Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NEWDELHI1704
2007-04-11 09:02:00
SECRET
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

INDO-PAK DISCUSSIONS ON SAARC SIDELINES HINT AT

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR PBTS MOPS KDEM KISL PK IN 
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P 110902Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4674
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 001704 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR PBTS MOPS KDEM KISL PK IN
SUBJECT: INDO-PAK DISCUSSIONS ON SAARC SIDELINES HINT AT
SOME PROGRESS

REF: NEW DELHI 1295

Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius, Reason 1.5 (B,D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 001704

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR PBTS MOPS KDEM KISL PK IN
SUBJECT: INDO-PAK DISCUSSIONS ON SAARC SIDELINES HINT AT
SOME PROGRESS

REF: NEW DELHI 1295

Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius, Reason 1.5 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: The recently concluded SAARC Summit (April
3-4) was notable for its lack of major tension over the
perennially contentious issues between India and Pakistan.
Indo-Pak experts on the sidelines of SAARC saw signals that a
proposal may be just around the corner to try to resolve
long-running disputes, but they also cautioned that time is
of the highest essence. As Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz
returned to Pakistan, he also left behind some positive
indications with Kashmiri leaders with whom he met. While
such optimism is helpful, details remain vague. Journalists
in Delhi think Siachen Glacier and/or Sir Creek resolutions
could be possible if Delhi and Islamabad muster the will to
close out these problems. Adding a dose of reality after the
SAARC meetings, the latest of eleven rounds of talks on
Siachen went nowhere, as usual. At least the public vibes
remain good. End Summary.

Kashmir Receives the Obligatory Public Mention at SAARC
--------------


2. (C) At the Fourteenth Summit of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in New Delhi
April 3-4, Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz labeled the
difference of opinion with India over Kashmir as "the core
issue" in their bilateral relationship. As reported in the
press, however, Aziz is not believed to have broached the
topic in "any serious manner" during a 50-minute meeting with
Prime Minister Singh. Media also noted that Singh, for his
part, did not use the word "terrorism" in his closing speech
to SAARC delegates on April. Instead, he advised, "We must
also win the war against all forms of extremism and
intolerance in our region." After the conclusion of the
summit, Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee

said that he was "not very much perturbed" by Aziz's
statement, and that it was "nothing new." This led some in
the press to speculate that Aziz publicly mentioned Kashmir
only to placate his domestic audience. In the evening of
April 4, Aziz met with a delegation of Kashmiri separatist
leaders, including Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Shabir Shah, Bilal
Ghani Lone, Fazal Haq Qureshi, Agha Syed Hassan Al-Moosvi,
and perhaps others. Aziz reportedly told the Kashmiris that
their fate is central to Pakistan-India relations, unity
among Kashmiris is important, and demilitarization of Kashmir
is only a step and not an end in and of itself. Bilal Lone
also told us that Aziz hinted that the separatists should
consider participating in Indian election if and when a deal
is struck between the two capitals.

Indo-Pak Proposal Almost Ready for Unveiling?
--------------


3. (C) Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian
Affairs Richard Boucher met on April 4 with Indo-Pak scholar
Dr. Radha Kumar, journalist and commentator Saeed Naqvi, and
Hindustan Times editor Manoj Joshi to discuss the status of
efforts toward the resolution of the Kashmir dispute and
overall Indo-Pak relations. All agreed that public opinion
in both countries was increasingly ready for a "settlement"
on Kashmir, and that while several issues remained to be
resolved, including the status of Pakistan's Northern Areas,
none of these was "insurmountable." Kumar, Naqvi, and Joshi
estimated that India and Pakistan could come to a solution
within just a few years, mainly requiring the political will

NEW DELHI 00001704 002 OF 005


to see it completed. As a sign of how close the two sides
were, Naqvi noted that last month he had attended a dinner
for Foreign Minister Kasuri at the New Delhi Pakistani High
Commission. Kasuri apparently spoke out of turn when he said
at the dinner that discussions had progressed to the point
that India and Pakistan were nearly ready to announce a
proposal to both countries' publics. Naqvi explained that
the bureaucrats in the room looked very uncomfortable as
Kasuri spoke and afterward the comments were muted in the
press.


4. (C) One issue that Joshi identified as still needing
resolution was the difference between a proposed "joint
consultative mechanism" for Jammu and Kashmir and a "joint
management mechanism," the former being India's suggestion
and the latter being Pakistan's characterization of India's
suggestion. Joshi explained that India would not agree to
joint management because it infers less than full
sovereignty, while a joint consultative framework could be
applied to issues of water, trade, tourism, and agriculture
that would not amount to a loss of sovereignty. Assistant
Secretary Boucher explained that joint management may not

SIPDIS
signify any loss of sovereignty, pointing to a joint
U.S.-Canada water management body.

