DIKO: NEW LEADERSHIP, OLD THINK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000209

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM CY TU
SUBJECT: DIKO: NEW LEADERSHIP, OLD THINK

REF: NICOSIA 197

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)



1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Of Cyprus's Big Four political parties,
only DIKO saw its vote haul increase in the most recent
elections (December 2006). A confident DIKO President Marios
Karoyian attributes the success to a reorganization effort he
initiated upon taking office in October. The party's message
had always resonated with the Cypriot population, Karoyian
informed the Ambassador March 6, but its top-down decision
making and cumbersome hierarchy had hindered connections with
the electorate. With new blood and a cleaner organizational
chart, he predicted greater DIKO victories in coming years,
starting with the 2008 presidential elections. Karoyian
vigorously defended former party leader and current RoC
President Tassos Papadopoulos -- "by no means the hard-liner
the opposition denigrates." The President remained committed
to reunification and determined to better the lot of Turkish
Cypriots, he insisted. Turning to the Cyprus Problem,
Karoyian agreed with the Ambassador that the July 8 process
must soon deliver progress, lest both sides and the
international community lose interest. While the Greek
Cypriot side was determined to deal, Karoyian believed
Turkey, the real power north of the Green Line, was not. The
latest issue dividing the communities, Turkish Cypriots'
insistence on direct trade, had political, not economic
motivations, and thus would prove a disincentive to
reunification, he concluded. END SUMMARY.

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New Bodies, New Ideas, Better Results
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2. (U) A worsening in his father's medical condition had
forced Karoyian to postpone the call a week. Despite that
concern -- and Karoyian's imminent check-in to a stop-smoking
clinic in Limassol -- the DIKO leader radiated calm and
confidence (and various kinds of smoke) throughout the
meeting. He claimed he had succeeded in revamping DIKO's
organizational chart in less than five months in office.
"Reorganization of the party was my top priority," he
explained. Karoyian's new lieutenants held functional, not
regional responsibilities, allowing better performance
through specialization. All would focus on strengthening
DIKO's appeal to Cypriot youth, however, the key to growing
the party. The new blood and energized bureaucracy would
ensure that DIKO's message, always palatable to Cypriot
rank-and-file, would reach and influence voters.


3. (SBU) On his watch DIKO had become more democratic and
less dogmatic. While he would strive to present a unified
party voice externally, Karoyian opposed efforts to stifle
internal debate. Recent comments by DIKO member and current
EU Health Commissioner Markos Kyprianou, seemingly
disparaging Papadopoulos's handling of the Cyprus Problem,
caused Karoyian little heartburn, for example. "Kyprianou's
not a member of the executive committee," he argued, "and he
did not intend to criticize the President." Rather, the EU
Commissioner had sought only to impress that solving the
CyProb was not Brussels's sole raison d'etre.

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He Loves Turkish Cypriots. He Really, Really Does
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4. (SBU) Despite declining to comment on the widely-held
expectation that Papadopoulos would stand for re-election,
Karoyian defended the President in the mode of a campaign
spin-doctor. "This man is not the hard-liner his enemies
claim," he contended. In the run-up to the Annan Plan
referenda, for example, just after winning election in 2003,
Papadopoulos sought limited changes that would ensure the
plan's workability. But Turkish Cypriots drew immediate
redlines, Karoyian insisted, and succeeded in painting the
President the intransigent party.


5. (SBU) Papadopoulos hoped to leave a "reformer" legacy,
the DIKO chief avowed. Yet the President felt boxed-in --
opposition DISY and the international community criticized
his every CyProb move. There was actually a positive story
to tell vis-a-vis rapprochement efforts; under Papadopoulos,
T/Cs had obtained the "right" to work in the
government-controlled areas, to acquire RoC passports, and to
secure free medical care unavailable to most Greek Cypriots.
Even Turkey was enjoying Papadopoulos's largesse, since twice
the RoC had kept holstered its EU accession veto, bucking
public demand. Why, then, his hard-line reputation?

