopoulos would also
retain about 80 percent of EDEK,s voters, which would yield
another 6 percent overall. EVROKO would add another 5
percent or so in the first round. Lillikas added that he
expected that a significant percentage of DISY and AKEL
voters, despite their parties, official support for the
other candidates, would, in the privacy of the voting booth,
support Papadopoulos. He also predicted that, over the next
long six months of campaigning, the current enthusiasm of the
AKEL cadres for Christofias,s candidacy would fray, and that
there would be several prominent public defections from AKEL
to Papadopoulos. Lillikas,s ultimate prediction was that
Papadopoulos would face Kasoulides in the second round, and
defeat him soundly. If Christofias edged out Kasoulides for
a slot in the second round, said Lillikas, Papadopoulos would
beat him even more soundly. Lillikas opined that it was
"impossible" that Papadopoulos would not make it into the
second round.
4. (C) As for himself, Lillikas said that he would spend the
next two weeks arranging the library in his (palatial) home,
then go on holiday with his family until the end of August,
"and then I will see what happens." Contrary to press
speculation, Lillikas did not confirm that he would serve as
Papadopoulos,s campaign spokesman. When asked about a role
in the President,s campaign, he instead said, "My heart is
with AKEL, but my head is with Papadopoulos."
5. (C) Comment: Lillikas has a history of choosing correctly
which potential political mentor can further his personal
interests, and hitching his wagon thereto. Despite his
confident predictions, Lillikas,s note of hesitation about
his future role in Papadopoulos,s campaign makes us think
that Lillikas, whose political instincts are keen, has not
truly decided which way the political wind is actually
blowing. End comment.
SCHLICHER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
FOR EUR/SE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2017
TAGS: CY PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: LILLIKAS ON PAPADOP'S POLITICAL FUTURE (AND HIS
OWN)
REF: A. NICOSIA 583
B. NICOSIA 579
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher for reason 1.5 (b).
1. (C) In a one-on-one conversation on the evening of July
11, Foreign Minister Giorgos Lillikas, who earlier that day
had submitted his resignation to President Papadopoulos,
offered the Ambassador comments on the collapse of the
governing coalition and the upcoming presidential race.
Lillikas noted that, like the other ministers who had
submitted their resignations, he had been asked by
Papadopoulos to keep doing his job until a replacement had
been identified.
2. (C) Lillikas claimed that he and Papadopoulos had been
surprised that AKEL actually went ahead with plans to put
forth Christofias as a candidate. Objectively, said
Lillikas, the administration had been a success -- he cited
Cyprus,s accession to the EU, acceptance into the Eurozone,
strong economic growth rate, and "normalization" of AKEL in
Cypriot political life as proof. Yes, admitted Lillikas,
there had been differences over the Cyprus problem, but
Christofias had never raised these differences "in a profound
way" directly with the President or himself. Lillikas said
that, in the last two months, he had had several
conversations with Christofias aimed at keeping the coalition
together; in one conversation, said Lillikas, he had offered
to support Christofias in 2013 (instead of running himself).
Lillikas added that he had warned Christofias that those
within the party who were pushing him to run had neither
Christofias,s interest nor AKEL,s in mind. Rather,
continued Lillikas, those pushing for a Christofias candidacy
knew that Christofias could not win, but were betting that a
disastrous Christofias candidacy would force Christofias to
step down from the leadership of the party, thus giving the
"candidacy cheerleaders" the chance to grab the leadership
themselves. Lillikas said that Christofias seemed to
understand the downsides, but that, in the end, "ego" tilted
Christofias in favor of running.
3. (C) Ambassador asked how President Papadopoulos, with his
main coalition partner now fielding its own candidate, could
get the percentages necessary to get into a second round next
year. Lillikas replied that DIKO, the President's party,
would give him around 16 percent. Papadopoulos would also
retain about 80 percent of EDEK,s voters, which would yield
another 6 percent overall. EVROKO would add another 5
percent or so in the first round. Lillikas added that he
expected that a significant percentage of DISY and AKEL
voters, despite their parties, official support for the
other candidates, would, in the privacy of the voting booth,
support Papadopoulos. He also predicted that, over the next
long six months of campaigning, the current enthusiasm of the
AKEL cadres for Christofias,s candidacy would fray, and that
there would be several prominent public defections from AKEL
to Papadopoulos. Lillikas,s ultimate prediction was that
Papadopoulos would face Kasoulides in the second round, and
defeat him soundly. If Christofias edged out Kasoulides for
a slot in the second round, said Lillikas, Papadopoulos would
beat him even more soundly. Lillikas opined that it was
"impossible" that Papadopoulos would not make it into the
second round.
4. (C) As for himself, Lillikas said that he would spend the
next two weeks arranging the library in his (palatial) home,
then go on holiday with his family until the end of August,
"and then I will see what happens." Contrary to press
speculation, Lillikas did not confirm that he would serve as
Papadopoulos,s campaign spokesman. When asked about a role
in the President,s campaign, he instead said, "My heart is
with AKEL, but my head is with Papadopoulos."
5. (C) Comment: Lillikas has a history of choosing correctly
which potential political mentor can further his personal
interests, and hitching his wagon thereto. Despite his
confident predictions, Lillikas,s note of hesitation about
his future role in Papadopoulos,s campaign makes us think
that Lillikas, whose political instincts are keen, has not
truly decided which way the political wind is actually
blowing. End comment.
SCHLICHER