Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NIAMEY137
2007-02-14 09:17:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Niamey
Cable title:  

NIGER TRIP REPORTS (2) TAHOUA & THE CHALLENGES OF

Tags:  PGOV EAGR EAID ECON SOCI SMIG NG 
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VZCZCXRO7096
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHNM #0137/01 0450917
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 140917Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3255
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0509
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NIAMEY 000137 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE, SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR AF/W, BACHMAN; PASS TO USAID FOR KTOWERS; INR/AA FOR
BOGOSIAN; PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER; ACCRA AND DAKAR FOR USAID

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV EAGR EAID ECON SOCI SMIG NG
SUBJECT: NIGER TRIP REPORTS (2) TAHOUA & THE CHALLENGES OF
DECENTRALIZATION

REF NIAMEY 76, NIAMEY 62, 06 Niamey 1075

-------
SUMMARY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NIAMEY 000137

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE, SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR AF/W, BACHMAN; PASS TO USAID FOR KTOWERS; INR/AA FOR
BOGOSIAN; PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER; ACCRA AND DAKAR FOR USAID

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV EAGR EAID ECON SOCI SMIG NG
SUBJECT: NIGER TRIP REPORTS (2) TAHOUA & THE CHALLENGES OF
DECENTRALIZATION

REF NIAMEY 76, NIAMEY 62, 06 Niamey 1075

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) This is the second cable in a series commenting on issues
examined by Poloff during December travel to northern and central
Niger. This edition examines some of the challenges facing Niger's
process of political decentralization. Since 2004, the Government of
Niger (GON) has tried to devolve power over local decision-making to
elected officials. Two years on, decentralization remains Niger's
greatest democratization challenge. While the process remains
popular, resource constraints, high local expectations, questionable
commitment by the GON, and occasionally weak performance by local
officials suggest an uncertain future. Poloff examined local
government performance in Niger's 4th largest city, Tahoua, and
found cause for guarded optimism.


2. (SBU) While in Tahoua, Poloff also examined issues of religion
and the re-insertion of Tuareg ex-combatants from the Azaouagh zone.
These issues are addressed, respectively, by reftels A & B. END
SUMMARY

--------------
TAHOUA OVERVIEW
--------------


3. (U) The city of Tahoua (pop. est. 114,000) is Niger's 4th
largest. Along with Niamey, Maradi, and Zinder, it is one of 4
"urban communities," in Niger. Urban communities consist of one or
more urban communes, which function rather as boroughs would in
London or New York City-as administrative sub-units with some degree
of autonomy. The chief central government administrator for the
urban communities is the regional governor. NOTE: Niamey, alone
among the urban communities, constitutes coterminous region, and
therefore has its own governor. The urban communities of Tahoua,
Maradi, and Zinder share governors with their respective regions.
END NOTE. Tahoua is also the capital of the region of Tahoua and the
Department of Tahoua.

--------------
Decentralization Challenges

and the Urban Community.
--------------


4. (U) Poloff met with the President of the Urban Community of
Tahoua, Elhadji Dodo Abdou Ouhou, several municipal counselors, the
city's two commune mayors, and a civil servant who assists them.
Tahoua has two urban communes, each with a council and mayor. The
President of the Urban Community is an overarching "Lord Mayor"
responsible for the entire city. He is charged with coordination of
urban commune actions and with representing the entire polity to GON
entities.


5. (SBU) Decentralization continues to pose problems of capacity and
organization in Tahoua. Our interlocutors argued that the relevant
texts still aren't well understood by illiterate councilors and
citizens. The President, two commune Mayors, and five counselors
attending the meeting agreed that the process, while still popular,
saddled them with a devastating combination of enormous
responsibilities and insufficient resources.


