Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NEWDELHI1974
2007-04-25 12:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:
INDIA CAPABLE BUT UNWILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN IRAQ
VZCZCXRO6367 OO RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV DE RUEHNE #1974 1151233 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 251233Z APR 07 FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5139 INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0068 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6034 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3483 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1992 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4875 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4514 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6797 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 001974
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS, PM/RSAT, AND NEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS MOPS PTER IZ IN
SUBJECT: INDIA CAPABLE BUT UNWILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN IRAQ
REF: SECSTATE 54925
Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 001974
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS, PM/RSAT, AND NEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS MOPS PTER IZ IN
SUBJECT: INDIA CAPABLE BUT UNWILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN IRAQ
REF: SECSTATE 54925
Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)
1. (C) The Government of India (GOI) is capable of sending
both military and civilian resources to help accomplish the
mission in Iraq, but the will to do so does not exist. In
2003, when the U.S. first approached the GOI to contribute
troops to Iraq, then-Prime Minister Vajpayee's initial
reaction was positive. When Parliament debated the subject
later, however, there was widespread opposition from
political parties across the spectrum to sending Indian
troops or civilians to Iraq. Even the rightist Bhartiya
Janata Party (BJP),which supported U.S. goals, was deeply
divided on sending Indian troops. Many political parties
were concerned about pleasing their Muslim vote blocs and, in
light of impending 2004 elections, put pressure on Vajpayee
to keep India out of the war in Iraq. While a different
government is in power now, it is a shaky coalition, and
concerns about Iraq are even more acute. The United
Progressive Alliance (UPA)-ruled government must consider the
views of Muslim constituencies, vital to its political
survival, who would not/not be in favor of participation in
the Iraq coalition. Post suggests that approaching the
Indian government at this time for the contribution of troops
and/or civilians would be unlikely to succeed.
KAESTNER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS, PM/RSAT, AND NEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS MOPS PTER IZ IN
SUBJECT: INDIA CAPABLE BUT UNWILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN IRAQ
REF: SECSTATE 54925
Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)
1. (C) The Government of India (GOI) is capable of sending
both military and civilian resources to help accomplish the
mission in Iraq, but the will to do so does not exist. In
2003, when the U.S. first approached the GOI to contribute
troops to Iraq, then-Prime Minister Vajpayee's initial
reaction was positive. When Parliament debated the subject
later, however, there was widespread opposition from
political parties across the spectrum to sending Indian
troops or civilians to Iraq. Even the rightist Bhartiya
Janata Party (BJP),which supported U.S. goals, was deeply
divided on sending Indian troops. Many political parties
were concerned about pleasing their Muslim vote blocs and, in
light of impending 2004 elections, put pressure on Vajpayee
to keep India out of the war in Iraq. While a different
government is in power now, it is a shaky coalition, and
concerns about Iraq are even more acute. The United
Progressive Alliance (UPA)-ruled government must consider the
views of Muslim constituencies, vital to its political
survival, who would not/not be in favor of participation in
the Iraq coalition. Post suggests that approaching the
Indian government at this time for the contribution of troops
and/or civilians would be unlikely to succeed.
KAESTNER