The Fly in the Ointment: Terrorism
--------------


5. (C) Boucher also met with former Indian Ambassador to the
United States K. Shankar Bajpai on April 4 to discuss
Indo-Pak relations. On the subject of cross-border terrorism,
Boucher said that he has been disturbed by the Indian
Government's tendency to assume that if a terrorist
organization emerges in a country, then that country's
government is automatically complicit in some way. Bajpai
responded that the Indian Government is only now beginning to
realize that some previously foreign-backed terrorist
organizations have taken on an independent existence. With
regard to Pakistan, Boucher advised that the government there
must do its part by ceasing to differentiate between "good"
and "bad" terrorists, particularly concerning Kashmir. Bajpai
added that some Pakistani government officials also maintain
"warm relations" with Taliban figures as they are
anticipating an American withdrawal from Afghanistan in the
near future. Bajpai further lamented that in addition to
terrorist threats originating in Pakistan--and now
Bangladesh--India has home-grown terrorist elements to
combat, too.

Concessions Likely in Siachen and Sir Creek Disputes?
--------------


6. (C) Even if Kashmir is not quite ready for settlement,
Manoj Joshi predicted that the Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek
border disputes, also components of the Composite Dialogue,
could be resolved in a few months. This would happen because
each side would make a concession on one issue and receive a
concession on the other--Pakistan would concede on Siachen,
India on Sir Creek. There was an approximate agreement where
Pakistan said it would agree to a redeployment schedule.
Joshi explained that since redeployment inferred movement
from one place to another, a redeployment schedule implicitly
recognizes the current locations of both Indian and Pakistani
troops--something Pakistan had previously refused to
acknowledge through formal troop demarcations. On Sir Creek,
the recently completed joint survey shows that the river
banks have moved into Indian territory, compelling India to

NEW DELHI 00001704 003 OF 005


accept a new border there that gives more land to Pakistan.


A Dose of Jarring Siachen Reality
--------------


7. (SBU) Despite official statements indicating that the
eleventh round of Siachen Glacier talks (April 6-7) "were
held in a candid and constructive atmosphere" and that the
meetings would continue, some blunt words by the Pakistani
side after the talks were widely reported in the Indian
press. One Times of India headline read: "Indians are
stubborn, arrogant: Pak officials." Other papers here said
the Pakistanis balked at the customary Indian insistence on
verification of actual ground positions. The article went on
to say that unnamed Pakistani Defense Ministry officials had
blamed "Indian stubbornness" for the failure and that India's
growing relations with the U.S. were the source of its
"arrogance." Reportedly Pakistani Defense Secretary Kamran
Rasool left the talks to go "straight to his room," where his
Indian counterpart found him and continued discussions. The
lack of progress in these talks, coming right on the heels of
the SAARC Summit, has no doubt disappointed Indo-Pak
watchers, but they can derive hope from the fact that it
appears that the talks will inexorably grind on, although no
date has been fixed for the next meeting, according to the
media.

Better Sooner than Later
--------------


8. (C) The three Indo-Pak observers also told Boucher that
a resolution on Kashmir was better done sooner than later.
Radha Kumar stated that the government of India should come
to an agreement within six months, because she felt Musharraf
was becoming "weaker and weaker." Saeed Naqvi observed that
both countries' moderates gain from a settlement between
India and Pakistan. By contrast, the lack of a settlement
would bolster violence and radicalization in both countries.
Manoj Joshi agreed, claiming that certain footprints of
recent terrorist attacks in India did not lead to Pakistan,
but were linked to domestic developments. If Kashmir was not
solved soon, he predicted, Islamic radicalism could take root
in India.

Geelani Visa Refusal Good for U.S. and Kashmir
--------------


9. (C) In a separate meeting with Deputy PolCouns, Radha
Kumar expressed agreement with our recent decision to deny a
visa--ostensably for medical treatment in the U.S.--to Sayeed
Ali Shah Geelani, a Kashmiri separatist leader with ties to
terrorist group Hizbul Mujahideen (reftel). Kumar said the
verdict made American opposition to violence crystal clear to
all. In terms of the political scene in Kashmir, Kumar added
that the decision has strengthened the hand of moderate
Hurriyat separatist Mirwaiz Omar Farooq. She also thought
that the situation could possibly give confidence to
associates of Geelani who are too intimidated by him to talk
and participate more in the peace process, such as Hizbul
Mujahideen chief Syed Salahuddin or some members of the
Jemaat al Islamiya.

