Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NDJAMENA618
2007-07-25 16:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHAD FOREIGN MINISTER ON ARUSHA MEETING

Tags:  PREL PGOV SU CD 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0618 2061639
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 251639Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5565
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000618 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU CD
SUBJECT: CHAD FOREIGN MINISTER ON ARUSHA MEETING

Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Lucy Tamlyn for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000618

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU CD
SUBJECT: CHAD FOREIGN MINISTER ON ARUSHA MEETING

Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Lucy Tamlyn for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (SBU) Summary: Chad Foreign Minister Allam-mi stressed
to Charge that Chad would do all it could to ensure a
successful meeting in Arusha. Referring to Embassy demarches
concerning the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue's aborted
meeting in Mombasa, he stated that Chad did not want to have
a bilateral discussion with the United States and CHD on
Darfur; all efforts needed to be conducted under the AU/UN
umbrella. End summary.


2. (SBU) The Charge d'Affaires met with the Minister of
Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, July 24 at his request. Foreign
Minister Allam-mi wanted to revisit the Embassy request on
behalf of the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue that Chad
allow Sudan rebels to depart for Mombasa via Abeche (eastern
Chad). (Note: Minister Allam-mi was not in N'Djamena during
the time of the original request. End note).


3. (C) Foreign Minister Allam-mi started off by claiming
that there were no Sudan rebels in Chad other than some who
are here for medical reasons. He said that Chad had "sent
all of the SLM" to Asmara; the JEM had all gone to Tripoli --
with the exception of Khalil who might still be in Darfur.
If the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue wanted to organize
rebel commanders for a meeting, they should ask the UN and
the African Union (AU) to pick them up in Darfur and
transport them where needed. He said that he had asked the
Chadian security agency (ANS) where the rebels were and the
ANS confirmed that the commanders were all deep in Darfur. In
any event, he had asked UN negotiator Jan Eliasson about the
CHD meeting while in Tripoli and Eliasson had told him that
the CHD initiative was overtaken by events.


4. (C) Allam-mi wanted to emphasize that Chad subscribed to
the Tripoli consensus and UN/AU leadership on all
initiatives; they did not want to be out "conducting a
bilateral discussion with the United States and the CHD on
Darfur." He acknowledged that CHD had played a constructive
role in earlier negotiations, but stressed that all efforts
were now bent on ensuring the success of the August 1-3
meeting in Arusha, including getting all of the Sudanese
rebel factions there "and in good humor." Chadian Ambassador
Baharadine Haroun Brahim was organizing the Chadian side.
(Comment: Baharadine has been closely involved in Chad
negotiations on Darfur for a number of years and was recently
named Chadian Ambassador to Khartoum.) Allam-mi stated that
his major concern was Eritrea -- Chad wanted peace for its
own sake; Eritrea, on the other hand, was involved because it
was playing a game and saw opportunities for political
leverage. He said that there were currently five Sudanese
elements in Asmara (but even if these did not go to Arusha,
they were represented by others.) However, JEM leader Khalil
Ibrahim could still be a problem. He commented that Khalil
needed to "play the game."


5. (C) As for the next step, Allam-mi thought that Tripoli
would be the best location for a meeting at the end of
August. Libya knew the players, and had ways to pressure
them. According to Allam-mi, the rebels needed to accept a
"Darfur-Darfur" dialogue going forward. The military leaders
could not claim to be the only representatives of the people
of Darfur. Their political leaders and civil society members
in Sudan and abroad needed to plot the course forward and
legitimize the Abuja accord.

Comment:


6. (C) Among Chadian officials, Allam-mi seems particularly
keen to avoid displeasing Qaddafi. From Chad's perspective,
it may be smart not to take on any new baggage regarding the
Darfur rebels (whom Chad has a long history of aiding and
abetting). Chad probably sees its interests currently best
served by not annoying Libya or Sudan - with whom its
relationship is now relatively good (Libya) and relatively
"less-bad" (Sudan).


7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
TAMLYN