Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NIAMEY739
2007-05-29 15:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Niamey
Cable title:  

ISLAM IN NIGER (4): ATTITUDES TOWARD IZALA IN

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R 291548Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3528
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
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RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 NIAMEY 000739 

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EUCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2017
TAGS: EAID KDEM PGOV PINR PTER SOCI KISL NG
SUBJECT: ISLAM IN NIGER (4): ATTITUDES TOWARD IZALA IN
HAUSALAND

REF: A. 06 NIAMEY 1193

B. NIAMEY 76

C. NIAMEY 123

D. INR BRIEF 11/14/00

E. NIAMEY 713

F. NIAMEY 714

G. NIAMEY 703

NIAMEY 00000739 001.2 OF 007


Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER ZACH HARKENRIDER FOR REASON 1.4 (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 NIAMEY 000739

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SIPDIS

DEPT AF/W FOR BACHMAN
DEPT INR/AA FOR BOGOSIAN
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER
PASS TO USAID FOR AMARTIN AND KTOWERS
EUCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2017
TAGS: EAID KDEM PGOV PINR PTER SOCI KISL NG
SUBJECT: ISLAM IN NIGER (4): ATTITUDES TOWARD IZALA IN
HAUSALAND

REF: A. 06 NIAMEY 1193

B. NIAMEY 76

C. NIAMEY 123

D. INR BRIEF 11/14/00

E. NIAMEY 713

F. NIAMEY 714

G. NIAMEY 703

NIAMEY 00000739 001.2 OF 007


Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER ZACH HARKENRIDER FOR REASON 1.4 (D)


1. (U) NOTE: This is the fourth in a series of cables
(reftels A,B,C) reporting on the changing nature of Islam in
Niger. END NOTE

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


2. (C) Previous cables in this series examined the rise, in
Niger, of a Wahhabist-inspired form of Islamic fundamentalism
from the Shari'a states of northern Nigeria. This edition
examines the reasons why Nigeriens -- particularly the
country's Hausa majority -- embrace or reject it, and
assesses its future here by assessing it in its heartland.
Izalat'bid'a - "the exclusion of all that is superfluous"
(Izala for short),is strongest in Niger's "Hausaland." In
the Hausa cities of southern Niger, elites have embraced
Izala and many ordinary Nigeriens have rallied to its
lavishly endowed mosques and social services. Middle-Eastern
money and the rise of new elites, it seems, are enabling the
importation of an ideology variously described as
"anti-western modernization," "Islamic globalization," and
"de-Africanization" of the faith. Each of these is a fair
description of Izala's effects, and each label describes an
important change in contemporary Niger. Yet, Poloff's
examination of Hausaland attitudes toward Izala over time and
during recent travel suggests some important limits to its
growth, political influence, and long-term prospects.


3. (C) The Government of Niger (GON) is hostile to divisive
ideologies, and has the means and inclination to control
them. While Izala produces tensions elsewhere, in Maradi,

where it first entered Niger and is strongest, traditional
leaders appear either comfortable with it or dismissive of
it. Many parishioners and patrons are attracted to Izala less
by genuine belief than by various opportunities for material
gain. Many traditional Nigerien Muslims, having flirted with
Izala, drift back into their old sects, no more radical for
the experience. Many of northern Nigeria's Izalists have gone
from being the revolutionaries and radicals of the 1980s to
the establishment figures of today. In Nigerien Hausaland,
which lags behind metropolitan Nigeria, Izala still seems
radical to many, but it may already be past its prime in
Niger. Izala's association with a small segment of an already
narrow commercial elite, and ordinary Nigeriens' ambivilent
reactions to the sect may contain its radicalizing potential
until time and familiarity entirely defuse it. END SUMMARY.

