NATIONALISTS AND DEEP STATE STIRRING THE "TRNC" POT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000301

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: NATIONALISTS AND DEEP STATE STIRRING THE "TRNC" POT

REF: A. NICOSIA 140

B. NICOSIA 151

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In recent months, nationalist elements in
the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" appear to be
manufacturing and/or exploiting events in order to pressure
pro-solution "President" Mehmet Ali Talat and "Prime
Minister" Ferdi Soyer to toe a harder line more consistent
with policies of the mainland Turkish "Deep State."
Instigators may also intend to affect Turkish presidential
and parliamentary elections by putting in play the "national
issue" of Cyprus. While we cannot assess the campaign's
success in Ankara, the nationalist drumbeat here has forced
Talat to look continually over his shoulder, vacillating as
he contemplates negotiations under the July 8 Process
framework. Still regrouping after a series of electoral
defeats, local nationalist parties such as Tahsin
Ertugruloglu's UBP have not yet been able to craft a credible
opposition message to take full advantage of Talat's
shrinking political stature. Soyer, in fact, has assured the
Ambassador that the majority of Turkish Cypriots still
support his "government." Nonetheless, the political tide in
the Turkish Cypriot community seems to be turning right,
dampening hopes for movement on Cyprus Problem settlement
negotiations. END SUMMARY.

--------------
RELATIONS GETTING DOWNRIGHT UGLY
--------------


2. (C) Relations between "President" Talat's CTP-led
"government" and local representatives of the Turkish "Deep
State" have grown increasingly strained in 2007 (Ref A).
With elections in Ankara around the corner, hard-line Turkish
nationalist elements on Cyprus appear bent on injecting the
Cyprus card into the mainland political process. Should the
AKP (which has strongly backed Talat and the CTP) lose
political ground in Turkish elections later this year,
anti-solution nationalists in the Turkish Cypriot community
hope they will emerge from the political wilderness to which
they have been exiled since the 2004 Annan Plan referendum
and the end of the Denktash regime. Right-wing groups,
therefore, have stepped up their public sniping against
Talat, Soyer, and the CTP "government" -- often with brazenly
open support from mainland Turkish military brass stationed
here. A recent series of incidents, all widely reported in
the Turkish Cypriot press, have provided ammunition for
reactionary critics of the Talat administration. It is
unclear whether these incidents have been manufactured or
merely seized upon as targets of opportunity -- but taken
together, they smell of a nationalist smear campaign against
the north's erstwhile pro-solution civilian leadership.

--------------
Yet More Flags?
--------------


3. (SBU) In January, for example, an organization calling
itself the "Flag at the Summit Association" began publicly
lobbying to fly two massive flags on the summit of Besparmak
(Pentadaktylos, in Greek) Mountain, a garish complement to
the half-mile-long Turkish Cypriot flag painted on a
prominent hillside closer to Nicosia. The organization
reportedly is holding fund-raisers to raise the 80,000 YTL
($56,500) required for the project. In early February,
members garnered additional press coverage by conducting a
tree-planting event on the slopes of Besparmak. While the
mainstream media, much of which still supports Talat, has
tried to starve the story of oxygen, few have criticized the
flag initiative. One pro-solution activist privately told us
that although most Turkish Cypriots understand that
poke-in-the-eye gestures like this will only complicate
settlement prospects, very few people are willing to be seen
speaking out "against the flag" in the current, charged
environment.

-------------- --------------
Debate Over 1963 "Bathtub Massacre" Proves Irresistible
-------------- --------------


4. (SBU) In late February, public debate in the Turkish
Cypriot community over an iconic photograph brought an
immediate response from the nationalists. The photo depicted
a T/C family brutally murdered in the bathtub of their
Nicosia home during the December 1963 outbreak of
inter-communal violence in Cyprus. Their killers are
generally believed to have been Greek Cypriot EOKA

NICOSIA 00000301 002 OF 003


guerrillas; the famous photograph of the crime scene is
etched in every Turkish Cypriot's brain, and "government"
officials long ago transformed the home into the much-visited
"Museum of Barbarism." In a February 27 interview with
prominent newspaper "Kibris," however, a former Turkish
Resistance Organization (TMT) fighter cast doubt on the
circumstances in which the photo was taken, claiming that he
had discovered the corpses elsewhere and moved them to the
bathtub for greater shock effect. Far-left daily "Afrika"
went further, publishing allegations that Turkish
nationalists themselves committed the murders in hopes of
provoking Turkey's intervention to end the inter-communal
clashes.


