CHAD AMCIT CASE: REPORTED MDJT REQUEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000825

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS, RABAT FOR LEGAT,
STATE FOR AF/C AND CA/OCS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2012
TAGS: CASC PTER CD LY
SUBJECT: CHAD AMCIT CASE: REPORTED MDJT REQUEST

REF: NDJAMENA 812

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)


1. (SBU) CDA and other Emboffs met with Mr. Hadir Adji,
President of the Associations Friends of the Tibesti and two
of his colleagues on October 19 to pass on the message that
the case of seized American Cash Steven Godbold was being
followed with a great deal of interest and concern in
Washington, and that the Embassy had asked for Government of
Chad assistance. CDA explained to the group that the United
States would not negotiate with the MDJT, but that we hoped
that the Tubu community would do everything possible to seek
Godbold's release, given the importance the United States
attached to the safety of a U.S. citizen, and bearing in mind
the implications that this had for future U.S. assistance to
the region. The Tubu leaders said that Godbold was
considered a member of their community; that it was highly
unlikely that any harm would come to him. They strongly
warned against using any kind of force, stating that the town
of Zoumri had been an MDJT stronghold for years.


2. (C) Subsequently, Mr. Adji requested to see CDA on
October 23. Mr. Adji (please protect) said that he had
traveled to Maroua (Nigeria) over the weekend where he had
spoken three times over the phone with MDJT leader Choa Dazi
(who he said was in Libya.)


3. (C) Mr. Adji informed CDA that Dazi told him that Godbold
had been seized in order to call attention to the MDJT
movement, and so that the Government of Chad would take the
movement seriously. Dazi told Adji that he wanted the
Americans to support the MDJT movement, and to advocate for
it with the Government of Chad. Mr. Adji informed the CDA
that he had told Dazi that Godbold should be released without
any preconditions. He told CDA that he had assured Adji that
after Godbold's release that the Americans would be willing
to support efforts -- much as the EU, the UN or France was
doing -- for national reconciliation.


4. (C) CDA informed Mr. Adji of the travel to Bardai of a
Red Cross representative who would be available to meet
discretely with MDJT representatives. Mr. Adji said that he
would follow up on this information with his colleagues and
with the Red Cross representative in N'Djamena (who he knows
well). Mr. Adji felt that Dazi might be willing to release
Godbold to the Red Cross.


5. (C) CDA agreed with Mr. Adji that Mr. Godbold should be
released without any preconditions. Concerning Mr. Adji's
comments to Dazi on what the USG might or might not be
willing to do should Godbold be released, she explained that
the United States Government had stated publicly that it did
not support any efforts to seize power in Chad by arms and we
called on all parties to find a peaceful solution. However,
the seizure of Mr. Godbold was a criminal act; Mr. Godbold
had nothing to do with the internal politics of Chad and the
United States would not be drawn into these by means of
hostage-taking.

COMMENT:


6. (C) Despite Dazi's message through Mr. Adji, it is not
clear whether Dazi is opportunistically seeking to score
points for his splinter (and very marginalized) wing of the
MDJT or whether he is acting under instructions from (or to
curry favor with) Libya.


7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
TAMLYN