Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NEWDELHI2916
2007-06-22 13:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

CONCLUSION OF THE SEVENTH US-INDIA WORKING GROUP

Tags:  PREL KPKO MARR UNGA IN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 NEW DELHI 002916 

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017
TAGS: PREL KPKO MARR UNGA IN
SUBJECT: CONCLUSION OF THE SEVENTH US-INDIA WORKING GROUP
ON PEACEKEEPING

REF: A. STATE 92154

B. NEW DELHI 1325

Classified By: Political Counselor Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 NEW DELHI 002916

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017
TAGS: PREL KPKO MARR UNGA IN
SUBJECT: CONCLUSION OF THE SEVENTH US-INDIA WORKING GROUP
ON PEACEKEEPING

REF: A. STATE 92154

B. NEW DELHI 1325

Classified By: Political Counselor Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The seventh annual US-India Joint Working
Group on Peacekeeping on June 19 focused on opportunities for
the U.S. and India to work together to meet new challenges in
global peacekeeping capacity. IO PDAS James Warlick led the
US delegation, and Joint Secretary Sanjiv Arora of the MEA
led an 11 member delegation comprised of MEA, MHA, and
military staff officers with UN involvement. Arora confirmed
that the GOI will participate in this year's capstone Global
Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) event, "Khan Quest
2007" in August in Mongolia. He also confirmed that the GOI
would like to host the joint GPOI/DPKO-created Senior Mission
Leader Course (SMLC) training event at its Center for UN
Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in January 2008. Warlick explored
whether the GOI would also consider contributing troops for
middle ring security for the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq
(UNAMI),and Arora stated that he was not authorized to
commit at this time. The Indians expressed concern about the
proposed reorganization of the UNDPKO, expressing hope that
the split between operations and support would help
streamline and speed up peacekeeping decision-making, but
cautiously withheld its full support for the Secretary
General's proposal. Major General V. Bhatnager emphasized
that any proposed splitting of responsibility must not result
in ambiguity in UNDPKO command and control.


2. (C) Warlick urged India to be prepared for the
possibility of peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Chad, and
Somalia. Arora restated the GOI's position that UNDPKO must
consult with all stakeholders before initiating new PKOs. The
GOI pointed to its great success with the deployment of
all-Indian Female Formed Police Units (FFPU) to Liberia this
past year. The Indians briefed on their police and military
contributions to UN Peacekeeping, emphasizing Indian
operational successes in the UN Mission to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and Lebanon (UNIFIL). The US

delegation praised the Indian Center for UN Peacekeeping for
its comprehensive and high standards in training. During a
dinner hosted by DCM, Special Envoy Chinmaya Gharekhan
proposed that India and Africa work together to enhance
African peacekeeping capabilities. END SUMMARY.


3. (U) Issues discussed at the Peacekeeping Joint Working
Group included:

-- Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Reform (paras
6 - 9)
-- Command and Control of PKO (para 10)
-- Peace Building (paras 11 - 12)
-- DPKO Capacity Building (paras 13 - 16)
-- Meeting the challenges of the surge in PKO (paras 17 - 20)


4. (C) Joint Secretary for United Nations (Political) Sanjiv
Arora began by stressing the importance of the peacekeeping
dialogue facilitated by the bilateral Joint Working Group
(JWG). Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary James Warlick
responded by recognizing that India, with its enormous
contribution to missions across the globe, was crucial to UN
peacekeeping efforts and largely responsible for their
success. Warlick went on to identify the JWG as a valuable
opportunity to establish a mutual understanding of
Peacekeeping operations, and to compare notes with regard to
the future of the program, given the "extraordinary
challenges in the future." Arora concurred, noting the
importance of both the US, a member of the UN Security
Council and India, one of the largest contributors of troops
to Peacekeeping operations, respectively.


5. (C) Arora expressed his hope that the two delegations
could exchange views on conceptual operational issues,
potential areas of cooperation, and perceptions regarding
major developments in the realm of UN Peacekeeping. Arora
emphasized that the success of the India ) US JWG was not

NEW DELHI 00002916 002 OF 007


determined by "action points," but by the "larger utility of
having an exchange of information and notes regarding major
challenges."

DPKO REFORM ) DEBATING THE PROPOSED SPLIT


6. (C) Arora raised the issue of the new UN Secretary
General's idea to restructure the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO),noting that although the
effort has received a green light from member states and
other UN departments, more details on the restructuring
process needed to be established before India would decide to
lend its full support.


