Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NDJAMENA462
2007-06-05 16:20:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:
SLM LEADER COMMENTS ON UNIFICATION EFFORTS
how-toVZCZCXRO6060 RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV DE RUEHNJ #0462/01 1561620 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 051620Z JUN 07 FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5348 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0413
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000462
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: SLM LEADER COMMENTS ON UNIFICATION EFFORTS
NDJAMENA 00000462 001.2 OF 002
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000462
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: SLM LEADER COMMENTS ON UNIFICATION EFFORTS
NDJAMENA 00000462 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The prospects for leaders within the
Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) to unify appear to be dim
and getting dimmer. During a recent meeting with SLM leader
Adam Shogar, he expressed dismay with recent unification
efforts, and was focused on the differences between the
various factions, rather than what they had in common. Adam
stated that he did not accept the Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA) as the basis for future talks, but said that both SLM
political leader Dr. Sharif Harir and SLM commander Ahmed
Abdulshafi might be ready to do so. END SUMMARY
2. (U) On the evening of 31 May, the Ambassador and Pol/Mil
officer met with SLM leader Adam Shogar on an isolated rock
outcropping on the outskirts of Abeche. Over the course of
the hour long meeting, Shogar provided his commentary on the
state of unification efforts within the SLM and possible
options for the future.
--------------
Failure of the National Redemption Front
--------------
3. (SBU) Shogar stated that the National Redemption Front
(NRF) had failed and highlighted his belief that the Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM) wanted to use the NRF umbrella to
augment their own organization. Within the NRF, there were
to be three key positions, the President, Secretary General,
and the FieldQommander. JEM wanted JEM leader Khalil
Ibrahim to serve as President, with another JEM officer in
the Field Commander position, and SLM taking the Secretary
General position. He acknowledged that JEM was also willing
to share the leadership positions on a rotating basis, but
said JEM insisted that Khalil serve as the first president.
Shogar had suppQted electing individuals to the key
positions based on proportional representation. He had even
proposed disbanding JEM and SLM entirely and creating a new
organization. JEM had rejected this proposal.
4. (SBU) Shogar noted that there would never be an
agreement within the SLM to allow Khalil to serve in a
leadership position within a unified opposition. He stated
that Khalil was not acceptable due to his relationship with
Turabi. When pressed on this issue, Shogar explained that
elements within the SLM had requested Khalil declare to the
media that he had no such relationship with Turabi, or the
National Congress Party, and to condemn Turabi publicly, but
that Khalil refused. While not accepting Khalil as President
within a unified opposition, Shogar noted that there would be
no problem with Khalil serving in some other capacity. He
described his relationship with JEM official Ahmed Togoud as
good, and mentioned that they had just talked that day, when
Togoud called him from Europe.
--------------
SLM Unification Efforts
--------------
5. (SBU) Shogar suggested that SLM political leader Dr.
Sharif Harir's participation in the recent Sudanese
opposition unification conference in Ameri was a big mistake,
and worked against SLM unification efforts. Shogar stated
that SLM commander Ahmed Abdulshafi and Sharif were both
getting pressure from the Eritrean government to go into
negotiations with the Government of Sudan. He said that
Khamis Abdulla, his SLM ally, was in Asmara for the meeting
underway there, but that Khamis did not intend to enter into
talks on unification. Shogar was dismissive of some of his
other SLM colleagues, calling into question their support
base, noting that Abdulshafi had only three or four vehicles
in his faction and Sharif, who was always wanting a
leadership position, also had minimal support on the ground.
-------------- ---
Center for Humanitarian Dialogue's (CHD) Efforts
-------------- ---
6. (SBU) Shogar was well aware of the CHD's plans for a SLM
unification conference in Nairobi. Shogar suggested that
these efforts were premature, and that prior to any such
conference there needed to be additional "hard work" in order
to bring the leaders together. While Shogar appreciated the
efforts of the CHD, he was not optimistic about this
particular gathering. Although he did not plan to attend, he
had selected ten individuals from his group to participate.
--------------
Views on the DPA
--------------
7. (SBU) Shogar stated that he does not accept using the
DPA as a basis for talks, because he does not trust the
NDJAMENA 00000462 002.6 OF 002
Sudanese government's willingness to implement it. Pressed
by the Ambassador not to aim at starting negotiations from
scratch, Shogar said it would be acceptable to return to the
fifth round of the Abuja talks and start from the Declaration
of Principles. He noted that he believed both Sharif and
Abdulshafi might support using an Abuja Plus formula as a
basis for discussions.
8. (SBU) Shogar saw little promise in the Ambassador's
point about setting aside for now attempts at reuniting the
SLM and instead entering into talks based on the substantial
areas of agreement that already exist among the rebel
factions on negotiating objectives. Shogar argued instead
that the SLM's unity was a necesary condition for successful
talks. Without it, he stated, it would be easy for Khartoum
to further divide the rebel groups with its "big bags" of
money.
9. (SBU) As night closed in and the meeting drew to a
close, Shogar noted that he would be traveling next week to
"the liberated area" in Darfur. He said now he intended "to
go his own way," working with other members of his group,
including Khamis Abdulla and Adam Bakheit, and with
representatives of the NMRD and various Arab groups now
emerging in opposition to the Sudanese government.
