NEW TURKISH ENGAGEMENT REGS; LIVE FIRE IN BUFFER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000126

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP MOPS CY TU
SUBJECT: NEW TURKISH ENGAGEMENT REGS; LIVE FIRE IN BUFFER
ZONE.

REF: A. NICOSIA CY IIR 6 823 0056 07

B. EMBASSY NICOSIA - EUR/SE EMAILS OF 1/31/07

C. 2/6/07

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (U) UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) military informed
Embassy DAO January 31 that Turkish Forces (TF) a day earlier
had fired on Greek Cypriot farmers in or near the Buffer Zone
(BZ). Two separate incidents had occurred, in Astromeritis,
west of Nicosia and the site of a BZ crossing point, and in
Atheniou, southeast of the capital.


2. (U) UNFICYP Civil Affairs Chief Kyoko Shiotani informed
the Embassy January 31 that UN forces were investigating the
two live-fire incidents (Ref B). In Astromeritis, a Greek
Cypriot farmer had told local UNFICYP personnel that the TF
fired six shots at him, although the UN troops in the area
had heard no gunfire (a Turkish Army officer and a Turkish
diplomat separately confirmed the account, however).
Shiotani considered the second incident, in Atheniou, even
more worrisome. There, the UN was investigating reports that
the TF had fired on a black jeep that reportedly had
encroached to within a few meters of the Turkish Cypriot
cease-fire line (CFL, the northern edge of the BZ). Shiotani
fretted that similar encounters with potentially lethal
outcomes were imminent. Expounding, she claimed that Greek
Cypriot farmers were routinely ignoring the UN's "Farming
Security Line" that roughly bisected the BZ, tilling fields
that nearly reached the T/C CFL.


3. (C) DAO confirmed the shooting accounts February 1 in a
meeting with a senior Turkish Army colonel (Ref A). The
officer, who advises Turkish Forces Commander in Cyprus LTG
Kivrikoglu, asserted the TF had deliberately staged the
incidents to express displeasure with G/C farming practices
within the BZ. Kivrikoglu on January 29 had ordered changes
to a long-standing policy of restraint and non-confrontation,
the staff officer revealed, in response to "UNFICYP
encouraging (sic) the G/Cs to normalize activities within the
BZ by allowing its increased civilian use." The Turkish
Forces regarded the BZ as purely a security zone; any changes
to the permitted activities regime could occur only as part
of a comprehensive Cyprus solution. Under the TF's new rules
of engagement, the officer continued, troops would first
offer verbal warnings (in Turkish, usually),then fire
warning shots in the air, shots in the ground near the
perpetrator(s),and finally, shots intended to wound.


4. (C) UNFICYP is growing increasingly worried that
hardening attitudes in both communities threatens its ability
to carry out the UN's security mandate in the BZ, Shiotani
noted February 9. Especially since the 2005 reduction in
force numbers, each side was trying to exert authority in
territory the UN patrolled, the Greek Cypriots with their
farmers and civilian construction and the Turkish troops with
their aggressive posturing and cocked rifles. She asked for
USG assistance in bringing both sides to heel. The UN's
preferred mechanism was a late 1980s aide memoire that
specified UNFICYP's rights and activities within the BZ (Post
will attempt to secure a copy to deliver to EUR/SE.) For
years, both sides had respected the document in principle,
but never had formally accepted it. UNFICYP had instituted a
full-court press to convince both sides to sign, but was
making no headway, she lamented.


5. (C) Greek Cypriots sought to assert full authority over
the BZ, Shiotani asserted, despite numerous UNSCRs giving
UNFICYP control over certain functions. She understood that
G/Cs needed the ability to manage villages scattered the
length of the 180-kilometer strip; that said, their
maximalist demands were excessive. Expecting the UN to bow
out completely from the construction permit process was a
non-starter, for example. Turning to UNFICYP's relations
with Turkish Forces, a different set of problems arose.
Rather than promoting the BZ's return to normal conditions --
as reads the UN Civil Affairs mandate -- the TF hoped to
freeze it in time. They interpreted any new construction as
a violation of the status quo and bone for immediate
contention, Shiotani revealed. Maintaining equilibrium
between the divergent stances was consuming more and more
UNFICYP energy and putting peacekeepers in a riskier and more
difficult position.


6. (C) The UN is fighting the BZ battle in New York as well
(Ref C). According to UNFICYP DCM Wlodek Cibor, a UN DPKO
official has summoned the Turkish PermRep to a February 14

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meeting, at which the Secretariat will protest formally the
TF's aggressive new Buffer Zone SOP. Cibor believed that
Cyprus had come up in the February 9 meeting in New York
between Turkish FM Abdullah Gul and new SYG Ban Ki-Moon,
although the two-para unofficial readout he had read did not
provide much detail.


7. (C) COMMENT: These activities are worrying in their own
right; at the same time, they come in the context of
lingering, possibly even increasing tension between the
Turkish military and the Talat "administration" in northern
Cyprus.
SCHLICHER