CHAD: FOREIGN MINISTER ON REBELS AND PEACEKEEPING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000477

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM CH SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: FOREIGN MINISTER ON REBELS AND PEACEKEEPING


Classified By: Ambassador Marc Wall for reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with the Ambassador June 7,
Foreign Minister Allam-Mi said that both Sudan and Chad were
adequately abiding by the Riyadh accord's requirement to rein
in each other's rebels. Greater calm had prevailed in
eastern Chad as a result. Allam-mi hardened his verbiage
opposing a large UN peacekeeping force in Chad. Chad wished
to see, instead, a beefing up of existing Chadian and French
capabilities. (He was not sure of the proposals which the
French foreign minister would be bringing on his impending
trip to Chad.) Allam-Mi was not favorable toward the
Ambassador's request to permit movement of SLM rebels through
Chad to a reconciliation meeting in Nairobi. Allam-Mi did
not believe the principal antagonists in SLM could be brought
back together no matter how much effort was expended. In his
view, moving Sudanese rebels through Chad would complicate
Chad's relations with Sudan; instead, their movement should
be facilitated through the AU in Darfur. End summary.


2. (U) The Ambassador met Foreign Minister Ahmat Allam-Mi
June 7, with poloff as notetaker. Allam-Mi, recently
returned from Libya, joked that the Libyans were nervous
about the Americans' establishing a base in Chad.
Apparently, the Libyans had heard about small
American expeditionary groups involved in bilateral training
programs and been alarmed that a new U.S. African command had
been set up, needing a forward base. (In Chad!)

Calmer in the East
--------------


3. (C) Allam-Mi said that the Sudanese-Chadian
reconciliation effort in Riyadh had produced favorable
results, as both sides were reining in each other's rebels.
Sudan had tried to overthrow the Chadian government, it had
failed, and perhaps it had begun to learn a lesson.
Information coming to Ndjamena from Sudan was contradictory
-- some suggesting the Sudanese had arrested Chadian rebel
leaders, some suggesting it was continuing to support them --
but Chad was for the moment content to believe that Sudan was
reining them in, since Chadian rebel attacks had diminished.
Moreover, attacks by the Janjaweed into Chad had subsided in
recent weeks.


4. (C) For its part, Allam-Mi said, Chad had ordered
Sudanese rebel leaders, including the JEM's Khalil Ibrahim,
to leave Chad and had advised them to go to Asmara to
negotiate an end to the Darfur crisis. Khalil had never been
a "friend" of Chad, in fact causing Chad as much trouble as
Sudan, able to spend ample funds provided by Hasan al-Turabi.
But Chad would use him again if Sudan "bothered" Chad again.
The Sudanese, in Allam-Mi's view, tended to overemphasize
Khalil Ibrahim and other Zaghawan rebels and did not pay
enough attention to the Fur, Masalit, and other Darfurian
ethnicities. They claimed that they did not have control
over the Chadian rebels but then seemed able to rein them in
when they wanted to. Notably, Sudan had done nothing to rein
in Mahamat Nour, the Tama rebel who was now Minister of
Defense -- he had come in on his own, with no stimulus from
Sudan.

Unwilling for SLM to Pass through Chad
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador said that the United States was hoping
to organize a reconciliation conference in Nairobi of SLM
leaders, through the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, and
sought Chadian agreement on their passage through Chad.
Allam-Mi replied that Chad did not wish to see a
multiplication of efforts to unify the Darfurian rebels.
There already existed a process through the African Union and
UN, to which the United States had subscribed, with venues
already proposed in Juba, Eritrea, and Libya. The Ambassador
underlined that the United States completely supported that
process and the Nairobi conference would strengthen it.
Allam-Mi demurred, insisting that transporting rebels through
Chad was not the way to strengthen the process. Sudan would
see an anti-Sudan plot. If the rebels needed to be
transported, the way to do it was via the African Union
mission in Darfur (e.g., al-Fasher or Tine) under an
agreement with Sudan. In any case, Allam-mi said, he doubted
that the principal antagonists within the SLM could be
brought together. It would be better to accept from the
start that there would be at least two SLM groups (under
Minni Minnawi and Abd al-Wahid) and probably others.

No UN Force in the East but Maybe the French
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador asked Allam-Mi's current view on a
peacekeeping force in eastern Chad. Allam-Mi said that the
Arab states were very sensitive on this issue. In any case,

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it was not necessary to follow the hugely expensive and
time-consuming route, so preferred by the UN, of setting up a
large UN force of 10-20,000 troops. Chad had offered a
memorandum, when the subject first arose, laying out a
sensible plan for improving existing forces on the ground,
police, gendarmes, and army, which should be protected from
the air. The Libyan-Eritrean border monitors now being
established and the African Union stations in Abeche and Tine
could also make a contribution to security in eastern Chad.
Finally, the French, with their aremd presence in Abeche,
should make a greater contribution. But so far, with all the
focus on a grand scheme, there had been no start on the more
realistic Chadian proposal. Establishing such a peacekeeping
force in the Central African Republic was, however,
acceptable to Chad -- "tomorrow, if they like." With a
relatively narrow border with northern Sudan, CAR's security
problem was more easily addressed with a peacekeeping force.


7. (C) Allam-Mi said he was not clear what the new French
foreign minister had in mind in the way of enhanced forces
and humanitarian corridors, but it would be revealed in his
imminent visit. Allam-Mi said that the French already had a
significant presence in Abeche, so the questions now were
whether France was willing to do more -- give those forces
fuller scope, intergrate with Chadian forces, and put more
resources at Chad's disposal? In sum, Allam-Mi said, it was
best to build on capabilities that were already present, and
proceed in measured steps.
WALL