--------------
AT HOME IN HAUSALAND:
IZALA'S GEOGRAPHY
--------------


4. (C) While most of Niger's Hausa (fifty-three percent)
majority lives in the southern regions of Maradi, Tahoua, and
Zinder, Hausas also dominate northern cities like Agadez and
Arlit. Hausa ethnic identity and Izalist practice seem to
correlate strongly, although some minority groups are
attracted by the practices of their Hausa neighbors (reftel
C). The southern "Hausaland" states are home to roughly half
of the country's population. They contain cities of
historical and cultural importance like Zinder, and major
commercial centers like Maradi and Birni N'Konni. The Nigeria
border and trade routes heading north across the Sahara
define Hausaland. Wealth derives from commerce and
trans-shipment. As much as goods and persons, ideas flow up
from Kano, Katsina, and Sokoto. Niger watchers have long felt
that Nigerian Izalat'bid'a and its divisive politics could
infect Niger's Hausa belt. Fundamentalist-inspired riots over
a fashion show and attacks on Christian churches in Maradi

NIAMEY 00000739 002.2 OF 007


earlier in this decade (reftel D) suggested that Niger's
Hausaland was starting to suffer some of the religious
violence common south of the border. Theory and practice
suggested that "it could happen here."

--------------
IZALA'S EFFECTS (1) IN THEORY:
BEING MODERN IN MARADI
--------------


5. (C) In Poloff's meetings with traditional Islamic clergy
and chiefs in Hausaland we asked what sort of people followed
Izala. Responses clustered around two descriptions:
"intellectuals," (meaning better-educated Nigeriens with jobs
in the formal sector),and "those who value or have money."
Accustomed to thinking of Izala's allure as being strongest
for the disenfranchised (like unemployed young people),we
wondered why the system's comparative winners would opt out
of traditional religious practice.


6. (U) Academic analysis and Emboffs' observations of the
Nigerien scene offer some answers. In a 2004 "Africa Today"
article, Northeastern University political scientist William
F.S. Miles, a Niger expert, characterized fundamentalist
practice as a "de-Africanization" of African Islam. He also
cited other sources which described Izala as a form of
"anti-western modernization," or a compelling "global brand"
of Islam with a strong Middle Eastern flavor. These academic
labels appear valid when one examines the demographics of
Nigerien Izala.


7. (U) Local contacts' descriptions and our experience of
Izala and its followers suggest who the "global brand's"
consumers are. Upwardly mobile Nigeriens generally come in
two flavors: fonctionnaires (civil servants) and commercants
(traders). Both are uniquely positioned to profit in the
world's least developed country, though for different
reasons. The fonctionnaire class has led Niger since
independence. Teachers and civil servants, executives in
para-statal enterprises, they got where they were by virtue
of being among the few who had access to modern education.
While many remain on the top, this elite's intake is limited.
With the collapse of Nigerien public education in the 1990s
and the degradation of the civil service through budget cuts
and the elevation of political appointees, entry into this
class was shut off and its remunerations and prestige were
greatly lessened. The boubou-clad commercant replaced the
safari-suited fonctionnaire as the image of success, and
commercial acumen replaced Francophone liberal education as
the road to wealth.


8. (U) Superficial differences aside, wealthy fonctionnaires
and commercants both face a common enemy in tradition. The
Hausa practice of gift giving and societal expectations that
a successful member of a family will provide for multiple
relatives and loosely defined "cousins," militate against
capital formation. Massive expenditures on baptisms,
marriages, and dowries, and various expectations for "zakat"
beyond the literal Koranic tithe constrain successful
Nigeriens. Yet, these practices have more to do with African
cultural traditions than with Islam. Izala, by denying a
theological basis for such expenditure and welfare
arrangements, frees successful Nigeriens from them.


