MEA SLAMS UNMIN, URGES ELECTIONS AT THE SOONEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 004822

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PREF KDEM UN BT NP IN
SUBJECT: MEA SLAMS UNMIN, URGES ELECTIONS AT THE SOONEST
FOR NEPAL

REF: A. A: USUN NEW YORK 000924


B. B: NEW DELHI 004493

Classified By: PolCouns Atul Keshap for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Joint
Secretary (for Nepal and Bhutan) Preeti Saran conveyed in an

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October 30 meeting with Acting PolCouns her government's
disappointment with the electoral delay in Nepal, emphasized
the need for New Delhi and Washington to pressure the
Government of Nepal (GON) to announce a new election date as
soon as possible, and warned against what she viewed as the
increasing activism of the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN).
Underscoring that the current interim parliament inflates the
true power of the Maoists and lacks any popular mandate,
Saran cautioned that only an elected constituent assembly was
the proper body to resolve such crucial issues as deciding
the structure of the state and the future of the monarchy;
the answers to those questions, however, were for the people
of Nepal to decide. With the Maoists continuing to "move the
goalposts", she argued that a decision by the GON to move
forward with election plans would "call the Maoists' bluff"
and allow the GON to seize the initiative. Without a quick
return to elections -- which she hoped would occur as early
as February or March 2008 -- she predicted two futures for
Nepal: either a Maoist takeover or a return to civil war.
Meanwhile, UNMIN officials -- specifically UNMIN head Ian
Martin -- have exacerbated the situation with their Maoist
sympathies, she cautioned, and thus any attempt by the UN to
expand UNMIN's mandate must be stopped. The conversation
reveals that the GOI continues to value coordination with the
USG on Nepal but lacks any identifiable contingency plan for
its neighbor -- instead pinning all its hopes on holding
elections as soon as possible; in the meantime it has
redirected much of its focus on reining in the UN. END
SUMMARY

Elections Are the Key to a Positive Outcome in Nepal
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2. (C) In a meeting with Acting PolCouns on October 30, MEA
Joint Secretary (for Nepal and Bhutan) Preeti Saran conveyed
her government's disappointment over the indefinite
postponement of Nepal,s constituent assembly elections,
emphasized that the holding of elections at the earliest
possible date was essential to forestalling Nepal's descent
into civil war or a Maoist takeover, and admitted that New
Delhi had yet to formulate a contingency plan should events
in Nepal continue in the wrong direction. Saran began the
meeting by expressing her appreciation for the close working
relationship that the United States and India have forged in
addressing the issue and stated that the two countries share
the same goals for Nepal -- peace and security. She then
decried the GON's decision earlier this month to delay
elections, stating that she still does not understand why the
November 22 date was not feasible. During the visit to
Kathmandu in mid-October by Indian Special Envoy to Nepal
Shyam Saran, the Special Envoy stressed India,s extreme
disappointment with the delay to the GON and urged the
announcement of a new election date as early as possible.
Saran argued that the earliest that elections could now be
held would be in the spring -- in late February or March --
given weather conditions in the interregnum.


3. (C) Elections are the best and only way forward for a
successful political transition in Nepal, Saran cautioned;
otherwise Nepal would be headed for one of two outcomes: a
Maoist takeover or a return to civil war. India would not
welcome either of these negative outcomes, she argued, and
thus was throwing its full weight behind the holding of
elections even if it meant proceeding without Maoist consent
or divorcing it from the rest of the peace process, including
the weapons verification process or discussion of security
sector reform. Highlighting how the Maoists have held the GON
hostage to their shifting demands throughout the process, she
lamented that the Maoists continue to "shift the goalposts"
with new demands and argued that the GON needed "to call the

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Maoists' bluff" and proceed with elections no matter their
reaction.


4. (C) New Delhi's logic in arguing for the holding of
elections centers on the realization that the current regime
lacks any democratic mandate and has afforded the Maoists
more political influence than they actually have amongst the
populace or would get in a free and fair election. Such key
issues as the future of the monarchy and structure of the
state must be decided by the people through a democratically
elected constituent assembly, she cautioned. New Delhi has
no stance on what the answers to these key political
questions facing Nepal -- "it is for the people of Nepal to
decide the structure of the state," she said -- as long as
the decision takes place in the proper democratic forum.
Noting that the Maoists currently have 84 seats in the
Interim Parliament, Saran argued that they realize that they
would lose influence if elections proceed and thus were
attempting to extend the life of the current regime as long
as possible. The GON should proceed with elections even if
the Maoists refuse to participate and even if elections
result in a formal split in the Maoists -- who are facing
tensions within their leadership over whether they should
continue with the peace process. She downplayed reports of
growing tensions within the Maoist movement and argued that
even if a fracture did occur, Maoist leader Pushpa Dahal (aka
Prachanda) would remain the most powerful.


5. (C) Saran demurred when Acting PolCouns asked if New
Delhi had developed a contingency plan for Nepal, stating
only that India, as the country that would be most affected
by any implosion in Nepal, remained engaged on the issue. To
underscore the impact that Nepal has on India, she relayed
that recent violence in Nepal's Kapilvastu District, which
borders India, resulted in the influx of 18,000 Nepali women
and children across the border into India in one day. When
queried about whether India's Hindu-nationalist Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) might be involved in fomenting unrest
in Nepal, Saran argued that while RSS activism might be
occurring on a small scale in Nepal, it is overplayed by the
press.

