Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NDJAMENA951
2007-12-13 16:14:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHAD: EUFOR PROSPECTS GLOOMY

Tags:  UNSC PGOV PREL PREF CD CR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1099
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0951/01 3471614
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131614Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5959
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1454
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000951 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: UNSC PGOV PREL PREF CD CR
SUBJECT: CHAD: EUFOR PROSPECTS GLOOMY

REF: NDJAMENA 942

NDJAMENA 00000951 001.2 OF 002


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000951

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: UNSC PGOV PREL PREF CD CR
SUBJECT: CHAD: EUFOR PROSPECTS GLOOMY

REF: NDJAMENA 942

NDJAMENA 00000951 001.2 OF 002



1. (SBU) Summary: Cancellation or postponement of EUFOR due
to resource and logistics constraints is a possibility
according to EUFOR's General Gannacia. Nonetheless, EUFOR
and MINURCAT advance teams continue to lay the groundwork for
eventual deployment. MINURCAT may request assistance from
donors in overcoming obstacles with the Chadian government.
End summary.


2. (SBU) EUFOR's General Gannacia made a two day visit to
Chad to view EUFOR preparations in N'Djamena and Abeche. In
a meeting December 12 with DCM, he informed her that EUFOR
might have to be canceled due to lack of funding for field
operations and lack of air support. Even if support
materialized, the operation might be postponed until December
2008 if the operation could not deploy sufficiently ahead of
the start of the next rainy season (which begins in May).
Ganaccia explained that he could live with a force of 3,000
rather than the hoped for 4,500, but he needed funding in
order to contract logisticians, field engineers, etc. And he
needed helicopters for quick reaction capability in order to
successfully patrol Chad's vast eastern region. For its
part, France had stated that it would not exceed the amount
already pledged. For other Europeans, Ganaccia considered the
problem to be lack of political will, rather than resources.
The UK and Germany, in particular, were not interested in
seeing a European defense force succeed.


3. (SBU) Ganaccia was confident that EUFOR's mission was
achievable - even with the recent insecurity in the east -
although it would have been preferable to have been up and
running before the rebel incursions began. EUFOR would deter
attacks on IDPs, refugees and humanitarian operations and
provide force protection to the UN-trained gendarme force
(MINURCAT). He would consider the mission a success of IDPs
returned home. EUFOR would not interfere with Chadian rebel
movements if they did not threaten these groups (they would,
however, pass on intelligence of their movements to the
Chadian authorities.) He discounted the threats from Chadian

rebels that EUFOR might be considered a "belligerent force"
and therefore a legitimate target. In his words, "let them
try."


4. (SBU) Ganaccia said that the relationship with the UN
force, MINURCAT was proceeding well. Both sides had a good
idea as to how EUFOR would go about supporting and protecting
MINURCAT. Agreement had been reached on common warning
systems and "direct intervention circumstances" EUFOR would
have intelligence cells co-located with MINURCAT in their six
presence towns (Abeche, Iriba, Guereda, Goz Beida, Bahai and
Farchana.)


5. (SBU) Ganaccia also felt that relations with the Chadian
authorities were good, with a high degree of cooperation. He
noted, however, that they particularly interested in ensuring
that this would be just a one year mission, with no UN
follow-on force. An assessment is mandated in UN Security
Resolution 1788 at the six months mark. But the six months
mark was still unknown given the uncertainty as to the start
date.

MINURCAT PREPARATIONS


6. (SBU) MINURCAT officers gave a well-prepared briefing to
members of the diplomatic corps on December 12 on status of
preparations (largely recapitulating information provided by
MINURCAT head to DAS Fitzgerald reftel). MINURCAT will have
six police commissariats in the towns of Abeche, Iriba,
Guereda, Goz Beida, Bahai and Farchana. They will have
smaller police posts in the 12 refugee camps/IDP areas. An
area of 5-10 kilometers around the camps/areas will be
patrolled. They hope to begin "training of trainers" no
later than December 18, with the four week training for the
gendarmes completed by March. Training will include skills
refresher (candidates are supposed to have spent at least two
years already either in the Chadian police or gendarmerie),
pofessionalization and human rights training. Deployment of
the 850 Chadian gendarmes will take place in stages starting
with Goz Beida, Djabal and Goz Amir camps, with the final
deployment reaching Bahai by June. However, if EUFOR deploys
sooner, MINURCAT deployment could speed up.


7. (SBU) MINURCAT will supply 214 vehicles, 900 side arms
with ammunition, 507 VHF radios, uniforms, personal items,
office equipment, and renovation of existing police/gendarme
facilities. However, MINURCAT too is experiencing
shortfalls. Only 180 police trainers (out of 300 desired)
have been provided by Francophone countries to date.

NDJAMENA 00000951 002.2 OF 002


Contributions to the trust fund were lagging: the EU had
contributed Euros 10 million EUROS, Japan Euros 2.2 EUROS,
and Norway $1 million, but they were still a long way from
the $20 million target. MINURCAT is also encountering
problems with the Chadian government, which, among other
issues, is not satisfied with the proposed stipend to be
offered to the Chadian Gendarmes. MINURCAT head Campaore
informed DCM that the Chadian government was pressing for
international scale salaries to be paid to the Chadian
gendarmes. (MINURCAT has provided for them to receive a
stipend of approximately USD 300 plus $5/day for living
expenses.) Campaore explained that he would work this issue
with the Chadian authorities, but might need UN members to
weigh in if the government continued to reject the UN's
stipend plan.
NIGRO