7. (C) Warlick affirmed that restructuring the UNDPKO was
understandable due to the "enormity" of Peacekeeping
operations, and added that UN members need to assess the DPKO
structure and ask of themselves: &does it make sense?8
especially considering budgetary implications. Warlick
indicated that the US Government was prepared to support the
Secretary General in his decisions regarding the DPKO and

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secretariat, but cautioned that the USG was wary of

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undercutting the ability of the DPKO to successfully carry
out operations. Arora reiterated that the GOI supports the
DPKO restructuring in principal, although it cautions against
"reform for the sake of reform." The GOI hopes that through
streamlining, the DPKO will be made more efficient and lag
time will be reduced. He noted that in the annual GOI
dialogue reviewing Peacekeeping commitments, the issue of
DPKO restructuring was brought up; until a more concrete
proposal is made, the GOI will refrain from making a final
judgment.


8. (C) Director of International Organization Affairs,
Peacekeeping, Sanctions, and Counterterrorism Douglas Wake
informed the Indian delegation that while in New York, he had
been assured that any restructuring would not result in
increasing resource allocations. This led Wake to raise the
question of what new resources might be necessary, given
ongoing and future peacekeeping operations. Wake identified
procurement, oversight, and staff support as issues that
warranted particular attention. Furthermore, he asserted
that every DPKO project or mission should be judged on its
own merits, and that compromise would be necessary; certain
missions would be approved, while others would be turned down.


9. (C) Warlick urged particular attention be paid to the
issue of sexual exploitation and abuse connected to
peacekeeping operations. While stressing that the issue was
not directly related to the conduct of Indian peacekeepers,
he noted that any such acts or allegations "taint the entire
DPKO," which could do more to address problems with
post-incident follow up. Arora noted that the GOI is "making
new arrangements accordingly" regarding allegations of sexual
exploitation, but added that, the human rights record of
Indian peacekeepers "is commendable."

COMMAND AND CONTROL MUST REMAIN CLEAR


10. (C) The US delegation next stated that efforts to alter
the Command and Control structure of Peacekeeping operations
should be thoroughly considered, especially in terms of
future operations, before concrete change is effected. JS
Arora declined to comment on Command and Control reform in
the case of a UN-AU hybrid force in Darfur, noting it is
"premature to indicate what the GOI thinks." MAJGEN V.
Bhatnager (Chief of Indian UN Peacekeeping Forces) weighed
in, stating that in his experience, soldiers should ideally
be under one distinct command; dual control can lead to
"ambiguity and confusion." To mitigate this problem,
Bhatnager proposed delimiting specific areas of
responsibility, but acknowledged that further examination was
necessary. Bhatnager concluded by stressing that Troop
Contributing Countries (TCCs) must retain the prerogative of
selecting which soldiers would be deployed to Peacekeeping
operations. He briefly described the extensive training that
Indian peacekeepers are subjected to prior to deployment, and

NEW DELHI 00002916 003 OF 007


noted that problems, while few, were dealt with harshly.

PEACE BUILDING MUST FACTOR IN


11. (C) Warlick stated that the UN Peace-building Commission
(PBC) must plan for stabilization and reconstruction, opining
that where PBC proves ineffective, peacekeeping operations
may again be needed. He noted the success stories of Sierra
Leone and Burundi, where the military PKOs have been
withdrawn, noting a desire to extend this scenario to Cote
D,Ivoire and the Congo as conditions allow. Arora stated
that PBC is still groping for a role to play, and should be
used as a donor-driven process. Warlick noted that new
challenges in Africa, including new and continuing
Peacekeeping missions, must also be addressed.


12. (C) Separately, during a dinner conversation at the
DCM's residence, Special Envoy to the Middle East Ambassador
Chinmaya Gharekhan proposed that India and the US work
together to enhance African peacekeeping capabilities. He
stressed that, in view of China's energetic efforts to woo
African countries for their natural resources, India needs a
way to engage more deeply with Africa. While India has
strong cultural,,historical and colonial linkages with
Africa, it has a markedly weak diplomatic presence on the
continent, Gharekhan noted. (see ref B. for fuller
discussion.)