No Love Lost for UNMIN
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6. (C) In addition to the election timeframe, New Delhi is
increasingly worried about the role of UNMIN in Nepal's
transition. Saran harshly criticized what she viewed as the
increasing activism, pro-Maoist sympathies, and interference
in purely domestic issues by UNMIN and specifically its head,
Ian Martin, stating that UNMIN was exacerbating Nepal's
instability. Although she underscored New Delhi's support
for a UN role in Nepal and the logistical support it had so
far lent to UNMIN under its current mandate, Saran argued
that UNMIN had surpassed its current mandate by counseling
the Maoists and inserting itself into the Madhesi and Janjati
issues and the debate over the proper electoral structure.


7. (C) Saran claimed that UNMIN representatives were only
interested in institutionalizing their presence and empire
building, including expanding their role there "to increase
the number of UN jobs" and to provide Ian Martin with job
security. She further argued that UNMIN officials had
counseled the Maoists to demand an electoral system based
only on proportional representation, leading to the current
political stalemate in Kathmandu. She also highlighted Ian
Martin's October 25 report to the UN Security Council (Ref A)
as more evidence of UNMIN's pro-Maoist sympathies; the
report, she argued, was "damning on the GON" but relatively
light on criticism of the Maoists. Although not against
extending UNMIN's tenure under its current mandate, she
cautioned against expanding that mandate and hoped that
Washington would vote against any expansion at the UN
Security Council. Stating that Ian Martin enjoyed the
sympathies of his home country, the United Kingdom, Saran
admitted that New Delhi had formally conveyed to British
officials its disapproval of Ian Martin's and UNMIN's

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behavior in Nepal and its desire for a continued UN presence
without an expansion of its current mandate.

Chinese Actions in Nepal of Little Concern
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8. (C) When queried by Acting PolCouns about India's views
on China's role in Nepal, Saran stated that New Delhi had
little concern about Beijing's activities in and policies
toward Nepal, arguing that Nepal remained firmly within
India's cultural and economic sphere of influence. She
stated that India realizes that China, as Nepal's neighbor,
is naturally watching Nepal closely but sees meetings between
the Maoists and Chinese officials over the past few months
merely as part of Beijing,s efforts to remain on top of
developments in Kathmandu.

Fully Supportive of USG Efforts with Bhutanese Refugees
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9. (C) The meeting wrapped up with a discussion of
Bhutanese refugees in Nepal. Saran welcomed Washington's
"exceptionally generous" offer to accept 60,000 of the
refugees and pledged that New Delhi would lend whatever
logistical support American officials needed to facilitate
the resettlement process. She stated that she hoped that
Washington's as well as other countries' offers to take in
the majority of the refugees would bring about a final
resolution to the festering problem. She expressed concern
about the increasing radicalization of the refugees by the
Maoists and the Communist Party of Bhutan, warning that the
longer the refugees remain, the more radical they will
become. She worried that Maoist intimidation would prevent
all those who desired to be resettled abroad from following
through on their wish. Although worried about the spread of
Maoist influence in the camps, Saran opined that the Maoists
and the Communist Party of Bhutan posed little risk to at
this time to Bhutan's elections this coming December and
February.

Comment: If Plan A Fails, Blame the UN
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10. (C) Comment: Only a few weeks after claiming that the
November constituent assembly elections were now or never
(Ref B),the MEA appears to be swallowing its words and
basing its present Nepal policy on the tenuous hope that
elections will occur as soon as possible. Saran provided no
insight on exactly how the Government of India (GOI) plans to
help effect this result nor gave any indication that New
Delhi has any back up plan for the possibility that elections
may never occur. Instead, Saran was more concerned with the
pillorying the UN. It seems that the GOI's concern about the
UN has become so preoccupying that it threatens to distract
New Delhi from focusing on the bigger issue of reinvigorating
Nepal's peace process at this crucial juncture and planning
for the worst-case scenario. The silver lining is that New
Delhi is eager to continue to coordinate closely with us to
positively affect the political process taking place in
Nepal.


11. (C) We sent this cable to Embassy Kathmandu, and they had
the following additional comments. Ambassador Powell met
with UK and Indian ambassadors October 31. Mukherjee, who
had just come back from New Delhi, reported the growing
concern and frustration in the MEA with the Nepalis' failure
to agree on an election date. He was much milder in his
personal approach, indicating that a conscious decision had
been made to let the Nepalis sort out the current problems
without any Indian attempt to broker an agreement or come up
with a solution. All three ambassadors agreed that despite
rhetoric in yesterday's parliamentary session which referred
to civil war, the most likely scenario was for the
politicians to come to some sort of agreement that would
allow the current interim arrangements to continue, but also
block real progress on the peace agreement implementation.
The net result would be further erosion of the interim

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government's legitimacy. There was space between the UK/EU
and Indian positions on the relative importance of setting an
election date and moving forward on the peace process, but
general agreement that progress was needed on both fronts.
Mukherjee was adamant that elections could/should go forward
with or without the Maoists; Hall was much more in favor of
keeping the Maoists in the process even at the price of
further compromise. Mukherjee said the Indians would support
extension of the current UNMIN mandate, but would oppose any
expansion. When pressed by Hall on the capacity of current
UN staff to help with some of the peace process issues, he
suggested that UNMIN could do many of these things within the
current mandate if they were creative and low-key.
MULFORD