Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NEWDELHI1676
2007-04-09 14:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

CODEL LOWEY DISCUSSES 123 AGREEMENT, CONGRESSIONAL

Tags:  PREL PGOV PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001676 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN
SUBJECT: CODEL LOWEY DISCUSSES 123 AGREEMENT, CONGRESSIONAL
ROLE WITH MENON AND SARAN

NEW DELHI 00001676 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001676

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN
SUBJECT: CODEL LOWEY DISCUSSES 123 AGREEMENT, CONGRESSIONAL
ROLE WITH MENON AND SARAN

NEW DELHI 00001676 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a joint meeting with Foreign Secretary
Shiv Shankar Menon and Special Envoy to the Prime Minister
Shyam Saran, Codel Lowey outlined their concerns on the
civil-nuclear agreement, including fears that the Government
of India (GOI) had come to the conclusion that the U.S.
Congress could be ignored and that the agreement could be
pushed through with changes to which they had not consented.
Warning that the GOI should not assume that there had been
automatic support for the agreement, the Codel expressed that
the GOI and the U.S. had not had good dialogue on the
agreement since the Hyde Act had passed. Saran responded
that the GOI was still negotiating on the agreement, warning
that no one should jump to conclusions on its status. Citing
India's excellent record of non-proliferation and its own
technological advances, Saran indicated that the U.S. would
benefit more from having India as a partner in the realm of
civil nuclear technology, rather than an outsider. On the
recent indictment of an Indian-related company for illegally
obtaining sensitive technology, Menon reassured the
delegation that the Government of India was working with the
U.S. to investigate the situation, and that the GOI had no
interest in breaking U.S. law.
Members of the Delegation included:

Congresswoman Nita Lowey, Chairwoman of the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs
Sub-committee
Congressman Edward Royce
Congressman Adam Schiff
Congressman Steve Israel
Congressman Ben Chandler
Congressman Timothy Ryan
Congressman Cliff Stearns

END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Codel Lowey's meeting with Foreign Secretary Shiv
Shankar Menon and Special Envoy to the Prime Minister Shyam

Saran began on a strained note. When Ambassador Mulford
arrived at the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA),he learned
that the Codel was not coming to the meetings as a protest
against the fact that meetings with Congress Party President
Sonia Gandhi and Prime Minister Singh had not come through.
(Note: Gandhi was campaigning in Uttar Pradesh, and the
Prime Minister is in Assam. End note.) The Ambassador
assured Chairwoman Lowey by telephone that the Codel should
come meet Menon and Saran, and then explained to the Foreign
Secretary what had transpired. Menon said the MEA had

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scheduled the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister meetings
for Friday, April 6, and then the delegation changed their
schedule. (Note: These meetings were never confirmed to the
Embassy. End note.)


3. (C) Chairwoman Lowey opened the meeting by strongly
expressing her disappointment that Prime Minister Singh was
unable to meet with her delegation. Congressman Edward Royce

NEW DELHI 00001676 002.2 OF 003


echoed Lowey's disappointment to the Foreign Secretary,
stating that the delegation had been asked by Congressional
leadership to come to India to discuss the civil nuclear
agreement, of which all members of the delegation had voted
in favor. Menon emphasized that both the Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee wanted to meet with the
Codel, but that it had been physically impossible due to the
Prime Minister being out of town and Mukherjee's serious car
accident, which had taken place two days earlier.


4. (C) Royce indicated that he thought the GOI had come to
the conclusion that the U.S. Congress could be pushed aside
on the civil-nuclear agreement, and that the U.S.
Administration could instead support the initial agreement
that had not been approved by Congress. He reiterated that
the Hyde Act language dictates that there be no changes in
the legislation when the 123 Agreement comes to Congress for
approval. He expressed concern that Congress thought the
issue of India not conducting nuclear testing had been
resolved, and underlined that U.S. law was very clear on why
the U.S. could not cooperate on civil nuclear energy with
countries that conduct nuclear tests. He added that it
seemed that the GOI did not view the judgment of the U.S.
Congress as pivotal, and that Members of Congress felt that
they were being asked to change the Hyde Act.


