FM LAVROV DELIVERS SUPPORT FROM MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 001002

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/SCE, EUR/RUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY RU SE
SUBJECT: FM LAVROV DELIVERS SUPPORT FROM MOSCOW

REF: BRUSSELS 3480

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Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Greek Cypriot opinion leaders characterized
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's December 9-10 visit to the
island as "Russia Riding to the Rescue." Lavrov's timing was
impeccable, and seemingly too providential (for the G/C
cause) to be coincidental. He arrived shortly before two key
debates: the UN Security Council discussing renewal of the
UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Secretary General's
locally-controversial December UNFICYP report, and EU
ministers and heads of state/government tackling Kosovo final
status. Mainstream media and pro-government politicians
subsequently would claim Lavrov helped deliver victory in
both, with the administration milking the results for maximum
electoral gain. Russian interventions in New York had
defeated the "Anglo-American attempt to interject unfair
political criteria" into the UNFICYP debate and ensured
passage of UNSCR favorable to Greek Cypriots, the newspapers
trumpeted. Along similar lines, Lavrov's widely-covered
comments on the dangerous, precedent-setting nature of a
Kosovo unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) had
bolstered Nicosia's arguments in Brussels, and perhaps
convinced member-state fence-sitters to oppose a UDI. More
thoughtful commentators and third-country diplomats
questioned what "quo" Cyprus had offered for Russia's "quid,"
since Lavrov's message throughout had delighted even the
hardest G/C hard-liners. Similarly worried, UNFICYP contacts
fretted that a developing Nicosia-Moscow "axis" boded poorly
for Cyprus Problem negotiations. END SUMMARY.

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Long in the Works, but Timing TBD
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2. (C) Scuttlebutt here regarding a pending Lavrov visit
surfaced in the fall, growing in volume after GoR Special
Cyprus Coordinator Leonid Abramov visited the island November
17-18. Russian Embassy DCM Alexander Shcherbakov informed us
November 21 that Abramov had traveled to Cyprus "to prepare
the ground" for the Minister's visit, tentatively scheduled
for December 10-12. Lavrov had no specific purpose in coming
to Cyprus other than to reciprocate for then-Cypriot FM
George Lillikas's February trip to Moscow, Shcherbakov
asserted. He expected "the usual:" calls on President
Tassos Papadopoulos, House President Dimitris Christofias,
and FM Erato Marcoullis. As Cyprus, not his embassy, was
crafting the schedule, he expected Lavrov would remain south
of the Green Line and see no Turkish Cypriots officially.
Shcherbakov acknowledged the potential electoral
repercussions of organizing a high-level visit while Cyprus's
presidential campaign was hitting full stride. "It's
unavoidable, however," was his justification.

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Mostly Music to G/C Ears
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3. (SBU) Lavrov evidently shortened his visit to allow
attendance at a Russia-EU Dialogue meeting in Brussels
(Reftel). Arriving December 9, he conducted the planned
meetings and also took time to bestow the "Pushkin Medal" on
the Russian-educated Christofias and a former Cypriot
minister. His press conferences following the Papadopoulos
and Marcoullis meetings generated most of the press play,
however. Lavrov first took aim the December UNFICYP report,
whose "pro-Turk" contents had spawned greater-than-normal
angst amongst Greek Cypriots. On Paragraph 45, which stated
"...the upcoming year may prove to be crucial in the search
for a comprehensive settlement," Lavrov blasted Secretary
General Ban Ki-Moon for attempting to impose timetables on
the negotiation. No such timetables would grace the UNSCR
that eventually endorsed the report, he promised. Referring
to Russia's stance on the Cyprus Problem, Lavrov parroted the
oft-repeated Greek Cypriot maxim that any solution must be
"viable, workable, and based on a body of prior UNSCRs."


4. (U) With Troika talks having concluded the same day and
with Kosovo garnering great coverage here, media sought
Lavrov's position on final status. The Russian was careful
not to proffer a direct Kosovo-Cyprus comparison (although
the press took that liberty in interpreting his remarks
later). Asked to reveal Russia's likely reaction to a Kosovo
UDI and other nations' responses to it, the Minister remarked
that countries recognizing Kosovo would violate international
law and set off a chain reaction in the Balkans and
elsewhere. "The West should think long and hard before
taking this route," he concluded.

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5. (SBU) Subsequent days' headlines screamed "A Setback for
the Anglo-Americans" and "Russia to the Rescue;" reportedly
the government was "completely satisfied" by Lavrov's visit.
No longer would Britain and the United States exercise
exclusive control over Cyprus Problem negotiations, now that
Moscow, a permanent Security Council member, was exerting its
influence. Self-congratulatory back-patting increased with
news of "victory" in New York; the latest UNSCR did not
welcome the unpleasant UNFICYP report, but rather only
sections of it. Additional good news came from Brussels,
with tougher-than-expected Council conclusions criticizing
Turkey, and with no member-state consensus emerging over
recognition of Kosovo's independence. Such outcomes proved
that President Papadopoulos's hard-line policies were
delivering successes, the pro-government press reported, and
disproved allegations of Cyprus's worsening reputation and
growing isolation in international fora.

