UN-BROKERED TALKS HIT SNAG; SPEED BUMP OR MAJOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000256

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: UN-BROKERED TALKS HIT SNAG; SPEED BUMP OR MAJOR
COLLISION?

REF: NICOSIA 205

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4(b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Two week ago, there was cause for Cyprus
Problem optimism. Hairline cracks were showing in hard-line
President Tassos Papadopoulos's coalition, Brussels appeared
to be tiring of Nicosia's maximalist position on Turkish
Cypriot direct trade, and T/C leaders mostly were behaving,
attempting to regain the moral high ground. Feeling
pressured though not quite cornered, Papadopoulos made
limited concessions, taking down the Ledra Street wall
(Reftel),eliminating pre-conditions on the crossing point's
opening, and apparently instructing negotiator Tasos Tzionis
to adopt a more accommodating position in talks with Turkish
Cypriot counterpart Rashid Pertev. UN sources March 16
claimed the representatives had agreed to "an arrangement"
that would allow the committees and working groups envisaged
in the "July 8 Process" finally to convene; at their next
meeting (March 19),UN SRSG Michael Moller hoped to dot the
last "i" and issue a formal announcement. That never
happened. In their readouts March 20, G/C media claimed the
T/C side had sidelined the talks by tabling a slew of
Ankara-ordered demands, an account that our UN interlocutors
in part confirmed.


2. (C) Moller believed a below-the-radar approach might have
broken the impasse. Instead, however, the wily Papadopoulos
issued a high-minded but clearly T/C-baiting statement late
March 20, calling for an immediate commencement of the July 8
process and subsequent leaders' meetings. Predictably, Talat
hit the roof, refuting Papadopoulos's claims on the
"arrangement's" validity and canceling the follow-on
Tzionis-Pertev meetings. UN officials calling on the T/C
leader March 21 later described him as "shell-shocked and
lost." Officially, the "TRNC Presidency" has announced that
Talat is "reflecting" on the process, but there is no word
when the communities might re-commence negotiations. In
addition to the local dynamics, much of the T/C side of the
story seems grounded in electoral machinations and
civilian-military jostling in Ankara. END SUMMARY.

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Even Limited Movement Causes Celebration
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3. (C) Prior Embassy reporting has documented Papadopoulos's
March "charm offensive," evinced best by the President's
March 9 order to remove the wall at Ledra Street, a necessary
step in establishing a Buffer Zone crossing there.
Underpinning the tack change was both domestic and
international dissatisfaction with RoC policies and behavior.
At home, coalition mate AKEL was warning Papadopoulos not to
assume that its support was iron-clad, and even a prominent
member of the President's own DIKO party was criticizing his
handling of the CyProb. Meanwhile, Brussels-based officials
were pressing the President to open Ledra soonest and engage
the Turkish Cypriots in good-faith dialog under the July 8
Process framework. Other elements of Papadopoulos's
"softening" included a retraction of certain pre-conditions
on Ledra Street -- removal of the "TRNC national" symbols,
primarily -- and an apparent instruction to Tzionis to craft
an arrangement acceptable to Turkish Cypriots for the
long-delayed start-up of the July 8 talks.


4. (C) Various Embassy sources reported a greater pace of
activity in the Tzionis-Pertev meetings in early March, the
sides horsetrading and exchanging non-papers at every
setting. On March 5, the Greek Cypriots leaked their letter
to Moller, in which they floated a framework which became the
basis of the "arrangement." The G/C's "Proposal for the
Immediate Initiation of the Implementation of the 8 July 2006
Process" ordered the communities to a) finalize the lists of
technical committees and working groups to be established,
and b) each propose one committee and one working group for
immediate establishment. Taking advantage of the momentum
created with the four bodies' creation, the Coordination
Committee (Moller, Tzionis, and Pertev) would work to
establish others as circumstances warranted.

5. (C) G/C media began to carry stories intimating that a
July 8 Process deal looked imminent. In an above-the-fold
article March 12, leading daily "Phileleftheros" claimed the
technical committees "could get to work as early as
tomorrow," since the latest Tzionis proposal "left no room
for the 'Turks' to reject it, as it took into consideration
T/C concerns." UNFICYP contacts appeared equally optimistic,
with Moller informing the Ambassador that same day that he
and the sides' representatives had reached agreement on how

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to move forward. The G/Cs had shown noteworthy flexibility,
Moller complimented. Pertev had only to secure the approval
of Talat for the formal talks to commence.