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Stalled Process Benefits No One
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6. (SBU) Turning to the Gambari Process negotiations, the
Ambassador emphasized the same points he earlier had made
with party leaders Nikos Anastassiades (DISY),Dimitris
Cristofias (AKEL),and Yiannakis Omirou (EDEK): every party
to the conflict required and benefited from movement on the
local talks, albeit for different reasons. Claims that
progress was impossible due to coming elections in Cyprus,
Greece and Turkey were bunk, he stressed, and creative
thinking was needed. Karoyian agreed 2007 could not become a
lost year. "We don't want a solution in 15 or 20 years
time," he insisted, "but in 2008." Greek Cypriot negotiator
Tasos Tzionis soon would unveil a proposal designed to
overcome the Gambari Process impasse, Karoyian promised.
What the process required now was flexibility from the
Turkish Cypriot side.


7. (C) He doubted they would demonstrate such give. Echoing
a G/C refrain, Karoyian claimed Ankara's Deep State, not
"TRNC President" Mehmet Ali Talat or his representatives,
dictated T/C negotiating positions. "The Cyprus Problem is
not a conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots," he
maintained, alluding to Turkey proper. "WE can live together
as brothers." In response, the Ambassador suggested a
strategy that differentiated between Talat and Turkey.
Bad-mouthing the T/C leader at every opportunity, which Greek
Cypriot leaders were wont to do, would harden Talat's own
line, however, and force him to seek support from T/C
nationalists and the Turkish military.


8. (C) Karoyian cautioned against a stepped-up USG role in
solving the Cyprus Problem -- though the Ambassador had
suggested none. "Unfortunately, your image here is not
good," the DIKO leader pronounced. While all nations were
free to pursue their interests, those of the United States
and Cyprus did not coincide, he thought. A support role
pushing the parties to make progress on the UN track seemed
the better play. America's interest lay in reuniting Cyprus,
the Ambassador countered. He pointedly left aside the
question of what part the USG might play in future
initiatives, however.

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Trade for Trade's Sake, Only
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9. (C) Returning to his "Papadopoulos the Uniter" campaign,
Karoyian claimed the President supported efforts aimed at
improving Turkish Cypriots' standard of living. "Why
wouldn't he?," he questioned -- efforts undertaken to buoy
the T/C economy now, not later, might shave $4 billion from
the total cost of reconstruction. T/Cs were RoC citizens,
Karoyian asserted. Commerce between them and the European
Union should be encouraged, not thwarted. Yet the T/C's
fight for an EU regulation allowing trade through Famagusta
port had political, not economic underpinnings. For these
reasons, Karoyian continued, the T/Cs sought to prevent their
own businessmen from making deals using Limassol and Larnaca
ports in the government-controlled area.


10. (SBU) Upgrading the pseudo-state remained the "TRNC's"
primary objective, and opening Famagusta represented a
concrete milestone, Karoyian reasoned. There was no
compelling commercial reason to open another port; more
modern facilities like Limassol and Larnaca already were
money-losers. Further, he doubted that reputable shipping
lines would seek to do business in Famagusta. RoC officials
would continue to fight in Brussels against action they
deemed injurious to Cypriot sovereignty, Karoyian concluded.

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COMMENT
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11. (C) Marios Karoyian personifies DIKO,s "new guard" and
recent reinvigoration. Impressive for his work ethic and
political astuteness, the half Armenian, half Maronite
Cypriot possesses tremendous ambition as well, although a run
for the RoC presidency seems a way off. Not surprisingly, he
has focused on buttressing DIKO internally and increasing the
party's voter base, with notable success so far. Regarding
the Cyprus Problem, the Ambassador's visit shows there is
little light between the hard-line positions of Karoyian and
predecessor Papadopoulos. Their shared ideology underpins
this concordance, of course, but so do Karoyian's political

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aspirations, since no one rises in DIKO by bucking the boss's
line. END COMMENT.
SCHLICHER