HOW INDIA VIEWS DPKO CAPACITY BUILDING


13. (C) Arora drew attention to the new concept of "enhanced
rapidly deployable capacities," which could eventually
replace the UN Strategic Reserve. He admitted that these
proposals were mostly in conceptual stages, and that not much
has been made operational ) for example, the UN still lacked
a standing police force. The GOI stated its satisfaction
that the discussions regarding C-34 (UN special committee on
PKO) had been resolved. Warlick concurred that the USG is
also pleased with the outcome of the C-34 talks, and that the
USG considers it an example of how India and the US can work
together not just in Peacekeepig, but in larger contexts.


14. (C) Warlick asked how India would suggest building up
DPKO capacity, and Arora replied that the process could be
streamlined if the DPKO would double-track both political and
operational deliberatios simultaneously, rather than
sequentially. He also stated the GOI preference for a formal
DPKO request for troops, but noted that when this is not
possible, that the informal process should be more fluid.
Arora added that India supports the UN stand-by arrangement
system (UNSAS).


15. (C) General Bhatnager noted the large number of Indian
forces readily available for PKOs, but added that it would be
useful to partially supplant troops by use of high-technology
alternatives. He noted that at a recent multinational PKO
seminar at Germany's Center for Peacekeeping (ZDF) in Berlin,
Germany pointed to its focus on providing appropriate
available technology, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV),
sensors and imaging equipment to supplement and reduce the
number of actual boots on the ground when making assessments
of DPKO troop contribution requests. General Bhatnager noted
appreciatively that the Germans successfully augmented their
PKO troop contribution in Sudan with Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV) sorties. The GOI delegation noted that for the first
time, elements of the Indian Air Force have been deployed to
serve in a Peacekeeping capacity, and authorities are
considering possible future roles for Indian naval forces.


16. (C) Arora confirmed that the GOI would like to host the
joint GPOI/DPKO-created Senior Mission Leader Course (SMLC)
training event at its Center for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in
January 2008.

MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF THE SURGE IN PKO


17. (C) Warlick remarked that the UNDPKO needs to begin

NEW DELHI 00002916 004 OF 007


exploring options and contingencies for peacekeeping well in
advance of any deployment. Senior Military Advisor to the
International Organizations Bureau COL Larry Mrozinski noted
that currently the DPKO requires an average of 180 days to
respond to a crisis, and said there needs to be a way to
streamline the process to reduce this delay. He suggested
using trained professional police forces, which India has in
abundance, as advance forces. He warned of the danger of
"spillover" of conflicts, as in the case of the Darfur
conflict spilling over into Chad. MoD Joint Secretary
(General Staff) Julka noted that before coming onboard with a
new PKO suggestion, India would desire a threat assessment
from DPKO and even from the USG, along with the request.


18. (C) Arora agreed on the potential need for new
Peacekeeping operations, but underlined the GOI position that
all stakeholders must be consulted before starting a new
operation. He noted that there had been much talk of a
mission in Darfur in the wake of UNSCR 1706 of August 2006;
deployment of the light support packages is now almost
complete, while it is still not clear whether President
Bashir will accept the UN-AU hybrid force. Beyond Sudan,
observers have raised the possibility of peacekeeping
operations in Somalia, Chad, and the Central African
Republic. He added that potential roles for the UN in Nepal
and East Timor are also recent causes of concern.


19. (C) Warlick noted that the surge of expected PKO plans
have not materialized as quickly as expected, and urged India
to join US efforts to push for UNPKO to explore contingencies
in Sudan, Chad, and Somalia. He also expressed concern about
the lack of movement on transitioning a UNPKO to replace the
African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) force currently in
place. Arora restated the GOI's position that UNDPKO must
consult with all stakeholders before initiating new PKOs.
Julka added that the PKOs in Congo and Liberia have not fully
utilized available air force resources.


20. (C) Warlick stated that the UN is actively involved in a
political support mission in Iraq (UNAMI). Warlick asked if
the GOI would also consider contributing troops to provide
"middle ring" or perimeter security for UNAMI. Arora hedged
and stated that he was not authorized to give any commitment
as a reply.