5. (SBU) Few mainstream Turkish Cypriots accepted Afrika's
revisionist version of events (and indeed, despite some doubt
about where the family was killed, no serious evidence has
emerged suggesting that anyone other than EOKA pulled the
trigger). Nonetheless, nationalist veterans' groups, led by
the Turkish Cypriot Fighters' Association, used press
coverage of the story to re-ignite public discussion of Greek
Cypriot "barbarism" -- and slander any traitors who
questioned the long-held "official" version of events. They
orchestrated the return to the island of the husband/father
of the victims, Brigadier General (retired) Nihat Ilhan, a
former Turkish Army physician, who was feted by NGOs and
political parties alike as he attended "Martyrs' Day" events.
Pressed for comment, Talat described as "false and shameful"
the suggestion that ethnic Turks had perpetrated the
massacre. Other politicians hurriedly declared their support
for Ilhan -- and, by extension, for Turkey.

--------------
Shake HIS Hand? Never!
--------------


6. (U) A "handshake crisis" erupted on March 18 when the
Commander of the Turkish forces on the island, Lieutenant
General Hayri Kivrikoglu, allegedly refused to shake "Prime
Minister" Ferdi Soyer's hand at a dinner reception in honor
of Ilhan. The two argued at the dinner, and Soyer reportedly
stormed out. According to a right-wing journalist who
published an "expose" on the spat in the press, Kivrikoglu
told Soyer he would not shake the hand of a "Prime Minister"
who did not play the (Turkish) national anthem or hang
Ataturk posters and Turkish flags at his party's general
assembly earlier that day. Soyer insisted that there had
been posters and flags (which were, indeed, visible on
television coverage of the event). "Don't you believe we are
Turkish?" Soyer reportedly asked the general. "Prove you
are!" Kivrikoglu replied.


7. (C) Reaction to the Soyer-Kivrikoglu spat was widespread
and broke along ideological lines. Tahsin Ertugruloglu of
the right-wing UBP endorsed the general's behavior, calling
it "a natural reaction to bad conduct." In a subsequent
meeting with the Ambassador, he commented that that if Soyer
did not behave like a "proper 'Prime Minister,'" he should
expect "ugly incidents." Soyer and the CTP should decide to
which "state" they belong. Retired Fighters' Association
chairman Salih Direktor urged Soyer to apologize to the
Turkish Cypriot people for not defending them adequately, for
having changed school history texts (Ref B) to "appease"
Greek Cypriots, and for singing a socialist anthem, rather
than the national anthem, at his party congress. Eighteen
opposition mayors visited Kivrikoglu March 22 to express
their gratitude to Turkey for respecting the martyrs, the
flag, and the national anthem.


8. (SBU) Scrambling to protect their right flank, members of
the ruling CTP echoed Soyer's defense of the party's
"Turkishness." Party Secretary General Omer Kalyoncu was
quick to point out, however, that "certain circles" were
using the handshake scandal for political point-scoring --
disrespecting the "free will of the Turkish Cypriot people,"
who had elected CTP on its pro-solution platform. He blamed
the UBP for "hiding behind Kivrikoglu." Calls from
pro-solution NGOs for the general to apologize (and butt out
of politics) went unheeded.

