ISLAM IN NIGER (2): STUMBLING BLOCKS FOR IZALA IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NIAMEY 000076

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINR EAID SOCI KDEM NG
SUBJECT: ISLAM IN NIGER (2): STUMBLING BLOCKS FOR IZALA IN
THE "EXODE ZONE"

REF: 06 NIAMEY 1193

Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER ZACH HARKENRIDER FOR REASON 1.4 (D)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Reftel offered several themes to be examined in a
series of cables on Islam in Niger. In this edition, Poloff
reports on conversations with a prominent Imam that
illuminate the extent of fundamentalist penetration into the
central Nigerien region of Tahoua - an area linked by
proximity and language both to northern Nigeria's Sharia
states and Algeria / Mali. We examine the role of Middle
Eastern and South Asian clergy in spreading fundamentalist
doctrine, the strength of traditional Sufi clergy, and the
effects of economic migration on religious practice.
Conclusions defied certain expectations.


2. (C) Poloff discovered some very simple but effective
barriers to the spread of foreign Islamic fundamentalism in
Niger. While trade and economic migration transmit new
interpretations of Islam, they do not do so consistently;
where Nigeriens go determines what they bring back, and
Tahoua Hausas usually give the fundamentalist zone of Nigeria
a pass. Foreign preachers are spreading fundamentalist
doctrines, but their influence and effectiveness are limited
by language barriers and the reluctance of moderate
establishment clergy to give them space. Traditional
authorities remain strong, and their moderate, Sufi Islam is
holding fast in this part of Hausaland. END SUMMARY

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TAHOUA AND THE "EXODE:" A LEGACY
OF ECONOMIC MIGRATION
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3. (U) Tahoua is an interesting test case by virtue of its
role as a conduit for north / south trade and its peoples'
tradition of seasonal economic migration toward coastal
Africa. Both, presumably, would make Tahoua's Hausa villagers
less isolated than other Nigeriens and more likely to come
into contact with foreign theologies. The city of Tahoua sits
on the main north / south highway that runs from Nigeria
toward Algeria. The region of Tahoua extends from the border
town of Birni N'Konni in the south to isolated nomadic
communities bordering Algeria and Mali in the north. When
people and goods move between the West African coast and the
Mahgreb, they move through Tahoua region. Seasonal economic
migration or "exode" by Tahoua region's mostly Hausa
population is a phenomenon of long standing. While exode is a
national phenomenon, Tahoua is widely acknowledged to be the
principal source of migrants. Traditionally, the migrant
route led to the West African coast. More recently, Libya has
become a favored destination. These Nigeriens villagers
return home with money and ideas from the country's near
abroad, often building houses or improving their farms with
their savings. The scale of exode here means that ordinary
villagers from Tahoua spend less time at home and enjoy more
contact with neighboring cultures than their counterparts
from other regions.

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IMAM MOUSTAPHA: SUFISM AND IZALA
IN THE "EXODE" ZONE
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4. (U) Poloff examined the implications of this contact for
the region's religious culture during a December trip there.
Our concern was with the spread of fundamentalist Islamic
doctrines in a cultural zone traditionally dominated by
moderate, syncretistic Sufi theology. This can be defined
more specifically as the challenge posed to the dominant
Tidjaniya and Quadiriyya Sufi orders and their Maliki
(Egyptian origin) jurisprudence by "Ihiyaus Sunnah wa
Ikhmatul Bidi'ah," or Izala, and its Hanbali (Saudi origin)
jurisprudence. NOTE: The foregoing translates from Hausa as
"in favor of Sunna and against innovation." Ironically, this
derives from the title of a book, famous in Hausaland, by the
19th century Fulani cleric Ousmane Dan Fodio. Dan Fodio, who
founded the Sokoto Caliphate, was a Quadiriyya Sufi. END NOTE


5. (C) In Tahoua on December 8, Poloff met with Imam Ahmed
Moustapha, who, at only 40 years of age, is the region's most

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prominent cleric. The Imam of the city's Grand Mosque and an
emerging leader of the moderate, GON affiliated Islamic
Association of Niger (AIN),Moustapha has been a mission
contact for the past few years. He preaches to a few thousand
worshippers each Friday, and hosts a radio show through which
he dispenses spiritual advice to a broad listenership. Like
most Nigerien religious leaders, he can be broadly described
as a Tidjaniya Sufi.


6. (C) Our relationship with Imam Moustapha is a testament to
the value of the public diplomacy (PD) efforts from which it
derives. The Imam had participated in a PD "caravan," in
2006, traveling to various cities for discussions on Islam
keynoted by an American Islamic scholar. In 2005 he hosted an
American Imam - Bachir Arafat - who lectured on Islam in the
US, and served as his Hausa translator during a service at
Tahoua's Grand Mosque. During his discussion with Poloff,
Moustapha stressed the importance and desirability of further
cultural exchanges on religion, noting that a true
understanding of Islam was best arrived at via a discursive,
participatory process such as that of the PD caravan lecture
tour.


