Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NICOSIA21
2007-01-05 16:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

TALAT'S SHOWDOWN WITH TURKISH ARMY OVER LEDRA

Tags:  PGOV PREL UNFICYP EUN MOPS TU CY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0759
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0021/01 0051625
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051625Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7399
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0742
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000021 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP EUN MOPS TU CY
SUBJECT: TALAT'S SHOWDOWN WITH TURKISH ARMY OVER LEDRA
STREET CROSSING

REF: 05 NICOSIA 1883

Classified By: CDA Jane B. Zimmerman, reasons 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000021

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP EUN MOPS TU CY
SUBJECT: TALAT'S SHOWDOWN WITH TURKISH ARMY OVER LEDRA
STREET CROSSING

REF: 05 NICOSIA 1883

Classified By: CDA Jane B. Zimmerman, reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. "TRNC President" Mehmet Ali Talat's public
promise to remove the controversial pedestrian bridge at the
Green Line on Ledra Street has put him on a collision course
with the Turkish military. The bridge, which crosses over a
Turkish army patrol track along the north edge of the Buffer
Zone, precipitated a deadlock over a year ago in preparations
to open an economically and symbolically important crossing
point in the heart of Old Nicosia (reftel). Hoping to prove
himself master of his own domain -- and wrongfoot
Papadopoulos at the same time -- Talat announced December 28
that he would take down the bridge immediately in order to
signal his New Year commitment to making progress toward
solving the Cyprus problem. A week later, however, Turkish
military resistance has blocked plans to remove the
structure, prompting Talat to travel to Turkey to try to
break the deadlock in talks with the AKP government and the
TGS. Talat has taken a significant political gamble in
trying to force the issue over Turkish military objections;
his credibility as the leader of his community may be at
stake. According to "PM" Ferdi Soyer, Talat has threatened
to resign if he cannot make good on his promise to remove the
bridge. Soyer told Charge that if Talat is unsuccessful in
Ankara, the ruling CTP may well call its supporters onto the
streets for protests, which would reflect Turkish Cypriot
resentment at the reach of the military and "Deep State" in
Cyprus. END SUMMARY.

MR. TALAT, TEAR DOWN THIS BRIDGE
--------------


2. (C) On December 28 "President" Talat announced he would
remove the controversial pedestrian bridge the Turkish
Cypriots installed on Ledra Street in 2005 (reftel). Talat's
"government," which had scored a propaganda coup by
unilaterally opening a checkpoint at Astromeritis/Bostanci
earlier that summer, had hoped to pull off a similar stunt on

Ledra Street -- the north-south pedestrian/shopping avenue
that forms the central artery of Old Nicosia, but has been
cut in two since 1974. Most observers agree that an open
Ledra Street would provide a real boost to Nicosia's Turkish
Cypriot merchants (while some Greek Cypriot shopkeepers are
openly concerned about the prospect of low cost competitors,
who stay open on Sunday). More importantly, any move toward
reopening Ledra Street would signal a renewed commitment to
reuniting the island and Europe's last divided capital.


3. (C) Unlike other checkpoints already in operation,
however, Ledra Street crosses through an east-west patrol
track used by the Turkish army (at Ermou/Hermes Street) --
and Talat's decision to open a crossing there alarmed the
local force commanders, who take their orders from Ankara and
not from the "TRNC." The pedestrian bridge, which would have
carried civilian pedestrians over the heads of patrolling
Turkish troops, was viewed by "TRNC" officials as a
compromise solution that could have allowed the military to
enjoy unfettered access to the area even after the checkpoint
opened.


4. (C) Although the Embassy (together with the UK and the
French missions here) warned Talat at the time that putting
up a bridge on the site was politically unwise, Talat
nonetheless authorized its construction. This drew the
predictable howls of protest from the Greek Cypriots who
claimed (falsely, according to the UN) that the bridge
intruded into the Buffer Zone and (correctly) that the
building of a structure for military purposes along the Green
Line was a violation of the spirit of the cease-fire
agreement.

MR. PAPADOPOULOS, TEAR DOWN THAT PLATFORM
--------------


5. (C) In the year that followed, the Turkish Cypriots tried
-- unsuccessfully -- to draw attention away from their
decision to build the bridge and shift blame for the
checkpoint deadlock on Papadopoulos. The Turkish Cypriots
suggested they would take down the bridge in exchange for the
removal of a wall and viewing platform (complete with
dramatic pictures of "victims of the occupation") erected by
the Greek Cypriot National Guard on the southern end of the
Buffer Zone at Ledra Street. The GOC replied, however, that
no movement on the checkpoint was possible until the status
quo ante was restored and the bridge removed.


