Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NDJAMENA557
2007-07-05 07:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY IN CHAD: IS THERE HOPE?

Tags:  EAID EFIN EPET KDEM KPKO PGOV PHUM PREF PREL 
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DE RUEHNJ #0557/01 1860735
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 050735Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5483
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000557 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2012
TAGS: EAID EFIN EPET KDEM KPKO PGOV PHUM PREF PREL
PTER, CD
SUBJECT: DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY IN CHAD: IS THERE HOPE?

REF: NDJAMENA 553

Classified By: Ambassador Marc Wall for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000557

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2012
TAGS: EAID EFIN EPET KDEM KPKO PGOV PHUM PREF PREL
PTER, CD
SUBJECT: DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY IN CHAD: IS THERE HOPE?

REF: NDJAMENA 553

Classified By: Ambassador Marc Wall for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: President Idriss Deby Itno is a master
survivor in a political culture as cruel and a neighborhood
as dangerous as any in the world. Over the course of the
last few years he has succeeded once again in facing down all
challengers despite the fierce backlash his move to become
president-for-life unleashed. Deby is often seen as all
there is between relative calm and the abyss. But I would
argue that a durable peace in Chad will only come from
democratic reforms that include respecting arrangements for
the peaceful transfer of presidential power. In a country as
ethnically fragmented, weakly governed, and conflict-prone as
Chad, there is always the risk of turmoil. But without these
reforms, that risk is compounded. This matters to us. An
unstable Chad will not be able to cooperate effectively on
Darfur, counter-terrorism, oil, and humanitarian relief.
Only by addressing Chad's democratic deficit will it ever
break the cycle of violence that has plagued it for most of
its history and prevents it now from being a reliable partner
with us on the important issues at stake in this troubled
part of the world. END SUMMARY


2. (SBU) This is the second in a two-part account of a
departing ambassador's three years in Chad. A previous
message (ref) looked at the mixed record we have had in
pursuing our goals. This message examines the insurgency in
eastern Chad and the challenge of promoting democracy and
stability in a country that has known little of either.

--------------
Insurgency and Survival
--------------


3. (SBU) For much of the last two years, hardly a month has

gone by without bloody clashes taking place between Chadian
army units and rebel forces along the eastern border with
Sudan. Some were hit-and-run raids with few casualties;
others were much larger and deadlier confrontations. All the
main border towns, including Abeche, the base for
humanitarian operations, have at one time or another fallen
into rebel hands. Some rebel assaults advanced deep inside
the country, including on April 13 last year in the streets
of the capital city. Counter-attacks have taken Chadian
forces into Sudanese territory, most worrisomely in an
engagement last April that left 17 Sudanese troops dead.


4. (SBU) Deby has used all his formidable skills as a desert
fighter to withstand the attacks by the Chadian rebels. Oil
money has given him the means to arm his forces, and the
French military has intervened to support him at crucial
moments. But Deby is alive and in power today because of his
own courage as a field commander, wiliness as a tactician,
and audacity as a deal-maker. As he has proven throughout
his 17 tumultuous years in power and before that as army
commander or rebel coup plotter, he always ends up the last
man standing. If he cannot defeat his enemies in battle, he
buys them off or uses local ethnic-based militias to subdue
them. Deby's methods have produced such strange results as
naming the rebel leader who assaulted N'Djamena last year
Minister of Defense and turning his 9,000 followers into the
bastion of Deby's defense forces. They also led Deby to
throw his support behind the Sudanese rebel forces inside
Chad in exchange for their willingness to intervene in his
defense against his Chadian enemies.

--------------
A Chadian Rebellion with Chadian Roots
--------------


5. (SBU) Khartoum has provided support for these rebels, as
it did for Deby when he was plotting his return to overthrow
the Habre regime over 1989-90. Now, as then, the rebels
receive sanctuary inside Sudan as well as financing and
materiel help. But contrary to Deby's strident claims, they
are not a mercenary army hatched by Khartoum. On the
contrary, the roots of this insurgency are Chadian. The
commanders of the various rebel factions are senior Deby
family members or former government ministers or army
officers; the foot soldiers are largely young Chadian
recruits, often defectors from the Chadian army.


6. (SBU) Chad has lived with insurgencies virtually since
its independence from France in 1960, but for much of Deby's
tenure rebel activity slacked off somewhat. That relative
calm was shattered in 2005. A virulent insurgency sprang up
in reaction to his refusal to abide by the constitutional
term limits that would have required him to step down in

NDJAMENA 00000557 002 OF 003



2006. Despite statements in 2001 that he had no intention of
doing so, he set in motion the steps that would enable him to
stay on in power as president-for-life. The ruling party's
decision to accede to his ambitions in late 2003 opened the
first cracks in his support base. It was then that the
defections began and intra-clan feuds intensified. Hardly
anyone voted in the referendum to overturn the presidential
term limits in June 2005, but the results were nevertheless
proclaimed as a popular endorsement for the constitutional
change. The organized rebel attacks began soon after.