6. (SBU) Resource insufficiency was due both to substandard revenue
sharing by the GON and Tahoua's own inability to mobilize local
sources of revenue. Property taxes, collected by the GON on behalf
of the communes, had for years been shared @ 60% for the GON and 40%
for the communes. In 2006, the communes' share was abruptly cut to
just 20% by the new revenue law. Overall, Tahoua's revenue stream
breaks down like this:

--40% of the Urban Community (both communes included) budget derives
from GON revenue sharing. These funds, perceived as more constant
from year to year than locally collected revenues, have been used to
make payroll.

--24% of the budget derives from the "taxe voirie" or road tax
leveled on vehicles passing through. Interestingly, this forms a
bigger part of Tahoua Commune I's budget (25%) than Commune II's
(14%),probably owing to the fact that the former contains the
autogare, or small bus station-a lucrative source of revenue. The
Urban Community was only able to collect about 30% of the potential
revenue from road tax this year, due to a variety of problems
besetting collection.

--36% of the budget derives from other local taxes on markets, small
businesses, animals, municipal services, and the head tax.


NIAMEY 00000137 002 OF 003



7. (SBU) All in all, Tahoua's revenue picture seemed grim-the tax
recovery rate is 14% overall. In other words, the city is only able
to collect about 42 million CFA ($83,000) out of a potential 300
million CFA ($592,000) in revenue each year. Given the GON's
stingier revenue sharing this year, Tahoua city is in a bind.


8. (U) The local elected officials are responding to the crisis of
"incivisme fiscale"-the culture of tax avoidance-in a variety of
ways. They are working with traditional chiefs to convince people to
pay their taxes. To this end, they have established a working group
of neighborhood chiefs and municipal tax technicians that will
conduct a comprehensive revenue census. The census will then serve
as a basis for assessing tax payments. The group will also
popularize the notion that paying your taxes can yield important
benefits-like cleaner streets, tree plantings, and public water
points.


9. (U) Poor people, our interlocutors emphasized, still have trouble
seeing the value of tax payment, as no results are immediately
apparent. Others traced the roots of the problem deeper into the
past, claiming that Nigeriens' reluctance to pay taxes was a
phenomenon of long standing; cultural, and related to the colonial
experience. In the optimistic view of some participants, two years
after commune elections was too proximate a point from which to
judge the process. Most things, they noted, move slowly in Niger,
and decentralization's teething problems may not suggest a lack of
political will at the center.


10. (SBU) When Poloff asked about the underlying causes of the GON's
seeming neglect of the communes, answers varied from such optimistic
views to more realistic responses. Some participants conceded that
decentralization had both friends and enemies at the center, and
that they would have to lobby hard to convince the GON to live up to
its legal commitments to the process.


11. (SBU) Tahoua's councilors are doing just that-using the GON's
High Commission for Territorial Collectivities (HCCT) and the
Association of Nigerien Municipalities (AMN) to lobby the government
on their behalf. Poloff reminded the group that donors could help
them to a certain degree, but that foreign aid would matter little
unless matched with stronger revenue collection and a stronger GON
commitment-in CFA-to the decentralization process.


12. (SBU) COMMENT: The incoherence with which the GON's
decentralization portfolio is divided up between various
actors--HCCT, Ministry of Interior and Decentralization, Ministry of
Land Management and Community Development, and High Commission for
the Modernization of the State, etc.--is one cause of the
difficulty. END COMMENT

--------------
A Lotus in the Mud? Commune I
Shows What a Little Leadership Can
(and Can't) Accomplish
--------------


13. (U) Against this rather bleak backdrop, Tahoua Commune I (pop.
est. 48,000) stands out as a relative success story. While hardly
immune from the problems of revenue collection and "incivisme
fiscale" more broadly evident in Tahoua, number I has at least come
up with some good ideas with which to address them. Behind every
successful commune, there seems to be a dynamic mayor. Commune I's
Mayor Elhadji Albala Sofo, is a case in point. A young hadji and
nephew of the Chef de Canton, Sofo is an enthusiastic manager who
knows his commune inside and out. He has no shortage of good,
realistic ideas for improving municipal services and the municipal
revenue stream. Among the more prominent and interesting of these
ideas is that of a new autogare or bush taxi bus station-a resource
that would allow Commune I to build on its most viable revenue
base.