6. (C) In person, Pertev displayed far less optimism. The
March 5 G/C proposal was nothing new, the T/C negotiator
informed Emboffs March 9, but only a re-hashing of earlier
non-papers; he did not understand why it was garnering such
attention. While committing to study the two-committee,
two-group initiative, Pertev claimed the Turkish Cypriots
could never accept it as-is. Although the Greek Cypriots had
not mentioned property in the context of this particular
proposal, their insistence that both the working group and
technical committee agendas "be open to any issue raised by
either side" was an open door for the G/Cs to introduce the
show-stopping substantive issue of property into the
technical committee arena. This tactic was evidence, Pertev
felt, of their bad faith and of a desire not to see real
progress on the July 8 track.

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Meeting Outcome Disappoints
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7. (U) No milestones emerged from the March 19 meeting.
"Turkish Side Blocks Agreement for Start of Technical Talks"
trumpeted "Philelefteros" the following day. While Pertev
had not rejected the G/C's latest offer outright, the paper
continued, his insistence in avoiding any discussion of
property amounted to a de facto "no." Refusal to tackle the
land issue betrayed the spirit of the July 8 Process, since,
according to UN Undersecretary Ibrahim Gambari's formulation,
"all matters were open to discussion." Opposition daily
"Politis" rued that the negotiations would have to
re-commence completely, since the expectation that the sides
were close to agreement had proven false.


8. (C) Ever the optimist, Moller privately refuted accounts
that the talks had collapsed. Pertev had, however,
introduced several "pathetic" and "dilatory" conditions to
initiating the committees' work. The principal show-stopper
was a new T/C demand that the sides agree, in writing, that
each had the right NOT to discuss issues raised by the other.
Other requests included changing the names of various
committees and working groups, even though Talat earlier had
ok'd the nomenclature. Pertev had "seemed ashamed" to be
bringing up the new demands, Moller explained. (Note: We
have learned that the T/C backpedaling came on the heels of a
series of visits by high-level Turkish delegations. AKP Vice
President Nihat Ergun headed one on March 18, ostensibly to
attend the CTP,s party congress. Meanwhile, there are
reports that Turkish MFA U/S Apakan, DU/S Berk, and DG Ahmet
Dibek made an unpublicized visit to the island at the same
time, although the Turkish Cypriots have -- even in private
-- been uncharacteristically reticent to provide a read-out,
or even to confirm it occurred. End Note.)

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And the Blame Game Is On
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9. (SBU) Hopes the two sides might break the deadlock
discreetly disappeared late March 20. In a written
statement, Papadopoulos called on T/C leader Talat to
"jointly and immediately start implementing the 8 July
Agreement." Heavy with passive voice -- perhaps to highlight
the achievements, but more likely to hide the actors -- the
president assured that great problems had been addressed,
differences bridged, progress made, agendas coordinated, and
procedures for putting the groups and committees to work
finalized. Papadopoulos invited Talat to meet a week after
the bodies had convened and started their work. "I sincerely
believe...that the 8 July 8 process can soon produce results
and create the necessary dynamic for the solution of the
Cyprus Problem," the President ended.


10. (U) The fireworks began shortly afterward. Talat's
spokesman Hassan Ercakica delayed his weekly briefing one
hour, announcing that his "president" would address media
directly. Flanked by Pertev and Ercakica, a furious Talat,
despite the fact that he had also selectively leaked on many
occasions, blasted the G/Cs for revealing the contents of the
"arrangement" despite the sides' agreed media blackout.
There was no comprehensive agreement, the T/C leader
countered, but only "some overlapping views and certain
conformities." Papadopoulos sought only to burnish his image
with his statement, Talat believed. In the same way the
demolition of the Ledra Street wall had coincided with

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Tassos' trip to Brussels for a Council meeting, this latest
PR effort was occurring just as Tzionis was in Belgium to
discuss the EU's Direct Trade Regulation. For eight months
Papadopoulos had endeavored to prevent movement on the July 8
Agreement; this recent about-face was all about politics,
Talat argued.