9. (U) Modernity is as much a preoccupation as money. The
popularization of Hadj travel (a status symbol for Nigeriens
who have arrived economically) and commercial voyages to
Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E have exposed a large number of
Nigeriens to more developed and affluent Muslim societies.
Hadjis and Saudi-trained clerics return to Niger with an
expanded view of the world and a more contemptuous view of
"backward" local Islamic practice. By adopting Izalist
practice, these Nigeriens buy into what Miles describes as a
"more advanced and mature version of Islam, as practiced
internationally." Modern technology finds the same customers
as "modern" theology. The expansion of satellite TV (usually
via brands that feature Arab channels) is another symptom and
agent of modernization in Niger. Arabic TV shows (watched for
their song and dance routines and glitz even by non-Arabic
speakers) glamorize the "modern" Islamic powerhouses of the

NIAMEY 00000739 003.2 OF 007


Middle East. Nigerien elites' embrace of the new, global
"Brand Islam" manifests itself in different ways. More veils,
beards, and public events begun and concluded with prayers
are suggestive developments.


10. (C) "Being modern" in commercial towns like Maradi
involves a complex blending of technology, travel, and
religiosity. Affluent Nigerien Izalists are connected with a
larger Islamic identity that allows consumption of western
goods, while shielding them from impiety by a rejection of
western mores. Individualistic in practice, Izala frees its
adherents from traditional financial obligations to the
community and deference to the Imam and the chief. According
to Izalists, the Koran can be translated into Hausa, and
every Muslim can read and understand it, and seek divine aid
without clerical intermediation. Accepting Izala is a way for
young people and individualistic businessmen to throw off the
social and financial constraints imposed by elders and
traditional authorities. Izala provides a window onto a world
of Middle-Eastern glamour, and a channel by which Arab funds
can flow to Nigeriens. It facilitates commerce with Arab and
northern Nigerian adherents, and places no limits on personal
consumption. It is a sect for society's winners.

--------------
IZALA'S EFFECTS (2) IN PRACTICE:
TRADITION AND TENSION IN ZINDER
--------------


11. (C) In the court of the Tidjaniyya Sultan of Zinder,
Poloff found little respect for Izala. Meeting with twenty
courtiers, associated religious leaders, and sub-chiefs on
May 9, Poloff listened to their attitudes toward a sect
described as "troublemakers" and, again, "intellectuals." The
Izalists consider other Muslims to be animists, and deny the
authority of traditional preachers and chiefs. An Imam noted
that the Sultan does not have anything to do with the
Izalists, and that the latter "don't even dare to come to
this house." Our interlocutors stressed that the
traditionalist majority in Zinder would not "rise to the
provocations offered by the fanatics," but noted that if they
did "there would be war." The court further claimed that all
fundamentalists got their teachers and materials from the
Middle East, and attributed the rise of Izala to Nigeriens
who took religious instruction in Arab countries. In a common
Hausaland refrain, the traditionalists denounced Izala as a
religion for the young and those who sought material wealth.
They noted that Izala was led by educated, modern middle
class adherents and rich businessmen, but that it sought to
attract foot-soldiers by offering material aid and small jobs
to unemployed youth.


12. (C) Imam Mounirou Issoufou, a traditional Tidjaniyya
cleric and Koranic educator in Zinder, built on this. He
again claimed that Izala appealed to "intellectuals," who
used its teachings as a pretext to withdraw from the
common-life of the community. Izalists do not honor
traditional African ceremonies, or show sufficient deference
to elders, Mounirou claimed. While he noted Izala's small
size in Zinder -- one mosque out of eleven principal houses
of worship in the city, and even that usually half-full --
Mounirou noted that Izalists gained at least superficial
acceptance through philanthropy. Mounirou particularly
condemned Izalists for their refusal to dialogue with other
religions, and for their expectation "that everyone will live
like in Prophet Mohammed's time."