14. (U) The commune already gets 20 million CFA ($39,000) in annual
revenue from the current autogare, located in downtown Tahoua.
Because of the ease of access and lack of controls inherent in the
current site, transporters are often able to avoid paying taxes and
fees. Mayor Sofo wants to build a new, 40 million CFA ($79,000)
autogare on the outskirts of town near the intersection of the
Tahoua - Agadez highway. The site has already been cleared, walled
off, and partly paved. The commune would complete it-adding a police
station, public restroom facilities, and an administrative building
in the process.


15. (U) The new autogare would generate at least 30-35 million CFA
($59,000-$69,000) a year in revenue for the commune. Not only would
it be subject to stricter management controls than possible at the
present autogare, it would double as a shopping center, with 100 or
so purpose-built concrete shops that would be rented out to local
shopkeepers, many of whom are looking for new sites outside of the

NIAMEY 00000137 003 OF 003


crowded downtown area. Located at a key intersection near the
fire-station and a new technical college, the new autogare seems a
great idea in the history of urban planning (in Niger). Many local
shopkeepers are already on board, and passengers would undoubtedly
love the convenience, space, and ready access to services afforded
by the new autogare.


16. (U) The real problem is a lack of start up capital. Between
1991 and 1996, the GON tried a public sector, statist solution to
the problem of municipal capital project financing. It created the
Caisse des Prets des Collectivites Territorial (CPCT),which
financed a great number of projects including Tahoua's city hall.
Subject to massive political meddling, it had trouble leaning on its
borrowers, especially during the public sector financial crises of
the mid-1990s. Non-repayment of billions of CFA in outstanding loans
led both to the collapse of the CPCT in '96, and to the continuing
reluctance of private banks to provide communes with credit

--------------
LESSONS LEARNED AT THE TOWN DUMP
--------------


17. (U) The town dump illustrated an important truth: in Niger,
every solution seems to pose a problem. Commune I's first goal was
to address "assainissement"-public sanitation-one of the key
concerns of every commune government. The commune's officials had to
encourage people to clean out their lots and put the garbage out.
Sensitization efforts in this regard produced a great success.
People learned to bring their garbage to local collection points
throughout the commune and a problem was solved, yet another was
thereby posed.


18. (U) Commune I only has 12 overtaxed donkey carts to collect and
transport the waste from the collection points to the dump. Garbage
trucks are available, but @ 66,000 CFA ($130) a day, too expensive
to rent very often. A bulldozer for the dump would set the commune
back 50,000 CFA, ($98) exclusive of fuel and staff costs etc. While
we toured the dump, watching donkey carts pull up with small loads
of garbage, the councilors noted that even the refuse that made it
that far posed a public health problem. Lacking a fence, watchman,
or any other means of deterrence, the dump is a site for nocturnal
scavenging.

-------------- -
COMMENT: DECENTRALIZTION, WHOSE CHILD IS THIS?
-------------- -


19. (SBU) COMMENT: Garbage collection and municipal sanitation are,
at once, the most essential and most logistically difficult tasks
urban communes must accomplish. Getting these things right enables
communes to demonstrate their value to the taxpayers who might
thereby be more inclined to pay their taxes. However, given the
relatively high costs and logistical complexity of the task,
communes need substantial amounts of money to effect it-yielding
another catch 22 for Niger's local officials.


20. (SBU) The central problem remains a lack of investment and
revenue sharing by the central government, and communes' inability
to collect local taxes. Donors should devote more attention to
projects designed to increase revenue generation and collection.
They should also call on the GON to be more supportive of its new
communes. While donor pressure was a key factor behind
decentralization in the first place, the process will hardly prove
sustainable if donors' commitments are not matched by GON political
and budgetary support. Yet, this begs the question: how far should
donors go in supporting decentralization if the GON fails to keep
its part of the bargain? END COMMENT.
ALLEN