Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NIAMEY639
2007-05-08 11:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Niamey
Cable title:  

NIGER: FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON THE SECURITY SITUATION

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS MASS FR NG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0145
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHNM #0639/01 1281155
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZDK CCP
P 081155Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3452
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 3360
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUFGCIN/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NIAMEY 000639 

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SUBJECT: NIGER: FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON THE SECURITY SITUATION
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Classified By: Ambassador Bernadette M. Allen, reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NIAMEY 000639

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SUBJECT: NIGER: FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON THE SECURITY SITUATION
IN THE NORTH

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Classified By: Ambassador Bernadette M. Allen, reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: The French Ambassador to Niger believes a GON
attempt to defeat Tuareg dissidents risks turning bandits and
drug smugglers into something much worse, possibly to include
allies of AQIM. The Nigerien Armed Forces (FAN) cannot
defeat the Mouvement des Nigerien pour la Justice (MNJ),but
they may think they can. The GON may be involved in indirect
negotiations with the MNJ through intermediaries, and the
Libyan and Algerian governments. End Summary.


2. (C) In a May 7 meeting with Ambassador Allen and the DCM,
French Ambassador to Niger Francois Ponge said the Nigerien
government was correct in characterizing those responsible
for recent attacks in the North as bandits and drug
traffickers, but added that Nigerien government mishandling
of it could make the situation much worse. He said that
President Tandja was personally handling the issue, and was
siding with the military leadership on the need for a
military solution. The Prime Minister was more inclined to
negotiate.


4. (C) Ponge does not believe the FAN is currently in a
position to defeat the MNJ. Morale among the FAN rank and
file is low as they have suffered casualties in the fighting
and believe that some of their senior officers are getting
rich through involvement in trafficking. The FAN is looking
for materiel from China and elsewhere. It is particularly
interested in helicopters. Ponge's fear is that the FAN
thinks it can defeat the MNJ military, and in trying to do so
it might create broader Tuareg support for the MNJ.
Moreover, it risked creating an alliance between AQIM and the
MNJ. There may be links to a former FAN officer who had been
associated with former President Barre. The officer is not a
Tuareg, but has been involved in smuggling in the Lake Chad

area for some time. The conflict was linked with others in
the region, including Darfur, Chad and the Central African
Republic. Ponge said his government is urging negotiation.


5. (C) Ponge dismissed most of the known MNJ leaders as not
particularly well educated or prominent. The most prominent
is Aboubacar Alambo, who does not always get along with his
younger brother, Agali, also an MNJ member. Amouman
Kalakouwa has little education and has never been
"integrated" in anything. Cherif is a crook who stole from
every pot of money to which he had access. Ponge said that
none of them could have authored the communique posted on the
MNJ web site. Referring to MNJ claims that it has evidence
linking senior GON officials to corruption, Ponge quipped
that those claims may help prompt the GON to negotiate.
Ponge compared negotiating with the Tuaregs to dealing with
Corsican separatists; nobody speaks for all factions and
there is a lot of overlap between political and criminal
motivations.


6. (C) Ponge alluded to GON negotiations with the dissident
Tuaregs through intermediaries. He also noted Algerian and
Libyan mediation efforts. While the GON claims that the MNJ
is comprised of drug traffickers, Ponge said that a well
known Algerian drug ring is responsible for most of the drugs
trafficked through Niger, with Algerian government
complicity. Moreover, the Algerian government has largely
suspended military cooperation with Niger because of a
Nigerien UN vote (on the Western Sahara). Libya's role is
also problematic given its longstanding ties with various
Tuaregs, but Ponge thought it may be playing a positive role
now. He found it interesting the that there were many
indicators of a Libyan involvement in the initial February 8
attack on security forces in Iferouane, and speculated that
another party may have staged it to look like Libya was
involved to cover its own involvement. If Algeria or Libya
are behind the MNJ, they may be creating something they can't
control.


7. (C) Ponge said the MNJ's complaints about how few Tuareg's
were employed by the uranium mines were accurate, but largely
the fault of the Tuaregs themselves; Tuaregs initially
disdained working in the mines, forcing the mines to recruit
in the south. Moreover, Tuaregs traditionally put little
value on education, so there are not many Tuaregs with the
qualifications necessary for the more skilled mine work.
Security has been stepped up at the mines, with the
construction of berms and the deployment of a detachment of
FNIS (a paramilitary unit under the Interior Ministry)
troops.


8. (C) If the security situation is not resolved, it will
devastate Niger's tourism industry (based largely in the

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north) next season (beginning around November). Tourism has
been good the last two years, and people in the north would
suffer from a drop in tourists. (Unlike mining, tourism is a
sector that employs a disproportionately large number of
Tuaregs.)


9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
ALLEN