5. (C) Congressman Adam Schiff stated that he believed the
Hyde Act would not be amended prior to signing the 123
Agreement, and said he would not have voted for it otherwise.
He maintained that Congress wanted a strong relationship
with India, but added that Congress was concerned that China
could promote a similar exception for Pakistan, which he said
would be disastrous and would render the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) worthless. Many Members of
Congress would have preferred to strengthen Indo-U.S.
relations via means other than nuclear technology, Schiff
said, noting that accusations of having a double standard had
been leveled at the U.S. The vote in favor of the Hyde Act
had been strong initially, he said, but warned against
assuming that the 123 Agreement would get a passing vote.


6. (C) Congressman Steve Israel added his observation that
the vote in favor of the Hyde Act had not reflected automatic
support for the 123 Agreement, and complained that the GOI
and the U.S. Congress had not had a good dialogue about the
Agreement since the vote had passed, though the relationship
had been good before. He then reconveyed the delegation's
dismay at not having gotten a meeting with PM Singh, noting
that the delegation, which had been in Pakistan just before
arriving in New Delhi, had been immediately ushered to a
meeting with President Musharraf upon landing in Islamabad,
and reconveyed the delegation's dismay at not having gotten a
meeting with PM Singh.


7. (C) Saran, who came from the Prime Minister's office to
the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) to accommodate the
delegation despite the fact that he had a separately
scheduled meeting with them later, responded to the

NEW DELHI 00001676 003.2 OF 003


delegation's concerns by first reinforcing that it was not in
the GOI's interest to deny the Codel any of the appointments
they had requested. Saran emphasized strongly that the GOI
was not taking the U.S. Congress for granted, but noted that
both the Indian and U.S. sides would have to reconcile very
divergent positions on the Agreement within both of their
constituencies. Whether or not those different views could
be overcome "remains to be seen," said Saran, adding that,
"any perception that the Indian side is trying to change what
Congress has in mind is not an accurate reflection." The
U.S. and India were two independent, sovereign governments
who must both answer to their own legislative bodies as well
as public opinion in their countries, he contended.


8. (C) The civil-nuclear agreement was only possible due to
the U.S. recognition that India had a fifty-year, impeccable
record of non-proliferation, averred Saran, noting that
neither Pakistan, nor China, nor "some other NPT members"
could boast of that. He argued that India, in spite of
having been denied nuclear technology, had developed on its
own a large range of high technology, including a nuclear
program. Would the U.S. rather have a country with such a
wide range of dual-use technology available as a partner or a
target of non-proliferation, he asked. It would be better to
have India as a partner in a nuclear agreement than to keep
them on the outside, he declared. The civil nuclear
agreement had a broad range of support within India, he said,
urging the Codel not to rush to judgment while the agreement
was still in the negotiation process.


9. (C) Schiff raised the issue of the recent indictment of
three Indian nationals for illegally obtaining sensitive
technology from the U.S., noting that one concern of the U.S.
Congress was that U.S. assistance not be used for the
advancement of India's military program. This indictment
would significantly raise an alarm among Members of Congress
who were already concerned about the 123 Agreement. Menon
assured him that India's civil and strategic nuclear programs
were completely separate, and that the GOI was working with
the U.S. to examine the case and determine exactly what had
transpired. "We have no interest in breaking your laws," he
stated, adding that the GOI would get to the bottom of the
incident. "Our record and our interest argue against any
involvement," Menon maintained.


10. (C) Menon told the Codel that he had heard their message
of "don't take us for granted" loud and clear, and asked them
to extend the same courtesy to the GOI, noting that it was
trying to arrive at an Agreement that would benefit both the
U.S. and India. He thanked the delegation for their
frankness, indicating that it was useful to know what their
concerns were. The GOI had every intention of bringing this
agreement to fruition, he reassured them.
MULFORD