7. (C) While our discussion was wide-ranging, the most
important elements pertained to the Sufi / Izala dynamic in
Tahoua. Poloff was interested to see what inroads
fundamentalist theology was making in this famous exode
center. Imam Moustapha argued that Izala played only a
limited role in the spiritual life of the people, noting that
the sect could claim only one mosque out of twelve principal
mosques in the city. He estimated that the Izalas only
attracted ten or twenty regular parishioners, mostly young
people of a more absolutist disposition. He traced their
development in Tahoua back to the late 1980s, and speculated
that they received money from Nigeria and from their national
association.


8. (C) The Imam offered two explanations for Izala's limited
role in Tahoua: that Sufi traditional chiefs still exercise a
veto over mosque construction, sermon content, and the right
to preach. Any foreign preacher who wishes to work in Tahoua
must pre-clear his sermon content with traditional chiefs and
Imam Moustapha. The Sufi orders monitor the preaching and
will expel those who preach heresy, violence, or intolerance
from the city's principal mosques. Moustapha also argued that
most foreign preachers who came bearing fundamentalist
theology were from the Middle East or South Asia, not,
interestingly enough, from Northern Nigeria. He noted that
the effectiveness of foreign preachers from Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, or India is limited by the language barrier. Able to
communicate only in Arabic, South Asian languages, or
possibly English, these foreign preachers depend on the good
offices of locals for the Arabic to Hausa translation that
would render their messages intelligible. Arabic speakers
(like English speakers) are few and far between in Niger, and
tend to be well educated and therefore moderate Sufi Muslims.
Usually, such scholars hail from moderate "establishment"
theological institutions like the Islamic University of Say
in Niger, or Al-Azhar University in Cairo. These clerics are
theological opponents of Izalist fundamentalism. COMMENT:
This theory implies that the quality of Arabic language
instruction in Niger's numerous French/Arabic medium
high-schools is rather poor. That is an assumption that Post
may examine at greater length as part of PD section's
reporting on education in Niger. END COMMENT.


9. (C) In any event, this linguistic "hedge" may constitute a
barrier to the importation of extremist theology from the
Middle-East and South Asia, but it would not blunt the impact
of Izalists from Hausa speaking Northern Nigeria. This is
where the particularities of the Tahoua exode come into play.
While Hausas from Maradi or Zinder tend to migrate to and
trade with Nigeria, Tahoua Hausas have traditionally been
attracted to Cote d'Ivoire. Poloff's visit to Tahoua and some
of its principal exode towns suggests that this tradition
persists in spite of the troubles in Cote d'Ivoire. Missing
the "Izala zone" by dint of historical happenstance, Tahoua's
Hausas lack the historical, economic, and cultural contacts
that transmit change. This strange lacuna explains the Imam's
claim that Tahoua sees few Nigerian preachers, and qualifies
an old axiom, which holds that Niger and Nigeria are so
closely linked that when the latter gets a cold, the former
sneezes.


10. (C) Imam Moustapha capped off our discussion of Sufism by

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taking Poloff to visit the city's chief Marabout, or
religious teacher / witch-doctor, the Sarkin Malamye. In a
testament to his popularity and political pull, the
residential street leading to Malamye's compound was blocked
to all but VIP vehicles. His house, like that of a
traditional chief in Hausaland, had a small mosque at the
front. Poloff was pleased to see a PD produced "Mosques of
America" calendar inside, likely a gift from Imam Moustapha.
After a brief conversation, the Sarkin blessed us with prayer
and invited Emboffs to visit again.

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COMMENT: SUFISM & SYNCRETISM
ALIVE AND WELL IN HAUSALAND
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11. (C) The Sarkin Malamye, regarded by local Sufis as rich
in religious and magical knowledge, personifies the
syncretism that lies at the heart of Niger's African Islam.
Nigeriens believe in their Marabouts; in the Sufi theology
they teach, and in the charms and amulets they bless and
dispense. It is this fusion of Islam and traditional cultural
practice that Izalists seek to expunge in favor of a more
globally consistent Islamic culture grounded exclusively in
fundamental texts. This ideological conflict has led a
prominent academic observer of Hausaland to characterize
Islamization as "de-Africanization." Efforts to de-Africanize
Nigerien Islam appear to face an up-hill battle in Tahoua,
where figures like Imam Moustapha and Sarkin Malamye enjoy a
great following.


12. (C) A trading town in the Hausa zone with a mobile
population, Tahoua should be wide-open for Nigerian style
fundamentalism. Izala's weak performance there shows how
patchy the spread of theology from Nigeria and the Near East
can be. Thwarted in Tahoua by circumstances of history and
language and by the tenacity of tradition, Izala's reach
appears limited even in Hausaland. Perhaps the example of
Ousmane Dan Fodio, unwitting contributor of Izala's full
name, is apposite. He too waged a "jihad" to de-Africanize
Islamic practice, but two centuries later it is his spiritual
legatees who keep African style syncretism alive and well in
Niger. END COMMENT.
ALLEN