Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NICOSIA197
2007-03-07 15:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

COMMUNIST CHIEF UNDECIDED ON PRESIDENTIAL RUN

Tags:  PGOV PREL CY TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8691
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0197/01 0661554
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071554Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7603
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0810
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000197 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY TU
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHIEF UNDECIDED ON PRESIDENTIAL RUN

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000197

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY TU
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CHIEF UNDECIDED ON PRESIDENTIAL RUN

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: AKEL desires continued cooperation with
coalition mates DIKO and EDEK, Secretary General Dimitris
Christofias informed the Ambassador March 5. Nonetheless,
party leaders have not yet determined whether to support a
re-election bid by President Tassos Papadopoulos, urge the
coalition to dump the incumbent in favor of an AKEL man, or
run an independent campaign in the 2008 race; he expected a
decision at the party congress in June. On the Cyprus
Problem, Christofias lamented the lack of movement on the
Gambari Process negotiations but cautioned that the
international community's efforts "to rush" the 2004 Annan
Plan had led to its defeat. AKEL remained committed to
cross-Green Line political contacts, specifically the
AKEL-CTP connection, since "only through dialog with Turkish
Cypriots -- children of the same homeland -- can we end the
division of Cyprus." "TRNC President" and CTP boss Mehmet
Ali Talat disappointed him, however. While not the "Denktash
II" his harshest Greek Cypriot critics claimed, Talat's
pro-solution message seemed more diluted every day,
Christofias argued, a result of pressure from Turkey's
military and "Deep State." END SUMMARY.

-------------- -
An AKEL Candidacy? Maybe, Perhaps, We'll See.
-------------- -


2. (C) Stop Two on this latest round of outreach to the
island's political party leaders (Septels),the Ambassador
March 5 called on AKEL Secretary General and President of
Parliament Dimitris Christofias. The cherubic (in
appearance, if not always in demeanor) commissar was in
excellent spirits, praising the Ambassador's demeanor and
handling of the Cyprus Problem and bilateral relations with
the RoC. "American officials have not always been helpful to
our national cause," he alleged. "When former Secretary
Powell invited then-'TRNC Prime Minister' Talat to
Washington, for example, in effect he had politically
upgraded the breakaway state." In response, the Ambassador
reminded Christofias that this meeting and other engagements
with the current T/C leadership were grounded in the sides'

support for a reunification agenda, which the United States
strongly supports


3. (C) Christofias turned quickly to domestic politics and
Cyprus's 2008 presidential elections. On his mind was recent
speculation that AKEL was hedging its bets over supporting
Papadopoulos's re-election bid. "Like I told (leading Cypriot
daily) 'Phileleftheros' in yesterday's interview, I'm NOT
going to be clear on this," he asserted. AKEL favored
continued coordination with the President's DIKO and
Socialist EDEK. But the party had not yet chosen between
three courses of action: supporting Papadopoulos as the
coalition candidate next February, lobbying EDEK and DIKO to
back AKEL's choice instead, or fielding a candidate
independent from the coalition. Each approach offered
plusses and minuses, and the decision was not his alone to
take. "The party congress will have a say," he explained,
referring to AKEL's yearly rank-and-file gathering, taking
place this year in June.


4. (C) Personal ambition -- a drive for the Presidency --
would not affect AKEL's choice, Christofias swore. His
current job provided plenty of satisfaction. AKEL long had
been the party of democracy in Cyprus; Christofias hoped to
make it the party of liberation (from Turkish troops),
rapprochement (with Turkish Cypriots),and eventual
reunification of the island under a bi-zonal, bi-communal
federation.