Greater Roles for Kashmiris and U.S. in Indo-Pak Talks
Desired
--------------


NEW DELHI 00001704 004 OF 005



10. (C) Shahbir Ahmad Shah, President of the Jammu and
Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party, spoke with Deputy PolCouns
hours before he met with Shaukat Aziz on April 4. Shah
grumbled that although there was talk of behind-the-scenes
progress between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, there had
been no change in the ground reality in Kashmir. He said
that Kashmiris are confused because they are not involved in
Indo-Pak discussions and it is not even clear who is
representing their interests in general--certainly not Mufti
Mohammed Sayeed of the People's Democratic Party or any other
mainstream politician, in his opinion. Shah lamented the
lack of direct participation by the U.S. in the Kashmir
talks, saying that the U.S. can still wield considerable
influence over both Pakistan and India. He did acknowledge,
however, that the U.S. has a more multi-faceted and
complicated relationship with India these days. Also on the
subject of the U.S., Shah expressed his surprise at the
decision to refuse Geelani's visa at this time. He said that
although he is not in touch with Geelani and the two have
significant differences, Shah thought that the visa would be
granted on humanitarian grounds and not center on a question
of ideologies or advocacy of violence and terror.


11. (C) K. Shankar Bajpai said that a soft-border deal
between Pakistan and India would offer India a political "fig
leaf," but continued, "I,m still far from convinced that the
Pakistanis would go along with it." He added that he
considers the U.S. a stakeholder in resolving the dispute
over the Siachen Glacier. When Boucher asked what more the
U.S. should do, he recommended that Secretary Rice engage
Indian Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee, whom
Bajpai called a "political animal, not an ideologue." He also
endorsed the reactivation of a now-dormant Indo-U.S.
Commission founded during the time of former Secretary of
State Schultz. Bajpai recommended a revision of the
commission's four subcommittees as a starting point.

A Hands-off American Policy Toward Kashmir is Better
--------------


12. (S) In stark contrast, Deputy PolCouns talked with All
Parties Hurriyat Conference leader Bilal Ghani Lone the
morning after Lone's April 4 meeting with Shaukat Aziz. Lone
said that Aziz did not elaborate what has been accomplished
through backchannel discussions, but did say with cautious
optimism that talks are "moving at a positive pace." Aziz
told Lone and others at the meeting that April, May, and June
will be very crucial for discussions between India and
Pakistan, with "a lot of papers exchanged." According to
Lone, Aziz said that India and Pakistan would "go to the
masses" in perhaps some kind of special election, but
purposely left that point vague, giving the Hurriyat leader
the sense that he, too, may be able to stand for election if
a deal goes through.


13. (C) Despite the positive rhetoric, Lone said the lack of
further headway on Kashmir was the reason why Aziz, and not
President Pervez Musharraf, had represented Pakistan at the
SAARC summit. When asked if the U.S. could do anything to
support the peace process, Lone responded that the U.S.
should let things work themselves out "in a natural way and
without the U.S. pushing this guy or that guy." He
envisioned a role for greater U.S. public diplomacy in
Kashmir, particularly at the village-level. Lone did not see
the visa refusal for "tension-creating" Geelani as having a
great impact on perception of the U.S. in Kashmir; while
"certain quarters" were displeased, by and large "the friends

NEW DELHI 00001704 005 OF 005


and enemies of the U.S. won't change in Kashmir," he said.
The Geelani visa, he stressed, was a finished issue in
Kashmir. Nobody cared, he emphasized. Lone labeled
Washington-based Kashmiri American Council executive director
Ghulam Nabi Fai, whose tentative March 28 conference Geelani
was invited to attend, as a "dangerous man" and a jihadi who
was not to be trusted, and whom Lone would avoid in an
upcoming trip.

Comment: Optimism Only Sustainable with Progress
--------------


14. (C) Comment: There is a great deal of optimism about
the progress and future fruits of the Delhi-Islamabad
discussions, with a lot of speculation as to what is exactly
transpiring behind closed doors. The fact that Kashmiris
themselves are feeling left out of the proceedings is
somewhat troubling, but then again Kashmir will never have a
chance at peace until majority stakeholders India and
Pakistan have buried their own hatchets. This level of
optimism in India cannot be sustained indefinitely, however.
If both sides make progress on Siachen or Sir Creek
negotiations, it may signal the possibility of agreement on
far more tricky Kashmir. While our most recent meetings with
Kashmiri and Delhi contacts have yielded two drastically
different recommendations for future U.S. action, we believe
that our private, but firm, push for peace between Pakistan
and India is the best course of action at present.
Ultimately, this SAARC summit will be remembered for the
almost complete absence of rancor between India and Pakistan,
even if the substance was lacking. That itself is a
momentous achievement. End comment.


15. (U) Assistant Secretary Boucher reviewed this message
prior to its transmittal.
MULFORD