CYPRUS: THE DEVELOPMENT AND EXERCISE OF AVIAN AND PANDEMIC

UNCLAS NICOSIA 000269

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR G/AIG AND EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO KFLU KSTH CASC CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: THE DEVELOPMENT AND EXERCISE OF AVIAN AND PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA RESPONSE PLANS

REF: A) STATE 22992 B) 06 Nicosia 242 and previous

(U) This cable is sensitive but unclassified. Please treat
accordingly.


1. (SBU) Summary. Both the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish
Cypriot administration are much better prepared to deal with a major
AI outbreak than they were in January 2006 when two chickens in the
area administered by Turkish Cypriots tested positive for H5N1.
Both sides have recently tested their AI response plans (the GoC in
October and the Turkish Cypriot administration in December). With
Cyprus falling on the path of two main bird migration routes, both
sides are taking the threat seriously. The main weakness continues
to be the lack of cooperation across the UN-patrolled Green Line,
separating the two communities. While both communities recently
agreed to participate in a USAID-financed, UNDP-led bicommunal
animal disease working group -- this inchoate cooperation is very
fragile and yet to be tested in practice. End Summary.

Background
--------------

2. (SBU) Both the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot
administration are taking the AI threat seriously. (Note: Cyprus
has been divided since 1974 into the government-controlled,
primarily Greek Cypriot south and the predominantly Turkish Cypriot
north. The U.S. and all other countries except Turkey recognize
only the Government of Cyprus. The two communities are separated by
a UN-patrolled buffer zone called the Green Line. End note). Both
communities have prepared and tested AI veterinary and health
response plans (see below).


3. (SBU) A key catalyst for both sides to improve their response
plans was the AI scare that hit the Turkish Cypriot community in
January 2006 when two chickens tested positive for H5N1 in a
backyard farm in a small Turkish Cypriot village near the Green Line
(ref b). Since the 10 km surveillance zone cut across the Green
Line into the south and into one of the UK's military bases -- the
incident required some form of cooperation from all four
administrations on the island -- GoC, Turkish Cypriot, UN and UK.


4. (SBU) Typical of the lack of trust between the two communities,
both sides remember the incident very differently. The Turkish
Cypriots see it as a real case of AI that was quickly contained and
isolated due to their hard work and quick response. The GoC,
however, believes because other birds in close proximity were not
affected and the strain found was identical to that prevalent at the
time in Eastern Turkey, there was no AI outbreak in Cyprus. Rather,
the GoC believes that the Turkish Cypriot samples were inadvertently
contaminated in Turkey en route to the UK Weybridge laboratory.
Visiting EU veterinary experts have suggested to us that
contamination is probably the most likely scenario, but a real AI
outbreak cannot be ruled out. Since the GoC is regarded by the
international community as the sovereign government of the entire
island and it believes the samples were contaminated -- no AI
outbreak on Cyprus has ever been reported to the WHO or OIE. Six
months after the scare, the GoC sent a diplomatic note to all
Embassies resident in Cyprus informing them it was the GoC position
that no H5N1 had been found in any birds or humans on the island.

Government-controlled area
--------------

5. (SBU) EU rules require the GoC to have a national AI response
plan and to conduct regular exercises. We sent the department last
year an English version of the veterinary part of the plan. For
another copy, please contact EconOff Mike Dixon at
DixonMS@State.gov. The health portion in Greek is available at:

http://www.moh.gov.cy/MOH/moh.nsf/All/ 4CCD90ECED95DD
174225718800218F00?OpenDocument (with no breaks)

A very short synopsis of the health plan in English is available at:


http://www.moh.gov.cy/MOH/moh.nsf/All/ 9914FB742F8A35D
84225718700530986?OpenDocument (with no breaks)


6. (SBU) The GoC Veterinary Service organized a field exercise

October 9-11, 2006, that involved the culling of over 4,000
chickens. The scenario involved an outbreak at an actual chicken
farm near Nicosia and two secondary outbreaks in the Limassol and
Larnaca districts. Participants in the exercise included: the
Veterinary Service, Police, Civil Defense, Fire Department, Forestry
Department, the Games Fund, the Meterological services, Medical
Services and several private poultry farms. Three individuals from
the Turkish Cypriot "veterinary service" participated as observers.



