"TRNC" PROPERTY COMMISSION GATHERING STEAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000507

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY TU
SUBJECT: "TRNC" PROPERTY COMMISSION GATHERING STEAM

REF: NICOSIA 2010

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Jane Zimmerman, Reasons 1.4 (b),
(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Established in 2005 as a "local remedy" for
Greek Cypriots seeking redress over confiscated property in
northern Cyprus, the "TRNC Property Commission" is gaining
visibility and, in certain circles, acceptance. Over 180
G/Cs have petitioned the Commission seeking restitution of
land, compensation, or property exchange, with 22 cases
closed so far. This figure is likely to skyrocket if the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) declares the Commission
an effective local remedy; the ECHR determination could come
as early as this year. The institution has proven
controversial on both sides of the Green Line. In the north,
Turkish Cypriot nationalists decry its "traitorous"
decisions, while in the government-controlled area,
rank-and-file Greek Cypriots' use of the "illegal" Commission
both fosters and is indicative of growing frustration with
the RoC's preference for a legalistic, vice political
approach, to solving property elements of the Cyprus Problem.
G/C leaders and their media allies have not surrendered,
however, and are proposing legal restrictions over citizens'
access to the T/C institution. Most here predict that,
regardless of "illegality" and social pressures, growing
numbers of Greek Cypriots will file with the "TRNC Property
Commission" as long as it continues to outpace the ECHR in
bringing cases to amicable conclusions -- and as long as
Turkey keeps footing the bill. END SUMMARY.

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Commission Roots in Strasbourg
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2. (SBU) The "TRNC Property Commission" owes its existence
to Greek Cypriot Myra Xenides-Arestis, who owns property in
the Turkish military-controlled closed city of Varosha. At
the ECHR in 1998, Arestis filed suit against "occupying
power" Turkey for violating her rights by denying her access
to her property. The ECHR found in her favor in a 2005
preliminary ruling and ordered Turkey -- as the true
governing power in the north -- to provide relief to the
plaintiff. Further, the ruling stipulated that the "TRNC,"
while not sovereign, nonetheless represented a "subordinate
local authority" of Turkey, capable of providing redress to
other G/C plaintiffs. Under the preliminary finding, the
ECHR instructed Turkey and the "TRNC" to design and implement
an "effective local remedy;" only after future plaintiffs
exhausted it could property cases be referred to Strasbourg,
the ruling continued (Reftel).


3. (SBU) In response, "TRNC" authorities redesigned their
Denktash-era Property Commission so that Greek Cypriot
claimants could request compensation for, or restitution of,
their property in the north. It made its first offers to G/C
applicants in June 2006, just shy of an ECHR-mandated
deadline. Six months later, a subsequent ECHR ruling on
Arestis accepted "in principle" the "TRNC" entity as a local
remedy. Turkey and T/Cs welcomed the decision, which both
conferred a degree of indirect legitimacy on the T/C body and
might eventually absolve Turkey of responsibility for 1400
pending cases in the ECHR docket. Predictably, Greek
Cypriots evinced disgust at the prospect of being forced to
seek redress from the "illegal occupation regime."

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From a Trickle to a Stream
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4. (SBU) Despite stifling governmental and social pressure
not to countenance the "illegal state" Commission --
editorials regularly urge G/C landowners' to put their
community's interests before their own, despite certain
holdings' reaching well into the millions in value -- Greek
Cypriots continue to file applications. According to "TRNC"
statistics released the week of May 28, 178 G/Cs had
deposited paperwork at its offices in north Nicosia, and
commissioners had closed over twenty cases, the majority for
cash payments.


5. (C) Press coverage of the Commission's activities spiked
the same week, as news of Strasbourg's latest ruling on
Arestis spurred general interest in property matters. In its
May 23 finding, the ECHR denied both Arestis's final appeal
and Turkey's as well, ordering Ankara to pay over $1 million
for loss of use, moral damages, and legal costs. Arestis had
solicited the Court to rule on the effectiveness of the
Commission, which it refused to do. Her attorney, Achilleas

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Demetriades, told us June 1 that the ECHR likely will make
that determination as it processes any of the 32 G/C property
cases currently admitted, but not yet heard (two other,
prominent G/C property cases are nearing completion.) Rather
than focusing on the positives of the ECHR's Arestis ruling
-- Demetriades claimed it set the price for Turkey's
continuing occupation of Famagusta at $50 million per month
-- G/C media instead focused on Strasbourg's decision to
delay a final finding on the Commission's effectiveness,
worried the Court would confer legitimacy to the "TRNC"
institution.