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Turkish Side At Fault, Witnesses Say
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11. (C) In subsequent readouts, UNFICYP contacts provided
additional detail on the March 19 T/C turnabout. Pertev had
demanded not only an opt-out clause on discussing property,
DCM Wlodek Cibor told us March 20, but also to rename various
working groups and technical committees. More than semantics
were at play; Cibor understood why Tzionis would (and did)
oppose changing "Defense" to "Security and Guarantees," since
the updated name almost presupposed a future role for Turkish
military "guarantor" forces on the island. Pertev had
traveled to Turkey the week before, purportedly on personal
business. Had he received updated marching orders there?
Cibor questioned. That was certainly the Greek side's
perception. Off the record, the UN diplomat thought Talat
had "snapped" at his rebuttal press conference. Moller
intended to call on the T/C leader that day, to determine
what he had meant with his "enough is enough" comments.


12. (C) In their March 21 meeting the UN chief had found
Talat shell-shocked and still seething over Papadopoulos's
statement, revealed UNFICYP PolOff Tim Alchin at a diplomatic
corps dinner March 21. While the "TRNC President" did not
want to put the representatives' talks on long-term hold, the
T/C side was seeking time to formulate its next steps. Talat
had canceled the Pertev and Tzionis's March 22 follow-up,
Alchin noted, and it was unlikely the sides would reconvene
before March 26.

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The Latest/Greatest
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13. (C) Attempting to ensure this latest interruption is
brief, the Embassy, in coordination with like-minded missions
here, is urging Turkish Cypriots to re-engage on the July 8
Process. In a March 23 pow-wow, the Ambassador, Moller, and
the German and British chiefs of mission agreed that Talat's
recent moves put at risk his credibility with both the
international community and his own electoral base. The UN
chief added that higher-ups in the Secretariat "would not and
should not look kindly on Talat blithely discarding a process
that Gambari had created in July and then salvaged in
November." The Ambassador will join fellow P-5
representatives March 26 to debate the usefulness of a joint
call on Talat, which might provide him limited cover from
hard-liners within the TGS, local Turkish Forces, and the
opposition UBP and DP. In public commentary, we will
emphasize that both sides must put aside their pre-process
bickering and get to the table.

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Comment
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14. (C) In this latest installment of the CyProb drama,
Papadopoulos again demonstrated his peerless command of
tactics. Just two weeks ago he seemed on the defensive, with
coalition partners sniping and even the normally suck-up
media questioning his leadership. Yet with a few (un-bold)
strokes, he has quieted his opposition and the press, and is
again striding the high ground. We surmise the President
truly does want to see the committees up and running soon, if
only to quiet his pro-solution G/C detractors. We are
certain, however, they will make only as much progress as
Papadopoulos deems politically beneficial.


15. (C) Mirroring the President's craftiness and poise,
unfortunately, was Talat's predictability and prickliness; an
ambush he should have avoided instead beckoned him in. Were
we to write his playbook, he would replace tit-for-tat
attacks on his G/C counterpart with full engagement under the
July 8 framework -- there, he might smoke out Papadopoulos's
real intentions as the negotiations play out. In all
fairness, however, Talat faces pressures the G/C leader does
not. While we cannot say for sure what message last week's
mainland delegations brought, it seems likely they gave a
go-slow signal to the Turkish Cypriots; one of Talat,s close
political allies confirmed to us that the "president" is

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nervous about making any moves given the "delicate political"
situation on the mainland. As our Embassy Ankara colleagues
have noted, the Turkish Cypriot leader increasingly appears a
proxy in a broader battle between the AK Party and the TGS,
one that's bound to escalate as Turkish elections near. His
room to maneuver, to avoid future Papadopoulos traps, thus
seems scant.


16. (C) As we judge it, the best way to protect our multiple
interests -- preserving Talat and his agenda, supporting the
UN process, removing Cyprus as an irritant in international
fora, and managing impediments to Turkey's EU accession
process -- is for the USG actively to advocate a kick-off of
the July 8 Process, which can provide a labor-intensive means
of keeping the issues on the back burner during the looming
electoral exercises in Turkey and Cyprus.
SCHLICHER