--------------
MITIGATING FACTORS (1): SURVEILLANCE AND
CONTROL; RADICAL RELIGION UNDER THE
"ETAT DIRIGISTE"
--------------


13. (C) Across Hausaland secular and religious contacts cited
the role played by the GON in policing religious expression.
Several comments were typical: referring to the Nigerian
preachers who sometimes come to their town, clergy in Birni
N'Konni noted that they are ready to "call out to the
authorities" to prevent subversive preaching that "raises
social and ethnic tensions." The Prefect of Magaria (a border

NIAMEY 00000739 004.3 OF 007


town between Zinder and Kano) told Poloff that, in spite of
Nigeria's proximity, there was no Islamic fundamentalism in
his town. The GON was opposed to it, he noted, and "Nigerians
don't come here to preach." When Nigerian Imams come to Niger
they risk expulsion unless they have their papers in order
and a clear destination and sponsorship. Maradi police chief
Boube Souley said that Izala benefactor Rabi Dan Tchadoua
dutifully brings foreign preachers he invites to Niger to the
police station to be examined and registered. Souley noted
that "'(Dan Tchadoua)' knows that as a commercant the state
could get him at any time." NOTE: Souley noted that more than
fifty Saudi and Pakistani preachers passed through Maradi in
2006, heading into the interior to preach. END NOTE Maradi
Provincial Chief Ali Zaki, who seemed generally tolerant of
Izala, stated to Poloff on May 13 that the GON and the chiefs
would not tolerate any preaching that inspired violence or
hatred. His counterpart Abdoul Kadre Amadou Issaka, Canton
Chief of Kantche (Zinder),was more explicit in a May 12
meeting: Nigeriens returning from studies in Nigeria must
abide by traditional rules, he said. Izala preaching is not
allowed. Though he had not yet had occasion to do so, the
Chief of Kantche noted that he would ban Izala preaching or
refer it to GON authorities if he heard of it.


14. (C) Traditional chiefs in Niger are agents of the state.
Since the colonial period they have acted as eyes, ears, and
local enforcers for national authorities. Under the military
governments of Seyni Kountche (1974-1987),and Ali Saibou
(1987-1991) the state monitored religious practice for signs
of radicalism just as it monitored all other sectors of
society. The Association Islamique du Niger (AIN) -- Niger's
only Islamic association prior to 1991 -- was established by
the military regime to keep tabs on the content of preaching
and Koranic teaching. Old habits die hard. The military
regimes' legacy of infiltration, exploitation, and monitoring
of religious sects and practices persists to this day.
Traditional chiefs still assert the right to control local
religious expression (reftel C),either on their own behalf
or that of the government. The Chief of Kantche spoke for
many traditional rulers when he noted that "not a brick '(of
a new mosque)' can be laid without the chief's permission."
He claimed that his court would investigate the sources of
funding for new mosques, the background of their donors and
proposed Imams, and how the construction money was spent.
Only then would a mosque be authorized to open. With the
creation of an Islamic Council in 2006 and the establishment
of a Ministry of Religious Affairs on March 1 (reftel E),
secular authorities too seem ready to clamp down on radical
Islam in a style reminiscent of Kountche.


15. (C) COMMENT: The GON is neither secular (the Constitution
officially declares the state to be "non-confessional"),nor
particularly liberal. Most of Niger's leadership class is
composed of conservative and traditional Tidjaniyyas (reftel
A). But the GON's opposition to inflammatory preaching is
part and parcel of a determination to avoid ethnic or
religious incitement in general. This determination has been
central to every post-independence government and has
manifested itself in occasional limitations on freedom of
expression and the press. While many of its sources lie in
the politics of 1960s Niger (when a government led by
minority Djermas faced threats from a Hausa-led political
movement),it also derives from the French-colonial tradition
of "direct rule," and is one of the country's most durable
political traditions. END COMMENT

--------------
MITIGATING FACTORS (2): BORDERS AND
IDENTITY IN HAUSALAND
--------------


16. (U) Just as the border between Nigerien and Nigerian
Hausas yields two different systems of government and two
different reactions to Izala Islam, it defines Hausa identity
to a surprising extent. Post will examine the effect of the
border on Hausa identity septel. With respect to religion, it
is relevant in so far as Hausas perceive Izala as a foreign
import rather than a genuine Nigerien belief system. While
Tidjaniyya and Quadiriyya's respective Algerian / Senegalese
and Iraqi origins (Tidjaniyya's spiritual head until 1975 was

NIAMEY 00000739 005.3 OF 007


Sheik Ibrahim Niasse of Senegal) make them "foreign" as well,
no one has ever described them as such to Poloff. Everyone
describes Izala as "foreign," meaning either Nigerian or Arab
in inspiration and patronage. Indeed, if Izala's linkages to
foreign money and foreign images of success help to sell the
sect to a small number of upwardly mobile Nigeriens, those
same foreign associations also raise suspicions among a far
greater number of average folks in insular Niger.