6. (C) UN sources tell us that although they occasionally
raised the subject in their meetings with both sides,
diplomacy on the matter has consisted mainly of nasty

NICOSIA 00000021 002 OF 003


sound-bites exchanged through the media over the past year.
Informal discussions regarding the checkpoint between the two
mayors of Nicosia and party leaders from both communities
were similarly futile.

ARMY TO TALAT: YA FEELIN' LUCKY, PUNK?
--------------


7. (C) Talat's December 28 announcement that he would take
down the bridge caught most observers by surprise. Although
the Embassy (as well as the UK, UN and others) have
consistently prodded Talat to make a move on Ledra Street for
over a year, his response has been generally tepid; Talat
aides have repeatedly said that a simultaneous reciprocal
gesture from the GOC would be needed before they could
politically afford to back down from their decision to build
"the bridge of peace." Talat's personal secretary told us,
however, that Talat's change of heart sprung from a series of
factors including: 1) the new lull in Turkey-EU tensions, 2)
increasing domestic political pressure for the pro-solution
Talat to "do something" that might change the parameters of
the Cyprus problem and give an economic boost to his voters,
and 3) the new AKEL mayor in the south, who might be an
easier interlocutor on municipal issues like Ledra because of
her long ties to Talat's CTP and her support for the Annan
Plan.


8. (C) In a private meeting with the Charge, "PM" Ferdi Soyer
told us that Talat thought he had reached consensus with the
Turkish ambassador and army on the matter just before making
his announcement. Subsequently, however, local Turkish force
commander Kivrikoglu put his foot down, refused to agree to
the dismantling of the bridge, and began "working against
Talat" with the TGS in Ankara. Talat, feeling that his
credibility as a leader and fully-competent interlocutor was
at stake, made the announcement anyway.


9. (C) In the subsequent week -- despite encouraging
statements from the Embassy, UK High Commission, and UNFICYP
-- the Turkish Cypriots have not made any visible progress
removing the bridge. "TRNC" leaders publicly blame the delay
on "agitation" by local nationalist opposition forces, led by
Serdar Denktash, who categorize the unilateral demolition of
the bridge as a "concession" to Papadopoulos. The GOC,
meanwhile, has alternated between dismissing Talat's bridge
announcement as a "ruse" and claiming that, in any case,
Talat is a puppet who lacks the authority to act without
Turkish direction. President Papadopoulos stated that the
removal of the bridge would not be enough for the GOC to
agree to the opening of the checkpoint, and has dusted off a
series of additional demands including the demilitarization
of the Old City and the removal of flags and symbols in the
area -- despite their presence at currently-existing crossing
points.


10. (C) Turkish Cypriot officials have criticized
Papadopoulos's "bullying provocation" and promised us that
the bridge "would definitely come down soon." They insist
that as the "sovereign president of he TRNC", this is Talat's
call to make. Off the record, however, "PM" Soyer and
Talat's private Secretary Asim Akansoy confess that it is not
a done deal. According to them, Talat's January 4 visit to
Istanbul was an "emergency consultation" with Turkish PM
Erdogan and FM Gul. They reportedly offered their quiet
support to the removal of the bridge as a way to stay "on
step ahead" of Papadopoulos, but gave no hint of sticking
their necks out for Talat with regard to TGS Chief Buyukanit
or the military. Talat's January 5 meeting with Buyukanit
is, they say, likely to be more difficult -- and constitutes
a last-ditch attempt to win military approval to take down
the bridge.

COMMENT: TALAT'S CREDIBILITY ON THE LINE
--------------


11. (C) A fully-functional Ledra Street crossing seems
unlikely any time soon, even if the bridge comes down.
Although the bridge has distracted attention from this fact
for over a year, the GOC remains ambivalent (to say the
least) about the wisdom of opening a checkpoint that would be
politically and economically very beneficial to the Turkish
Cypriots. Papadopoulos's decision to attach additional
conditions could easily be viewed as attempt to create
fall-back pretexts to delay the checkpoint further.


12. (C) The current Ledra Street situation is about more than
just another checkpoint. What started as an apparently
honest (if clumsy and uncoordinated) attempt by Talat to
seize the initiative in the Cyprus problem has quickly
lurched into a crisis. After seeking and receiving public
messages of support for his decision from us, the UK, and

NICOSIA 00000021 003 OF 003


UNFICYP, Talat has yet to deliver. More ominously, Talat has
challenged the army in the arena of security, where the
Turkish Cypriots have traditionally held very little sway.
If he cannot prevail upon them to accept his right to decide
in this matter, his legitimacy as a leader, both in the eyes
of the international community and here on the island, will
be in tatters. Talat could conceivably make good on his (so
far private) threat to resign if this episode proves that he
is, indeed, merely a Turkish puppet. Even if the talk of
resignation is just a bluff, however, a humiliating defeat
would severely limit Talat's leeway to engage constructively
in the Gambari process. END COMMENT.
ZIMMERMAN