IN TOURING IRANIAN FACILITY SANS INSTRUCTIONS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000340

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/RA, EUR/SE, EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2017
TAGS: KNNP PARM MNUC TRGY AORC PREL CY
SUBJECT: IN TOURING IRANIAN FACILITY SANS INSTRUCTIONS,
AMBASSADOR PROVES MFA CONTROLS WEAK

REF: A. SECSTATE 45880


B. 06 NICOSIA 1461

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: RoC Ambassador to Iran Charalambos Kapsos,
acting without instructions from Nicosia, defied European
Union counsel and attended the April 9 ribbon-cutting of
Iran's Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, according to April 16
local media accounts. A Foreign Ministry official
subsequently confirmed the newspaper's story, but emphasized
that Cyprus continued to support UN Security Resolutions
aiming to prevent Tehran's development of nuclear weapons.
Ministry higher-ups already had reprimanded Kapsos, the
diplomat assured. The Natanz incident displays an MFA
Achilles' heel, its inability to exercise effective control
over its field missions. No solution appears imminent. END
SUMMARY.

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Approach to MFA Too Little, Too Late
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2. (C) Ref A, in which the Department instructed addressee
Posts to urge host countries not to send representatives to
the Natanz inauguration, arrived via normal (vice NIACT)
channels during the extended Easter weekend in Cyprus (April
6 - 9). As such, the message was OBE when the Embassy (and
Foreign Ministry) re-opened for business April 10. PolChief
nonetheless delivered post hoc points to the MFA's
Multilateral Affairs division that same day. He received no
substantive response.


3. (U) Six days later, opposition daily "Politis" screamed
that Cyprus "had opened a front with its EU and U.S. allies"
over Ambassador Kapsos's "ill-considered" decision to visit
Natanz. According to "Politis," Kapsos acted without first
seeking instructions from MFA superiors. Further, he had
ignored an EU Presidency recommendation, issued via the
German Embassy in Tehran, and an alleged "mild U.S. approach"
urging states to boycott the event. Washington had scaled
back its protests, the article continued, once it learned
that Kapsos had acted on his own initiative.

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Media Reporting Spot-On
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4. (SBU) German DCM Jochen Haidorn confirmed April 16 that
his counterparts in Tehran had distributed the EU Presidency
communication, which recommended that member-states not send
representatives to Natanz. To his knowledge, Cyprus never
had bucked EU consensus on Iran, and supported the imposition
of tough UN Security Council sanctions over Tehran's uranium
enrichment activities. Haidorn therefore believed that, had
Kapsos attended the inauguration, he did so of his own
volition.


5. (C) Multilateral Affairs Deputy Chief Marios Kountarides
had not seen the "Politis" article when PolChief telephoned
April 16 to follow up. Upon reading it, he requested an
immediate face-to-face meeting. Seemingly fearful of
repercussions that might beset Cyprus for its ambassador's
activities, he inquired as to the Embassy's original
instructions. Had the State Department singled out Cyprus in
its demarche, worried the RoC would break EU ranks or
otherwise voice dissent on Iran policy? Relieved that our
message had targeted all EU posts, he commenced to commenting
on the meat of "Politis's" allegations.

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An Ambassador Gone Bad
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6. (C) Kapsos had attended the Natanz festivities,
Kountarides admitted, looking exasperated. But the decision
had been the Ambassador's own; had he sought instructions,
the MFA's "NO" would have rung loud and clear. A policy
change had not occurred; Cyprus continued to back to the hilt
UNSC sanctions targeting the Iranian nuclear arms program
(Ref B). Ministry leaders were aghast over Kapsos's
freelancing, Kountarides claimed, which had embarrassed
Cyprus before fellow EU member-states. They already had
demanded an explanation from their "rogue" ambassador;
deeming his response unsatisfactory, they had reprimanded him.


7. (C) Kapsos was no stranger to controversy, Kountarides

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agreed. In early April, "Politis" had published accounts of
the ambassador's other misdeeds, most notably skipping his
presentation of credentials to Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad in order to return -- again, without permission
-- briefly to Cyprus. Further, media claimed Kapsos had
dismissed locally-hired embassy staff without cause, and had
issued visas improperly. For these acts, Kountarides
asserted, the MFA had dispatched an inspection team to
Tehran, led by RoC UN PermRep Andreas Mavroyiannis. Foreign
Minister Yiorgos Lillikas and Permanent Secretary ("D"
equivalent) Alexander Zenon had ordered Mavroyiannis to
conduct a thorough, speedy investigation. Were it to uncover
signs of wrongdoing, the MFA would press the Attorney General
to file charges against Kapsos, Kountarides promised.

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Problems to Worsen Before Getting Better
--------------


8. (C) Investigating the Cypriot ambassador's improprieties
should prove easy pickings for the MFA. While running
Cyprus's mission in Cairo a few years back, for example,
Kapsos allegedly imported and re-sold duty-free liquor on the
Egyptian market, embarrassing his mission and ministry and
straining bilateral relations. Further, his involvement in a
tawdry sex scandal there provided the tabloids great headline
grist. In neither case does it appear that anything more
than a mild letter of rebuke entered the ambassador's
personnel file. Returning to Nicosia and a series of office
director-type positions, he met regularly with U.S. Embassy
staff. Mostly avoiding work-related engagement, Kapsos
preferred to discuss ancient cultures and his penchant for
acquiring antiquities. We cannot discount the possibility
that he sought to pad his Persian collection, openly or
illicitly, from his Tehran outpost.


9. (C) The Natanz incident reveals that a visible MFA
weakness, the lack of effective control over its missions,
extends to policy matters as well as administration. On the
latter, media have feasted over allegations of cooked books,
favoritism in hiring, and sexual misconduct at overseas
Cypriot facilities. While a court did find former RoC
Ambassador to Sweden Costas Papadimas guilty of sexual
harassment in January, sentencing him to seven months'
imprisonment, contacts argue that most Ministry perpetrators
escape sanction or suffer only wrist slaps. "Effective"
employee representation is largely to blame; the same union
whose workplace rules ensure that only the highest-ranking
officers toil past five (a well-known Lillikas complaint)
protects members against all but the most flagrant violations.


10. (C) A second factor making Cypriot diplomats difficult
to control is their rapid, near-guaranteed progression
through the ranks. Comparing the number of career (vice
appointee) U.S. Ambassadors to the total count of Foreign
Service Officers, for illustration, a raw A-100 recruit
stands approximately a three-percent chance of running an
Embassy, and promotions become progressively more difficult
as rank rises. The RoC reality differs greatly. Owing to
the small size of its diplomatic corps and the RoC's desire
for broad representation -- to cultivate support for its
Cyprus Problem positions, primarily -- many missions operate
as one-diplomat shows, their principal officers wearing
ambassadorial stripes despite some possessing only
FS-1-equivalent experience levels. Most incoming MFA
diplomats expect and obtain chief of mission postings before
their careers expire, former Multilateral Affairs Chief (and
current Cypriot Ambassador to Ireland) Sotos Liassides told
PolChief in November. Their futures seemingly assured, he
continued, many adopt an arrogant attitude and are difficult
to manage. Other MFA officers consulted more recently claim
that promotion rates are dropping, but still greatly exceed
ours.


11. (C) A growing Cypriot diplomatic service would seem to
call for greater controls. Media recently reported that the
RoC legislature had approved an MFA workplan to open a dozen
additional missions by 2009. Twenty new diplomatic positions
will materialize to staff them, Kountarides reported,
although eighteen months will pass before the new hires came
on board. Lillikas and company seem best served by using the
interim to rein in their current charges.
SCHLICHER