-------------- --------------
International Efforts Yield Disappointing Response
-------------- --------------

7, (C) With the exception of a statement by a visiting
French minister in 2004 supporting Deby's third term
ambitions and one by me at the July 4 reception in 2005
taking exception to his tactics, the international community
was silent. There was concern not to get out in front of the
French or to put pressure on Deby that could have negative
effects on the Darfur peace efforts in Abuja. After the
election in May 2006, which brought Deby a resounding but
false victory, greater international pressure began to build.
Nothing significant came of these efforts. Deby ignored
appeals to postpone the elections. A national dialogue he
organized for parties loyal to him was derided by his
opposition. Our press statement expressing disappointment
over the conduct of the presidential elections barely
resonated. The Secretary's letter suggesting Deby consider
handing over power at the end of his third term drew a stiff
rebuke. Only in recent months have discussions started with
EU support that may lead to credible electoral reforms before
the next legislative elections.

--------------
Is Peace Possible in Chad?
--------------


8. (C) Perhaps the French are right. Perhaps, as a
well-placed official once told me with refreshing Gallic
cynicism, Deby is the leader of the gang that controls the
capital city. In this view Chad is too divided and
politically immature to be capable of effective governance.
No other conceivable leader could do any better job holding
such a conflict-prone country together. In fact, a successor
would likely be even more autocratic or else much less
capable of preventing collapse. Outsiders should do nothing
that could weaken Deby's hand. Any well-intentioned meddling
would only make the situation worse, potentially much worse.


9. (SBU) But I believe on balance this view is wrong. Other
countries in the region with pasts almost as troubled as
Chad's have succeeded in finding ways to hand power over
peacefully. The great majority of Chadians, still
remembering the horrors of the civil war that ravaged the
country from 1979 through much of the 1980's, has no desire
to repeat that past. As ineffectual as they seem now, some
of the opposition party leaders are impressive individuals
who in a political environment less dominated by a powerful
strong man would have the makings of being credible
contenders for leadership. The longer Deby hangs on to
power, the bigger a target he becomes and the more he
galvanizes his opponents against him. And even if one buys
the argument that a future without Deby is bound to be
chaotic does not mean it can be prevented indefinitely.
Better to put a process in place now that has some chance of
leading to a peaceful political transition than waiting for
the violence that will almost surely erupt when he dies or is
overthrown.

--------------
But What Can Outsiders Do?
--------------


10. (C) Even if the French (at least the French under
Chirac) are wrong, what can well-meaning outsiders do about
it? Deby is a proud, thin-skinned leader who fiercely
resists outside pressure. The international community is too
divided to put concerted pressure on him. Even though France
under its new regime might now be readier to join in efforts
to do so, Deby has vast experience maneuvering around critics
internally and would have little problem doing so with
outsiders. But even if we could get to him in ways that
might make a difference, would we even want to? Deby is a
strong man who wants to be our friend. He takes stands in
many areas that support our interests. He wants to cooperate
with us on counter-terrorism, has no patience with religious
extremism, supports the relief effort for Sudanese refugees,
and on balance backs efforts to stop the violence in Darfur.

NDJAMENA 00000557 003 OF 003


He has proven willing to give his consent to our requests on
specific issues. He would not take kindly to attempts to
push him harder on democratic change.

--------------
The Imperative of Democratic Reform
--------------


11. (C) However compelling the case is for more democracy,
the reality is that an array of more immediate interests will
tend to take precedence for us. But the conundrum is that
without more democracy Chad will never break the cycle of
violence perpetrated by those convinced they have no way of
addressing their grievances or changing their leaders through
a credible political process. The discussions now underway
on electoral reform, together with the recent round of talks
in Tripoli with leaders of the Chadian rebellion, may prove
to be initial steps toward addressing these failures. Given
Deby's past track record, skeptics have reason to view these
initiatives as just more gestures to make him look good
before his domestic opponents and international critics.
Deby's powers of ruthlessness and guile could see him through
for years to come, but it is a high-risk game. He will
ultimately fall, either from natural or other causes, and his
country will suffer in the aftermath. Until durable reforms
take root, including respecting arrangements for handing
power over peacefully and constitutionally, Chad is doomed to
repeat its history of autocratic rule and violent regime
change.


12. (SBU) An unstable Chad is not in our interest; in fact,
it is a potential nightmare. Chad cannot be a reliable
partner with us if the regime is constantly struggling for
survival against armed insurgencies. It will not be able to
work with us effectively to strengthen its defenses against
terrorists and extremists; it will not be able to manage its
oil revenues for the benefit of its poor; it will not be able
work constructively on Darfur; and it will not be able to
provide safehaven to Sudanese refugees or avoid adding to its
own displaced population.


13. (SBU) To address the roots of that instability, we must
do more to support efforts to improve governance in this
notoriously poorly governed country. We should be prepared
to work with others on reforming its electoral process,
improving oil revenue management, and making its military
more professional. But we should also let Deby know that as
much as we appreciate his cooperation in many areas, we
believe he should lend his support for a peaceful, democratic
transition when his term in office ends in 2011.
WALL