Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NEWDELHI2247
2007-05-10 11:41:00
SECRET
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

INDIA REQUESTS FORMAL TERRORISM WATCH LIST EXCHANGE

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR PBTS MOPS KDEM KISL ASEC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1114
PP RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHNE #2247 1301141
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 101141Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5526
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6138
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3594
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2080
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4974
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4646
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6904
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
S E C R E T NEW DELHI 002247 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR PBTS MOPS KDEM KISL ASEC
IN
SUBJECT: INDIA REQUESTS FORMAL TERRORISM WATCH LIST EXCHANGE

Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius, Reason 1.5 (B,D)

S E C R E T NEW DELHI 002247

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR PBTS MOPS KDEM KISL ASEC
IN
SUBJECT: INDIA REQUESTS FORMAL TERRORISM WATCH LIST EXCHANGE

Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius, Reason 1.5 (B,D)


1. (S) This is an ACTION request for the Department S/CT and
SCA. Please see paragraph 4.


2. (S) Summary: Indian MEA Counter-Terrorism Cell Director I
M Pandey passed a request to Poloff that the U.S. and India
sign an agreement to create a formal and continuous channel
to exchange terrorism watch lists, including "no fly" lists,
FBI wanted lists, and other intelligence-based terrorist
lists. Pandey indicated that the lists should include more
information than simply names and birth dates, since South
Asian names are often very similar. End Summary.


3. (S) Poloff met with Indian MEA Counter-Terrorism Cell
Director I M Pandey on May 8th to discuss follow-up steps to
the Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group. Pandey said that
he had been working to establish a point of contact for U.S.
officials to follow up on arrests of terrorism suspects
reported in the newspaper. He said, however, that this may
be the wrong avenue to help the U.S. ensure that terrorists
do not receive U.S. visas. Instead, he said the Ministry of
Home Affairs was asking for a formal bilateral agreement to
exchange terrorism watch lists on an ongoing basis. These
would include "no fly" lists, FBI wanted lists, and
additional lists derived for intelligence purposes. After
all, he explained, some of the people who appear in the
newspaper may be innocent, so it is important that we
exchange information about the real terrorists. He was also
concerned that some South Asian names are very common, such
as Singh and Patel, leading to confusion about who is really
on the list. He suggested that the lists should include more
information than simply names and dates of birth, if it is
available, to avoid this kind of confusion.


4. (S) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests guidance on how to
respond to Pandey's request, particularly whether this kind
of information, including names at a SECRET level, can be
shared with the GOI on a continuous basis. Can the
information be gathered into a single database? Legatt
comments that Homeland Security Presidential Directive/Hspd-6
may apply if India is formally included in the list of
certain foreign governments that should receive this
information.


5. (S) Comment: India has a wealth of information about
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) Lashkar-e-Taiba and
Jaish Muhammad, including names of terrorists involved in the
groups at an operational level, so India's lists may be of
high intelligence value for the United States. Further these
lists may be of high value for the Visa's Viper program at
Embassies across South Asia. As with any exchange with
India, we have to watch that this formal mechanism does not
become an excuse for the Ministry of Home Affairs to stall in
providing reciprocal information. The steps necessary to
negotiate this agreement may, themselves, prove to be a long
and drawn out process. End Comment.
PYATT