6. (SBU) Also contributing to the south's gloom on property
were accounts of increasing volumes of inter-communal
property transfers occurring directly between buyers and
sellers. Not only were Greek Cypriots reducing their
holdings in the north with T/Cs and foreign buyers, but G/Cs
were buying Turkish Cypriot land in the south -- and evicting
G/C "refugees" the government had settled there from 1974
onward. Contrasting with the negativity in the
government-controlled areas, property optimism has reigned
among T/C opinion leaders. Media have led the charge,
incorrectly spinning the ECHR's decision to deny Arestis's
appeal by claiming it had confirmed the Commission's
effectiveness.

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Commissioners Hard at Work
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7. (C) Seeking a first-hand picture of operations, Emboffs
June 6 called on Chief Commissioner Sumer Erkmen and
Commissioner Gongor Gunkan. Four additional G/Cs had filed
applications since the spate of press reporting, Erkmen
claimed, bringing the total caseload to 182. She provided a
breakdown of the Commission's work since its inception:

-- 182 cases accepted;
-- four cases voluntarily withdrawn by plaintiffs for various
reasons (to include, inter alia, unhappiness with Commission
offers, societal pressures, decision to file with G/C courts
or ECHR);
-- 22 cases closed, in the following manner:
-- 17 owners awarded compensation, with 12 already having
received payment, the total exceeding $20 million)
-- three owners awarded restitution of properties located in
Akanthou (2) and Leonarisso.
-- two cases closed with property swaps, i.e., Greek Cypriots
agreed to exchange their properties for T/C-owned land in the
government-controlled south. One previously had filed a case
with the ECHR; under Commission modalities, he must now order
the Court to terminate proceedings.


8. (C) Erken qualified all 22 as "friendly," final
settlements; G/Cs unhappy with Commission decisions had
recourse to a higher "TRNC" court, although none so far had
taken that decision. Of the restitution awards, likely to
spawn more controversy, she ventured the G/C owners were
unlikely to relocate to the mostly Turkish settler-inhabited
villages. Two, in fact, resided permanently in Greece.
Despite their placement in the "closed" category, Erken
agreed that consummating the two property exchanges looked
difficult, since the Republic of Cyprus Land Registry likely
needed to approve both transactions. Said approval would
violate the RoC's property guardianship law, which put all
T/C-owned properties under the government's sole control
until a final settlement of the Cyprus Problem was reached.


9. (C) Media portrayals that indicated the ECHR considered
the Commission an effective local remedy were indeed
premature, Gunkan agreed -- editors essentially were
reporting what they wanted to believe. That said,
Strasbourg's decision to reject Arestis's appeal, combined
with the Commission's now-substantial body of work, lent heft
to the "TRNC's" argument. Both commissioners were troubled
by Greek Cypriot leaders urging their flocks to avoid the T/C
institution. "The 'South' government should not and cannot
blatantly ignore the rights of individual property owners,"
Erken argued.

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Lots of Hands Involved
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10. (C) Six commissioners staffed the entity, Gunkan
revealed. Four worked full-time, while two foreign
commissioners, a German and a Swede, visited Cyprus monthly
to process casework. Rather than allotting X number of cases
per member, every commissioner evaluated every case, she

NICOSIA 00000507 003 OF 004


added. Once the six accepted a G/C application as valid,
they forwarded the package to the "TRNC Ministry of Interior"
for further processing, to include a title search and land
valuation. Slowing the process somewhat was the "MoI's"
reluctance to establish a unit dedicated to Commission
casework, Gunken admitted. At the conclusion of their
investigation, "MoI" staff returned the files to the
Commission, and it made a final decision. (Note: other
Embassy sources report that Turkish and/or Turkish Cypriot
security forces also contribute to Commission decisions,
mainly to prevent any property deemed "sensitive" -- those
near military facilities, for example -- from restitution to
G/C owners.)


11. (C) Cases varied greatly in complexity, making it
impossible to determine an average processing time.
Undoubtedly, however, the Commission worked faster than the
ECHR, Erken assured. Should the intake of applications
increase, say, in response to Strasbourg at some point
declaring the remedy effective, the Commission would require
additional support staff (currently numbering six.) Gunkan
revealed that the pace of work had declined of late; in
response to our question whether funding availability
determined case throughput, he sheepishly admitted it was a
factor. Funds for the Commission came directly from Turkey's
yearly $450 million assistance to the "TRNC." On
compensation cases, the Commission required Greek Cypriot
owners to establish bank accounts in the T/C-administered
areas, into which the "government" deposited funds. That
money could then be transferred to accounts in the south, but
only after transiting an intermediate location like London,
owing to RoC prohibitions on wire transfers from the
"occupied" north.