INDIA OUTLINES ITS PKO READINESS


21. (C) Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) Inspector General (UN
Police Forces) RR Bhatnager outlined PK capabilities of
Indian paramilitary police units, noting that service in the
troubled, insurgent-rife state of Kashmir gives Indian police
and military superior suitability for service in UN Formed
Police Units (FPU). He noted that Indian police and troops
often serve in Indian states where the locals have vastly
different cultures, dress, customs and even language, and
this experience readies the police for PKO in foreign
countries. He also noted that Indian paramilitary police
regularly perform missions quite similar to PKO duties, such
as roadblocks, IED detection and removal, border sealing and
patrolling and regular engagements with heavily armed
terrorists. Indian paramilitary police are also armed and
proficient with a wide array of advanced weaponry not readily
available to most countries, police, including light and
medium machine-guns, mortars and sniper rifles.


22. (C) Bhatnager outlined India's participation in
international police training, such as participation in the
Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in
Italy, and noted that India has trained 590 international
police officers at its National UN Civilian Police seminars
since 2003. He added that the number of Indian police
participating in UN FPUs has decreased from 303 in 2000 to 98
in 2007, but he pledged India's ability and willingness to
contribute more, both at the lower and senior police levels.
MHA Director (UN Police Forces) Inderjeet Kaur added that the
GOI also has vast reserves of ready-trained female officers
who are willing to participate, noting the deployment of

NEW DELHI 00002916 005 OF 007


all-Indian Female Formed Police Units (FFPU) to Liberia this
past year. Ministry of External Affairs Deputy Secretary
(International Organizations) Manish noted that some Liberian
women have expressed a wish to become police officers after
positive interactions with the Indian FFPU.

INDIA DETAILS ITS UN PKO CONTRIBUTIONS


23. (C) COL Vijay Singh (Director, UN Army HQ) gave an
overview presentation of India's military UN Peacekeeping
activities and current contributions, underlining that target
countries of UNPKO especially welcome Indian military
peacekeepers, valuing them for their neutrality and high
standards of professionalism. He pointed to great Indian
success in the UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (MONUC) describing how three Indian peacekeeping
brigades thwarted the Congo rebel leader Napunda in his
attempt to take the city of Goma. He also noted that the 4th
Sikh regiment participating in UNIFIL stood its ground
despite sustaining casualties, and for this was singled out
for praise by UNPKO Under Secretary Jean-Marie Guehenno.


24. (C) COL D.S. Gill (Director, Center for UN Peacekeeping)
gave a presentation on the military training conducted by the
Center for UN Peacekeeping, underlining that alone among all
the international UN Peacekeeping centers worldwide, India's
CUNPK fully funds the transportation, lodging and training of
15 foreign officers per annum. He pointed to cultural
sensitivity training, as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training.
Gill noted that six US military officers have trained at
CUNPK.


25. (C) Warlick praised the superb CUNPK training center, and
underlined the need for closer interaction between NATO and
UNDPK. Arora noted that the CUNPK recently hosted an ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) seminar, and that Indian and African PK
officials have gone to the German ZDF for training. Inspector
General Bhatnager noted that the CUNPK hopes to be recognized
by UNDPKO as an official Asia-Pacific regional police
training center. Mrozinski urged COL Gill and CUNPK reach
out to offer training for members of the Kosovar Police
Service School (KPSS),if they have not already done so.
Gill replied that CUNPK has not contacted KPSS yet, as they
are not members of the International Association of
Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC),but Arora agreed that
it would be a good idea to reach out to them.

NEED TO PHASE OUT OBSOLETE PKO MISSIONS


26. (C) Arora reiterated the GOI commitment to Peacekeeping
operations, and stated the GOI,s willingness to participate
in discussions on possible draw-downs of certain missions.
He observed that the process would benefit from more
information from the various stakeholders. More broadly, the
GOI expressed its interest in energizing consultations
between troop contributing countries (TCCs) and Security
Council members. Arora emphasized the utility of such
consultations and, while noting that they are occurring more
frequently and with more substantive proceedings, stated that
India would still like to see "more effort" to that end.


27. (C) Warlick questioned the need for continued UN
Peacekeeping operations where they were no longer needed. He
stated a "need for an exit strategy" in certain countries.
He also questioned the further need for certain legacy
missions. Arora noted that UNMOGIP is defunct, and an
"aberration" that should be canceled, but underlined that
India is "not playing the numbers game" when considering
downsizing and withdrawal of PKOs, stating that such cases
should be deliberated carefully, and shouldn't take any of
the stakeholders by surprise.