7. (SBU) Observers from the UNDP called the event a success noting
that the GOC had demonstrated the ability at short notice to confirm
an outbreak, mobilize the resources and staff required to respond,
implement an exclusion and surveillance zone, establish a local
disease control center and coordinate between a wide range of
stakeholders. Head of the GoC Veterinary Service Giorgos Neophytou
also termed the exercise a success. He noted to us, however, that
the exercise had exposed a weakness in their response to secondary
outbreaks. While everyone was quick to throw resources at the site
of the initial outbreak, their response to the secondary outbreaks
was much slower and more limited. The Veterinary Service was
preparing protocols to correct this. While the Veterinary Service
had prepared a short internal report for the Minister, no report on
the exercise was available to the public. The UNDP's main
recommendation was to point out the need for a bicommunal exercise
requiring actual cooperation between the two communities.


8. (SBU) Neophytou reported that they were planning to hold a
surprise drill in the near future and expected to be invited to join
an EU table top exercise in Brussels later this spring. The GoC
also hoped to host an international veterinary seminar on AI as
well, although this was still in the early planning stages.
Ministry of Health AI POC Chrystalla Hadjianastasiou reported that
the Ministry of Health had also participated in an EU-wide table top
exercise in November 2005.

Area administered by Turkish Cypriots
--------------

9. (SBU) The Turkish Cypriot authorities established an inter-agency
Avian Influenza Monitoring Committee under the "Prime Minister's
Office" and prepared an AI response plan based on the GoC plan
following joint demarches by the U.S., UK and EU. We sent English
language versions of the health and veterinary contingency plans to
OES and EUR/SE last year. To request another copy please contact
EconOff Mike Dixon at DixonMS@state.gov.


10. (SBU) Turkish Cypriot "Chief Veterinary Officer" Ersun Korudag
recently told us that the chicken farms were well regulated. His
greatest concern regarded the two or three chickens many village
families keep in their back yards. Consequently, the "veterinary
service" was aggressively enforcing rules that required all poultry,
poultry feed and water to be kept enclosed to prevent any
contamination from migratory birds. The service had also drafted a
very detailed AI veterinary implementation plan that included
specific information on every village and poultry farm.


11. (SBU) According to Korudag, the Turkish Cypriot's main exercise
to date was the suspected outbreak in January 2006 (see above),that
forced a real life response, including the establishment of
exclusion and surveillance zones and the culling of dozens of
poultry. To practice what they had learned, the Turkish Cypriot
"veterinary service" organized a follow-up AI exercise December
21-22, 2006. The first day consisted of classroom lectures. The
second day a field exercise based on the scenario that a large
number of chickens suddenly died at a small chicken farm near Ercan
airport. Representatives of the Turkish Cypriot "veterinary
service," police," "ministry of health" and "civil defense" all
played prominent roles in quickly identifying the outbreak and
setting up the exclusion and surveillance zones. Three GoC
veterinary officials were set to participate as observers, but
withdrew, however, when they received official invitations on "TRNC"
letterhead.

Comment
--------------

12. (SBU) Both Communities appear well set to handle relatively
small outbreaks that occur exclusively within their area of

effective control. Multiple simultaneous outbreaks or outbreaks
that straddle the UN-patrolled buffer zone, however, would challenge
either side and especially the Turkish Cypriot community where
resources are more limited (although the area and population is much
smaller). A critical gap remains the inability of the two sides to
cooperate during any emergency. Turkish Cypriot participation in
the GoC exercise and the commitment of both sides to participate in
the USAID-funded, UNDP-led bicommunal animal disease working group
are both positive steps forward. This limited cooperation, however,
has been extremely difficult to obtain, is untested, and is very
fragile. We will continue to advocate for closer AI coordination
and urge future bicommunal exercises to test both sides readiness to
deal with what could be a major threat to the health and well-being
of their citizens.

SCHLICHER