UPDATE ON MINURCAT IN CHAD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000942

SIPDIS

SIPDIS, SENSITIVE

STATE FOR AF/C, PM, AND PRM, PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREF UNSC CD CT
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON MINURCAT IN CHAD

REF: N'DJAMENA 890

NDJAMENA 00000942 001.2 OF 002



1. (SBU) Summary: MINURCAT is moving forward in preparing training
activities for Chadian police, but the security and political
situation could significantly delay or prevent the planned
deployment to eastern Chad. Privately, MINURCAT members expressed
concern about their narrow mandate, which precludes any involvement
in the political situation in Chad though they felt this was at the
core of the current conflict in the East. End Summary.


2. (SBU) On 5 December CDA Lucy Tamlyn and PRM Program Officer
Geoffrey Parker met with MINURCAT Political Affairs Officers David
Foncho and George Bakala. Geoffrey Parker and PRM DAS Bill
Fitzgerald spoke with MINURCAT head Ousseni Campaore in a separate
meeting on 4 December. MINURCAT gave an update on the status of
their mission and described some of the challenges they are
experiencing in carrying it out.


3. (SBU) MINURCAT plans to begin the first part of its mission -
training of police trainers - by 10 December, provided there are
resources available in the multi-donor trust fund. Currently
MINURCAT has only received pledges, which kept them from initiating
training on the original date of 4 December. MINURCAT plans to have
about 50 police trainers from the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations' (DPKO) New York-based Standing Police Capacity (SPC).
They will train the Chadian national trainers, many of whom the GOC
has already nominated.


4. (SBU) MINURCAT has also begun to receive members of the roughly
300-strong Civ-Pol element, which will deploy to the East with 850
Chadian policemen. France, Togo, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali,
Niger, and Cameroon have already sent individuals. Some countries
were supposedly too generous: Cote d'Ivoire was asked to bring its
original offer of 95 policemen down to under 10.


5. (SBU) Until it can get internal assets on the ground, MINURCAT
will be somewhat dependent on French military and UN logistical
capabilities. The French in Abeche have been giving communications
support, while the UN Humanitarian Air Service has been providing
air transport. The visitors pointed out that in past, more robust
DPKO missions (such as Sierra Leone and the DRC) had their own
logistical assets. But until that was the case in Chad, MINURCAT's
presence would represent an added strain on the current
communications structures (UNHCR has also been approached for
communications support) and logistical assets in the country. WFP
has also expressed concern about the potential for regional
transport congestion given MINURCAT's co-use of the port of Douala
to ship in vehicles, pre-fabricated living containers, and other
supplies.


6. (SBU) MINURCAT does not expect to reach full operational capacity
until the end of May. Deployment to the East will start in mid
January with the establishment of the Abeche police HQ. Deployment
will then continue over the next few months with 5 police stations
and 12 police posts. The police will be equipped with over 200
vehicles, 900 side arms (pistols),and 500 radios. The obvious
focus on the refugee camps has many humanitarians concerned that the
IDPs will be neglected. MINURCAT admitted that the current
deployment plan will not allow for police coverage of IDP sites over
10 kilometers from one of the refugee camps or main towns.


7. (SBU) The primary challenge cited by MINURCAT was the unstable
situation in eastern Chad, where President Deby is personally
leading his Armee Nationale Tchadienne (ANT) against three separate
rebel groups. The ongoing conflict could lead to a delay in the
deployment of the military contingent of MINURCAT - EUFOR - which
must happen before there can be a deployment of any civilian or
police elements. Even if the situation should calm down in the
East, MINURCAT (the civilian portion) and EUFOR have not yet agreed
on the exact extent of the security cooperation between them. This
is primarily due to the fact that the police will be spread across
12 refugee camps and 6 towns, while EUFOR will be concentrated in
only three locations - most likely Goz Beida, Abeche, and
potentially Iriba. Currently MINURCAT is not satisfied with EUFOR's
best security offer for the more distant police posts: a 2-hour
quick reaction force.


8. (SBU) Dealing with the Chadian authorities poses another set of
challenges for MINURCAT. The civilian portion of the mission is
made up of police (Civ-Pol and Chadian) as well as a
"multidimensional" element, the latter of which is experiencing some
resistance from the GOC. Though they are very small in number,
political affairs, human rights, and justice officers have been
viewed very suspiciously by Chadian authorities who fear such
personnel could meddle too deeply into internal matters and report
on issues from which the GOC would rather draw attention away.
Human rights, political developments, and "good governance" were
particularly sensitive issues. MINURCAT feels that tensions

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surrounding the multidimensional aspect of their mission could
increase once an improved security situation allowed them to deploy
these personnel to the East. Meanwhile, concerns regarding Chadian
reluctance to cooperate will be dealt with at the UN in New York.


9. (SBU) Another challenge in dealing with the GOC has been that of
human resources. MINURCAT has asked Chadian authorities to nominate
candidates for the police training but is not able to openly vet
them for police qualifications and previous criminal behavior/human
rights violations. The UN tries to vet them discreetly. Salaries
are also a source of disagreement: MINURCAT wants to pay the police
directly while the GOC would rather receive the money and pay the
police itself. PRM urged MINURCAT to pay salaries directly, given
UNHCR's bad experience paying gendarmes in the refugee camps through
the gendarmerie in N'Djamena (salaries had been reduced and arrived
months late).

Comment


10. (SBU) MINURCAT is making some progress in getting its first
training activities started, but ultimately the ability to fulfill
their mandate will be contingent upon EUFOR's ability to deploy to
the East. MINURCAT interlocutors were quite concerned with the
evolution of the political and security situation in Chad: MINURCAT
Political officers drew comparisons to other DPKO missions where the
UN mandate included a political track. Chad is also experiencing
political turmoil, they said, though MINURCAT's mandate does not
allow them to address this. According to them, without dealing with
the political issues at hand, the UN could find itself dealing with
Chad's security problems for quite some time.


11. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. Tamlyn