--------------
ENDING WHERE IT BEGAN?: ACCOMMODATING
IZALA IN MARADI AND KONNI
--------------


17. (C) Poloff's interactions with another royal court
offered a very different perspective from the hostile and
threatened reactions of Zinder clergy and nobles. Birni
N'Konni is a Hausa town and trade-hub three kilometers north
of the Nigerian border and ninety kilometers north of Sokoto.
On May 8, Poloff met the Alkali (religious judge),Grand
Mosque Imam, and other community notables associated with the
court of the traditional chief of Konni Canton. Sitting on an
animal skin rug and writing in a Harry Potter notebook, the
Alkali described religious relations in Konni as cordial.
Izalists and traditional Muslims pray together in the same
mosques (although in slightly different style) and interact
comfortably. Among the dozen persons in the room, the Imam
noted that he was a Quadiriyya, the Alkali a Tidjaniyya, and
another (bearded) participant, an Izala. The court of the
chief was non-sectarian. While everyone attends Izala
mosques, our interlocutors admitted that Izalists will not
usually attend other sects' mosques. Beyond that, there was
no talk of tension.


18. (C) Maradi's Provincial Chief, Ali Zaki, is a former
diplomat. His characterization of sectarian relations was
likewise diplomatic. Zaki stressed his role as a moderator
and guide for all groups. Izalists and traditional orders
alike respect his authority and come to him for judgment and
reconciliation. Though he stated that "we will not accept
problems in our province'...'preaching here cannot insult or
provoke," he did not direct his comments specifically toward
Izala or single it out for condemnation. Nor did he claim
broad power or desire to stamp out Izala. In fact, Zaki noted
that his role in coordinating mosque construction was based
on non-theological considerations, such as physical distance
between mosques and the number of parishioners that a new
mosque might serve. He claimed that these powers derived
entirely from the new GON created Islamic Council. He claimed
no other precedent for control of mosque construction, Imams,
or sermon content.


19. (C) Not all of our contacts in Maradi were so accepting,
but even those critical of Izala tended to treat it
dismissively, rather than as a threat. Maradi's Grand Mosque
Imam, the Tidjaniyya cleric Imam Moustapha Antoma, described
Izala Islam as weak in intellectual grounding and noted that
its advocates were routinely out-debated by traditional
Muslims. It won itself few friends in the early years when it
adopted a confrontational approach to inter-faith relations.
That rubbed most locals the wrong way, but Izala appears to
have matured. Antoma noted that many Izalists now come to his
mosque as they respect his preaching and Islamic scholarship.
Local Izalists have learned from experience to be team
players.


20. (C) Antoma questioned Izala's size and influence in
Maradi. He credited the sect with no more than five percent
of Maradi's Muslims. He noted that Izala patron and local
businessman Rabi Dan Tchadoua was funding the construction of
a third Izala mosque, but doubted that the they would be able
to fill it. Antoma described Dan Tchadoua as "rich but
lacking in Islamic knowledge." Antoma claimed that Izala
initially attracted parishioners because it gave them money
and had glamour, but its resources are now declining and many
erstwhile parishioners are jumping ship. He noted that those
who give money and social services can easily attract a crowd
in Niger, but money in the absence of genuine belief is weak
glue.