--------------
Talks Going Nowhere, Fast
--------------


5. (C) In tune with the Ambassador, the Communist boss rued
the slow pace of Gambari Process negotiations; eight months
after the UN undersecretary had brokered the deal, its
envisioned technical committees and working groups had not
yet convened. Here, Christofias toed the Papadopoulos line,
placing blame squarely upon Turkish Cypriots. Why Talat was
slow-rolling on the property element befuddled him, for
example. Certainly property comprised a final settlement
issue and was therefore grist for the working groups, but it
also affected day-to-day life and thus merited technical
committee attention. Local UN negotiator Michael Moller had
proven a capable mediator, Christofias ventured, but Turkish
Cypriot negotiator Rashid Pertev was unreliable -- Pertev
often supported positions one day, only to flip-flop the

NICOSIA 00000197 002 OF 002


next. The cause for such behavior, Christofias surmised, was
Turkish military and/or "Deep State" dissatisfaction with
Pertev's (and by extension, Talat's) tack.


6. (C) "My good friend, Mehmet Ali" was how Christofias
referred to the Turkish Cypriot leader. Talat's CTP had
shown great courage during the reign of T/C strongman and
perennial partition-supporter Rauf Denktash, he argued. For
decades the parties had collaborated, staging massive
rallies, sponsoring bi-communal youth outings for youth, and
searching for an equitable CyProb solution. AKEL and CTP
leaders continued to meet twice a month, on either side of
the Green Line. The CTP seemed to have lost its pro-solution
way, however. "I know Talat's in a tough spot with Turkey,"
Christofias admitted. But the harder line the "TRNC
President" was espousing did him and his community no favors.
The petroleum issue appeared a perfect case in point -- did
Talat believe that vaguely threatening the
internationally-recognized Cypriot Government would create a
climate conducive to settlement negotiations?

--------------
Sides Pulling Further Apart
--------------


7. (C) Christofias lamented the rise of nationalism on both
sides of the island. Especially troubling were polling
results that showed Cypriot youth leaning toward partition,
not reunification. Each day that passed made solving the
CyProb that much harder, he concluded. Christofias agreed
with the Ambassador that both communities' public messages
toward the other required re-thinking. Already he had urged
Papadopoulos to muzzle Government Spokesman Christodolou
Pashiardis, with some success. Pashiardis's T/C counterpart,
Hassan Ercakica, was a friend since student days, Christofias
revealed. He would deliver to Ercakica the same "if you
can't say something good..." message at their next meeting.


8. (C) The ongoing debate in EU circles over Turkish Cypriot
"isolation" frustrated the AKEL leader. "They have succeeded
in diverting attention from the true problem, Turkey's
occupation of an EU member state," Christofias winced. The
RoC had great stories to tell, having extended free medical
care, issued 75,000 passport, and opened its labor marked to
T/Cs. Its propaganda machine had failed miserably, however,
leaving Greek Cypriots constantly on the defensive. Now
Talat and company were pushing hard on direct trade, and they
seemed to enjoy support in the European Commission and
current EU Presidency. Nicosia would oppose tooth and nail
any EU actions amounting to an upgrade of the "pseudostate,"
Christofias promised.

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (C) Media here are agog over the possibility the
"dissatisfied" Communists might abandon the governing
coalition and go it alone in 2008. After all, their
reasoning goes, senior partner AKEL's polling numbers nearly
double those of DIKO, yet the party's influence in major
policy areas -- read, the Cyprus Problem -- fails to keep
pace. Nevertheless, the power-sharing arrangement serves
AKEL and Christofias well. Never before have party faithful
directed four ministries and run powerful parastatal
organizations, for example. A solo AKEL presidential run
could deliver greater spoils still, but probably would fail
and leave the party weaker, unacceptable to the risk-averse
Christofias. We therefore consider his public mulling but a
tactical ploy and believe the Communist leader, after a great
measure of Kabuki dancing, will announce the party's support
for Papadopoulos at its congress this summer.


10. (C) Christofias's CyProb gloom-and-doom came as no
surprise, either. Instinctively the most pro-solution of the
governing coalition's parties, AKEL seems genuinely troubled
by the slow pace of negotiations and ever-harsher barbs the
communities are trading. Yet his same risk aversion will
prevent the AKEL SecGen from leaning too heavily on
Papadopoulos for more flexibility in the local process, as
long as the voting public remains relatively comfortable with
the Cyprus status quo. END COMMENT.
SCHLICHER