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But At What Price?
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6. (C) Papadopoulos detractors, both media and political,
soon began asking what Cyprus had offered to cement this
asymmetric friendship between an island and a superstate.
Most alleged a simplistic "Kosovo for Cyprus" arrangement, in
which Nicosia committed to opposing recognition of a Kosovo
UDI within EU fora -- much to Russia and Serbia's liking --
while Russia promised to protect Greek Cypriots' interests in
the Security Council. More serious critics questioned
whether doing Russia's bidding in Brussels amounted to
abandoning Cyprus's true allies and interests, which lay
firmly in the West, not the East. Cyprus risked becoming
Moscow's "EU satellite," certain to bring a harsh reaction
from fellow member-states.


7. (C) In a de-brief December 13, Shcherbakov dismissed talk
of an axis or arrangement between the two nations. Also
false -- "pure conspiracy theory" -- were allegations that
Lavrov had timed his visit specifically to offer Cyprus
and/or Papadopoulos a lifeline Shared interests explained
the shared positions of Moscow and Nicosia on Kosovo and the
Cyprus Problem, he insisted. Both opposed separatism,
whether in Kosovo or elsewhere. Both favored political
solutions enjoying blessing from all sides to the dispute.
And both Russia and Cyprus opposed arbitration, "suffocating
timetables," and internationally-imposed settlements. Such
commonality of interests ensured constructive discussion on
other matters tackled during the visit, Shcherbakov added,
from Russia-Cyprus law enforcement cooperation to visa policy.


8. (C) Foreign Ministry official Maria Michael confirmed
December 12 that Cyprus and Russia had made progress on the
bilateral agenda during FM Lavrov's visit. In addition to
legal and consular matters, the sides also reached agreement
on unspecified technical and economic agreements. The
significance of Lavrov's visit lay in his comments regarding
the Cyprus Problem, however. His pro-Greek Cypriot stance in
the MFA press conference had surprised even Cypriot
counterpart Marcoullis. "We couldn't have drafted better
talking points," Michael chuckled. Like Shcherbakov, she
disparaged rumors of a mutual back-scratching arrangement
between the nations. "We see things the same way in Kosovo
and on the island," she concluded.


9. (C) Ban Ki-Moon's Cyprus report could have damaged
Cypriot interests gravely, asserted Greek Embassy DCM
Nicholas Garilides December 13. The UNFICYP document invited
countries to upgrade relations with the Turkish Cypriot
entity to a level just below official recognition -- "just
like Taiwan." It therefore was predictable the RoC would
trot out its biggest guns in defense. Whether or not the
visit's original focus was bilateral issues, Papadopoulos and
Marcoullis had had no choice but to lobby Lavrov hard
regarding the Cyprus Problem and Kosovo. It was not
difficult for Moscow to say "yes" to the request, Garilides
reasoned. Russia already backed the G/C position, and by
stating it so clearly, had won the RoC's gratitude. "A small
investment for a big payout -- Cyprus's help in Brussels, on
Kosovo and other matters." In playing the Russia card,
however, Cyprus had taken a step bound to draw larger EU
member-states' ire and leave it isolated. "I would not want
to be in their position," Garilides reflected.

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And to the Detriment of CyProb Negotiations?
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10. (C) Lavrov's aggressive tone and solidly pro-G/C message
had startled UNFICYP Senior Adviser Wlodek Cibor, especially
considering that Russian Ambassador Andrei Nestrenko normally
adopted reasonable, balanced positions in Nicosia P-5
representatives' meetings. Lavrov had opened their December
10 call by brandishing a copy of Papadopoulos's latest
proposal to jump-start the moribund July 8 Process
negotiations, Cibor revealed on December 13, and questioning
why Ban's report had not praised the G/C leader's efforts.
Lobbing G/C buzzwords liberally -- "settlers," "pseudostate,"
and "so-called isolation" being three -- Lavrov laid blame
squarely on Turkey for the stall in negotiations. "And why
was it imperative to reach a solution in 2008?" the Russian
demanded, alluding again to the Ban report. "Why not 2009 or
2010?"


11. (C) The meeting with Lavrov reminded Cibor of
get-togethers with Papadopoulos and his fellow G/C
hard-liners. Had the Greek Cypriots succeeded in obtaining
Russia's blind support on the Cyprus Problem, perhaps in
exchange for backing in Brussels? If so, chances for
significant movement in settlement talks seemed scant, since
the G/Cs would take extreme positions knowing that Moscow had
their backs.

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Comment:
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12. (C) It is immaterial whether Cyprus and Russia
established a formal arrangement during the Lavrov visit to
support each other's respective interests in European Union
and United Nations fora; for the short-term, their positions
on Kosovo and the Cyprus Problem are in synch, albeit for
different reasons. We would hope that Cyprus's sharpest
strategic minds are weighing the long-term pros and cons of a
virtual alliance guaranteed to raise EU member-state
suspicions and complicate consensus-building in Brussels,
however. But for the time being, it's party hats and Dom
Perignon at the Presidency and MFA, with officials
celebrating a diplomatic victory over the vilified
"Anglo-Americans." Papadopoulos benefited greatly from
Lavrov's visit, and it's no great leap to assume he
stage-managed the timing and optics for maximum bounce.
Recent months had seen his polling in decline, due partly to
a string of foreign policy setbacks. But in the last seven
days, he has delivered -- or at least created the impression
of delivering, through media hyping of the normal
give-and-take of the UNSCR rollover exercise -- success on
both the EU and UN fronts, and won endorsement from Nicosia's
closest CyProb ally, Russia. The next round of polls will
emerge in early January, and we expect the President's
numbers to level out or even inch up as a result.
SCHLICHER