--------------
Smoothing Things Over...For Now
--------------


9. (C) The CTP-led civilian "government" is clearly worried
about the implications of an open fight with the military --
especially after this year's bruising fight between Talat and
the army over the removal of the Ledra Street bridge. "PM"
Soyer has made public moves to put the handshake episode

NICOSIA 00000301 003 OF 003


behind him. During a "Martyrs' Commemoration" speech on
March 25, he made soothing noises toward the army, declaring
that there should be no ill-will between Turkey and the
"TRNC." Kivrikoglu's deputy, Major General Mehmet Eroz,
reportedly made a point of immediately shaking Soyer's hand.
It is unclear that this charm offensive has been totally
effective, however. April 2 press reports quoted Kivrikoglu
saying he would never forgive Soyer for disrespecting
Turkishness.


10. (C) In private, CTP insiders understand that their cold
war with the military and their UBP allies is far from over.
Soyer privately told the Ambassador March 27 that
anti-solution forces (both here and on the mainland) "hate"
him. Nationalist forces were trying to destroy the CTP's
pro-solution base of support, he said, by provoking the party
of Talat to take uncharacteristic, hard-line steps. The UBP
was hoping to exploit tension on the island that was spiking
in response to upcoming presidential elections in Turkey,
Soyer continued. The "PM" was confident, however, that the
majority of Turkish Cypriots still supported his government.


11. (C) CTP's greatest asset may indeed prove to be the
weakness of nationalist feeling in the north. Although hope
for Cyprus reunification and support for the EU have both
fallen precipitously in the T/C community, Ertugruloglu
conceded recently to the Ambassador that his nationalist,
anti-solution UBP did not yet have a lock on mainstream
Turkish Cypriot sympathies. Nonetheless, the party has been
clearly seeking to capitalize on its ideological similarities
to the "Deep State" -- credible rumors abound that the
military has been funding the UBP, veterans' groups, and
other nationalist forces that clearly hope to muster greater
public support over time.

--------------
But Tension Likely To Bubble Up Again
--------------


12. (C) COMMENT: We have yet to see a smoking gun that
links Besparmak, the Bathtub Murders, and the handshake row.
Nor is it certain that nationalist forces manufactured these
particular scandals as part of a broader effort to discredit
Talat, Soyer or the CTP. Nonetheless, the right wing has
taken advantage of these and similar events and hopes they
can help it gather political steam. While public bickering
over the handshake and bathtub seem certain to fade, the
underlying animosity between the "TRNC government" and
nationalists (including the UBP, the DP of Serdar Denktash,
the Turkish military, and army proxies like the T/C Fighters'
Association) seems set to spike as Turkish elections draw
near. Political friction in north Cyprus is at least partly
a proxy battle between Erdogan's AKP and the mainland "Deep
State."


13. (C) Meanwhile, Soyer's fears that the nationalists were
attempting to provoke Talat to move right are more than
well-founded; we'd say a turn already has occurred. One
might only look to the July 8 UN process for proof Despite
signing the agreement eight months ago and pledging to
implement it in a November exchange of letters with UN Under
Secretary Gambari, it now appears "President" Talat is

SIPDIS
seeking to ditch the document and return to the 2004 Annan
Plan as a basis for CyProb negotiations, a complete
non-starter on the Greek Cypriot side. Nationalist pressures
undoubtedly underpin Talat's backwards slide into
inflexibility.

14 (C) Talat's credibility at home and internationally is
best-served politically by returning to his pro-solution beat
and supporting the Gambari framework; this is especially true
now, when RoC President Tassos Papadopoulos is scoring
significant political points by showing uncharacteristic
flexibility. In his meetings with Talat, Soyer, and other
Turkish Cypriot leaders, the Ambassador has stressed that an
active UN process would help reduce tension between
nationalists and pro-settlement forces in northern Cyprus and
keep the island from being used as a political pawn in
mainland Turkish politics and Turkey's EU accession
negotiation. We will continue to urge an immediate start to
the Working Groups/Technical Committees process, although
serious Turkish Cypriot engagement will require encouragement
from Ankara -- from both AKP and the military. END COMMENT.
SCHLICHER