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Not All Cypriots Enamored with Commission
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12. (C) "They consider us traitors," lamented Gunken,
referring to Turkish Cypriot opposition parties UBP and DP.
These nationalist-heavy parties considered any effort to
return properties to their Greek Cypriot owners a sell-out of
the T/C cause. Along with hard-right mouthpiece "Volkan" and
a shady amalgamation of anti-G/C pressure groups calling
itself the Cyprus Turkish Platform, the nationalists were
protesting restitutions, real or not. Elaborating, Erkmen
explained that "Volkan" and the Platform had fomented a May
31 demonstration outside a house in Karsiyaka (Vasilia) that
the Commission allegedly intended to transfer. Trouble was,
no Greek Cypriot had ever filed an application for the
property, nor in Vasilia at all. Both commissioners expected
more trouble from the right wing in coming weeks.


13. (C) Predictably, the RoC response to the Commission has
centered on name-calling -- it's alternatively "so-called,"
"pseudo," and "illegal" -- and on discouraging Greek Cypriots
from applying. In regards to the latter, the RoC Interior
Minister went so far as to claim in May that Cypriot law
prohibited G/Cs from selling their land in the north, an
argument that expert Demetriades dismissed. More thoughtful
Attorney General Petros Clerides earned his government's ire
when he contradicted his counterpart at Interior days later,
revealing that prosecutors currently had no intention to
target G/C landowners who chose to divest properties in the
"occupied" area.


14. (SBU) Government and media alike soon renewed their
attack on the "TRNC Property Commission," however. On June
5, nationalist-leaning SIGMA TV presented to the Attorney
General and House President Dimitris Christofias a list of 67
Greek Cypriots who had applied to the Commission in 2006-07.
Associated daily "Simerini" the following day carried a list
of 20 applicants (by initials, not full names),their
property locations, and respective compensation claims.
Immediately the propaganda machine kicked in, tarring
applicants to the Commission as traitors for putting personal
gain ahead of community interest. "I told him in writing
what I thought of him" was how one real estate attorney,
speaking to pro-government English-language newspaper "Cyprus
Weekly," described his final encounter with a former client
who had filed a Commission claim.


15. (SBU) Parliament soon piled on. After Christofias had
discussed SIGMA's list with party leaders, MPs June 7
approved a resolution that warned compatriots not to play
into the hands of the "occupation regime." Turkey had
established the Commission only to avoid its obligations
under international law, the initiative continued; it called
on the government to take steps to ensure Ankara complied

NICOSIA 00000507 004 OF 004


with ECHR judgments and UN Security Council regulations.
Subsequently, EUROKO MP Rikkos Erotokritou captured the mood
of pro-government MPs in floating a bill in which applicants
to the "TRNC" Commission would lose their not-unsubstantial
RoC refugee benefits. AG Clerides again provided a useful,
cautionary counterpoint, however, reminding G/Cs that SIGMA's
list was unverified. Further, Erotokritou's legal thinking
was flawed; by claiming that G/Cs had broken the law simply
by presenting paperwork before an "illegal" body, the MP had
turned into criminals all those Greek Cypriots who presented
their passports to "TRNC officials" in order to cross the
Buffer Zone.

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Smooth Sailing Now, But What Cometh?
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16. (C) COMMENT: If its statistics are reliable, the
Commission's three restitutions, two exchanges, and 17
compensatory payments represent far more closure for Greek
Cypriot property owners than Strasbourg has ever delivered.
Basic data extrapolation shows at least one, but likely many
G/Cs having cashed million dollar "TRNC" checks, while
"Simerini" indicated that one Commission applicant had
claimed over $30 million for property in Morphou. With so
many "refugees" deprived of land and thus unable to enjoy the
same property boom as G/C landowners in the south, how long
can the RoC realistically expect them to put patriotism ahead
of pragmatism and ignore an avenue that has delivered riches
to some? Regardless of whether the ECHR finds the Commission
effective -- and despite Erotokritou's efforts to penalize
recourse to it -- we would expect an increasing number of
Greek Cypriots to resort to filing claims there. Along
similar lines, we predict that Turkey will continue to fund
the Commission at a level that allows it to trumpet success,
but at nowhere near the level necessary to be truly
effective. As we've written numerous times before, there
exists only one manner of satisfactorily resolving Cyprus's
100,000-plus property claims: inking a final CyProb
settlement.
ZIMMERMAN