28. (C) BGEN Dalbir Singh, (Deputy Chief of Indian UN
Peacekeeping Forces) noted that India still has Military
Observers (MILOB) in Cote D,Ivoire, and asked how soon this
PKO could be concluded. Warlick replied that Cote d,Ivoire
still lacks stability, and that a UNPKO needs to remain until

NEW DELHI 00002916 006 OF 007


the country is more stable. Wake added that it may be
possible to draw down following elections next year. Arora
noted that a peace agreement on Cote D,Ivoire was reached a
while back, but agreed that after the upcoming UN visit all
would have a better idea of when a pull-out might be
appropriate.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: CHAPTER VI VERSUS CHAPTER VII


29. (C) Mrozinski asked if the GOI was satisfied with the
Rules of Engagement (RoE) in the UNIFIL mission, to which
General Bhatnager replied that Indian troops were merely
observers there. Mrozinski emphasized that the UNFIL RoE
give individual unit commanders authority to interpret the
mandate as a field decision, and asked if the Indian
commanders employ this discretion. General Bhatnager hedged,
stating that it depends on the situation, yet finally
underlined that this decision should only be taken by the
overall UN Mission force commander, and any unit commanders
who violate the mandate by using their own discretion should
be reported. Arora added carefully that "it was perceived"
that there was ambiguity intentionally added to UNSCR 1701 in
order to blur the line between Chapters VI and VII. Arora
underlined that India did not hesitate to contribute troops
to UNIFIL, as (then Defense Minister) Mukherjee had promised
to UNSYG Kofi Annan, but admitted that there was much
deliberation both within India and with the UNDPKO about the
interpretation of UNSCR 1701.


30. (C) Director Wake underlined that a lack of a clear
mandate can constrain UNPKO, with frustrating results. Wake
emphasized that India, as a major troop contributing country,
and the US, as a UN Security Council member, need to demand
clearer mandates, specifying either Chapter VI and VII,
before committing troops to the proposed new hybrid mission
to Darfur. Arora demurred, noting that India is not a player
in the decision-making of defining the UNPKO mandate for
Darfur, and used the opportunity to get in a plug for India's
aspiration to a permanent seat on the UNSC, noting, "Maybe we
should be allowed into the UNSC, so that we can see for
ourselves how the mandates are decided." He added that often
a lack of information or appreciation of ground realities
causes the confusion in choosing the appropriate mandate for
a particular mission. General Bhatnager noted the importance
of giving a clear, unambiguously worded mandate to the ground
commanders, to avoid confusion. Wake pointed to UNSCR 1706,
authorizing the Darfur PKO, noting that the mandate must be
worded to give the PKO troops the authority to take any means
needed to fulfill their mission tasks, especially protecting
civilians, underlining, "we'll need a Chapter VII mandate."
Arora noted that the African Union (AU) and the Government of
Sudan are both stakeholders in the Darfur conflict, and need
to be consulted before this mandate is finalized.


31. (U) Participants:

USG:
James Warlick, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of International Organizations (IO) Affairs
Douglas Wake, Director of Peacekeeping, Sanctions and
Counterterrorism Office, Bureau of International
Organizations (IO) Affairs
COL Lawrence Mrozinski, Senior Military Advisor to
Peacekeeping, Sanctions and Counterterrorism Office, Bureau
of International Organizations (IO) Affairs
Geoffrey Pyatt, DCM, US Embassy New Delhi
Ted Osius, Political Counselor, US Embassy New Delhi
LTC Brian Hedrick, Deputy Chief, ODC, US Embassy New Delhi
Joel Ehrendreich, POL/MIL Section Chief, US Embassy New Delhi

India:
MEA Joint Secretary (International Organizations) Sanjiv
Arora, Indian delegation head
MEA Deputy Secretary (International Organizations) Manish
MEA Deputy Secretary (International Organizations) Surinder
Dutta
MEA Deputy Secretary (Americas) Prashant Agarwal

NEW DELHI 00002916 007 OF 007


MHA Inspector General (UN Police Forces) RR Bhatnager
MHA Director (UN Police Forces) Inderjeet Kaur
MoD Joint Secretary (General Staff) Julka
MAJGEN V. Bhatnager (Chief of Indian UN Peacekeeping Forces)
BGEN Dalbir Singh, (Deputy Chief of Indian UN Peacekeeping
Forces)
COL Vijay Singh (Director, UN Army HQ)
COL D.S. Gill (Director, Center for UN Peacekeeping)


32. (U) IO PDAS Warlick cleared this cable.
MULFORD