NIAMEY 00000739 006.4 OF 007



21. (C) This view was shared by most secular observers.
Mahaman Laouali, a local representative of Niger's largest
human rights NGO, noted that Maradi's people are "pragmatic
mercantilists, who take advantage of what Izala offers and,
two or three years later, come out of it and go back to their
old ways." Izala, he argued, was not deeply anchored: "people
don't really believe in it, it is against their traditions."
Maradi's police chief, Boube Souley, advanced an interesting
theory. He said that rich Izala commercants were trying to
win hearts and minds through philanthropy as a prerequisite
to seeking political power. He also stressed the Izala's
popular appeal derived from largesse, not conviction, noting
that "in Africa, ninety-eight percent of belief is food."

--------------
IZALA AND RELIGIOUS FRAUD
--------------


22. (C) Religious and secular observers suggested other
material incentives for following Izala. Antoma shared the
view that commercants embrace Izala because its theology
enables them to dodge costly social obligations imposed by
the traditional sects. Some, like Dan Tchadoua, also enjoy
more direct financial benefits. Antoma alleged that Dan
Tchadoua and other Izala leaders were able to steal
substantial quantities of Arab or Nigerian money sent to them
for mosque construction and proselytization. The Secretary
General of the Chamber of Commerce, Abdou Hassane, noted that
materials destined for mosque construction could be imported
duty free. Often, he argued, Maradi commercants would use
this provision to bring in materials sufficient for a small
Izala mosque (which they could build without authorization
and control by the local chief) -- and for a palatial house
as well. Secular NGOs and the civil society advise people to
look at what Izala Imams do and how they live.

--------------
COMMENT: SHOULD WE WORRY?
--------------


23. (C) Academics like Miles rue the passage of African
tradition and its replacement by Izala's global "Brand Islam"
for aesthetic reasons. The security and political
implications of Izalist expansion in Niger are harder to
discern. So too are the sect's real prospects in Niger.
Ousmane Dan Fodio's shadow still falls on Hausaland. People
recount stories of his 1804--1812 jihad against un-Islamic
syncretism, and the eventual institutionalization of the
revolutionary jihadis in the Sokoto Caliphate. Looking south
of the border today, Nigerien Hausas see Izala in a similar
process of institutionalization and moderation. There is a
perception that, as Izala radicals become "the man" even the
adoption of Shari'a has changed little (reftel F). NOTE: A
USAID funded "Northern Nigeria Muslim Outreach Assessment
Desk Study," published in draft form on May 26, 2006,
describes the co-optation and infiltration of the Izala sect
by traditional elites and the Nigerian state in the early
1990s. The study notes that some Izalas then united with
other radicals like the Muslim Brothers (or Ikhwan) in
continuing opposition to the state. At present, Post is
unaware of any Ikhwan presence in Niger. END NOTE.


24. (C) As the "Izalist jihad" loses steam in Nigeria, it
seems to have even dimmer prospects in Niger. Hostility from
the central government, resistance from locals, its foreign
(though Hausa) origins, and association with corruption and
opportunism limit Izala's appeal. So too does the small size
of the Nigerien elite, from which Izala seems to draw most of
its devotees. Ordinary Nigeriens, drawn in temporarily by the
promise of material gain, do not seem to stick or buy into
the theology. Without their support, the movement stands
little chance of obtaining political power or radicalizing
the Nigerien state. Even among its elite supporters, the
incentives for following Izala seem more material than
theological. While some Izala commercants are major
contributors to political parties, they seem to be cashing in
their political chips for lucrative government contracts
rather than Shari'a. The prospects for an Izala-inspired
political party appear nil. For their part, Nigerien
politicians' relations with Izala seem just as pragmatic and

NIAMEY 00000739 007.3 OF 007


mercenary as those of most ordinary people. They will take
Izalists' money, but crack down if "national unity," seems
threatened. Meanwhile, many of the public manifestations of
faith that Izala would impose -- veils, beards, public
prayers, Koranic education, and opposition to gender equity
-- are already here and endorsed equally by Izalists and
traditional orders (reftel G). Some foreign observers of
Izala argue that the sect is just laying low until its
numbers increase, at which point it will shoot for political
power. In Poloff's judgment, it is just as likely that Izala
reached its high water mark here some time ago. END COMMENT

MINIMIZED CONSIDERED

ALLEN