10. (SBU) COMMENT: Shogar, one of the most guileless of
prominent SLM figures, is turning into one of their most
uncompromising. His comments highlight the continuing
disarray in the SLM's ranks. For the main contenders, the
struggle for leadership of a unified movement is taking
precedence over the search for peace in Darfur. The Center
for Humanitarian Dialogue will have its work cut out for it
in seeking to bring Shogar's people on board at the
conference in Nairobi. END COMMENT
10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
WALL
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: SLM LEADER COMMENTS ON UNIFICATION EFFORTS
NDJAMENA 00000462 001.2 OF 002
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The prospects for leaders within the
Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) to unify appear to be dim
and getting dimmer. During a recent meeting with SLM leader
Adam Shogar, he expressed dismay with recent unification
efforts, and was focused on the differences between the
various factions, rather than what they had in common. Adam
stated that he did not accept the Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA) as the basis for future talks, but said that both SLM
political leader Dr. Sharif Harir and SLM commander Ahmed
Abdulshafi might be ready to do so. END SUMMARY
2. (U) On the evening of 31 May, the Ambassador and Pol/Mil
officer met with SLM leader Adam Shogar on an isolated rock
outcropping on the outskirts of Abeche. Over the course of
the hour long meeting, Shogar provided his commentary on the
state of unification efforts within the SLM and possible
options for the future.
--------------
Failure of the National Redemption Front
--------------
3. (SBU) Shogar stated that the National Redemption Front
(NRF) had failed and highlighted his belief that the Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM) wanted to use the NRF umbrella to
augment their own organization. Within the NRF, there were
to be three key positions, the President, Secretary General,
and the FieldQommander. JEM wanted JEM leader Khalil
Ibrahim to serve as President, with another JEM officer in
the Field Commander position, and SLM taking the Secretary
General position. He acknowledged that JEM was also willing
to share the leadership positions on a rotating basis, but
said JEM insisted that Khalil serve as the first president.
Shogar had suppQted electing individuals to the key
positions based on proportional representation. He had even
proposed disbanding JEM and SLM entirely and creating a new
organization. JEM had rejected this proposal.
4. (SBU) Shogar noted that there would never be an
agreement within the SLM to allow Khalil to serve in a
leadership position within a unified opposition. He stated
that Khalil was not acceptable due to his relationship with
Turabi. When pressed on this issue, Shogar explained that
elements within the SLM had requested Khalil declare to the
media that he had no such relationship with Turabi, or the
National Congress Party, and to condemn Turabi publicly, but
that Khalil refused. While not accepting Khalil as President
within a unified opposition, Shogar noted that there would be
no problem with Khalil serving in some other capacity. He
described his relationship with JEM official Ahmed Togoud as
good, and mentioned that they had just talked that day, when
Togoud called him from Europe.
--------------
SLM Unification Efforts
--------------
5. (SBU) Shogar suggested that SLM political leader Dr.
Sharif Harir's participation in the recent Sudanese
opposition unification conference in Ameri was a big mistake,
and worked against SLM unification efforts. Shogar stated
that SLM commander Ahmed Abdulshafi and Sharif were both
getting pressure from the Eritrean government to go into
negotiations with the Government of Sudan. He said that
Khamis Abdulla, his SLM ally, was in Asmara for the meeting
underway there, but that Khamis did not intend to enter into
talks on unification. Shogar was dismissive of some of his
other SLM colleagues, calling into question their support
base, noting that Abdulshafi had only three or four vehicles
in his faction and Sharif, who was always wanting a
leadership position, also had minimal support on the ground.
-------------- ---
Center for Humanitarian Dialogue's (CHD) Efforts
-------------- ---
6. (SBU) Shogar was well aware of the CHD's plans for a SLM
unification conference in Nairobi. Shogar suggested that
these efforts were premature, and that prior to any such
conference there needed to be additional "hard work" in order
to bring the leaders together. While Shogar appreciated the
efforts of the CHD, he was not optimistic about this
particular gathering. Although he did not plan to attend, he
had selected ten individuals from his group to participate.
--------------
Views on the DPA
--------------
7. (SBU) Shogar stated that he does not accept using the
DPA as a basis for talks, because he does not trust the
NDJAMENA 00000462 002.6 OF 002
Sudanese government's willingness to implement it. Pressed
by the Ambassador not to aim at starting negotiations from
scratch, Shogar said it would be acceptable to return to the
fifth round of the Abuja talks and start from the Declaration
of Principles. He noted that he believed both Sharif and
Abdulshafi might support using an Abuja Plus formula as a
basis for discussions.
8. (SBU) Shogar saw little promise in the Ambassador's
point about setting aside for now attempts at reuniting the
SLM and instead entering into talks based on the substantial
areas of agreement that already exist among the rebel
factions on negotiating objectives. Shogar argued instead
that the SLM's unity was a necesary condition for successful
talks. Without it, he stated, it would be easy for Khartoum
to further divide the rebel groups with its "big bags" of
money.
9. (SBU) As night closed in and the meeting drew to a
close, Shogar noted that he would be traveling next week to
"the liberated area" in Darfur. He said now he intended "to
go his own way," working with other members of his group,
including Khamis Abdulla and Adam Bakheit, and with
representatives of the NMRD and various Arab groups now
emerging in opposition to the Sudanese government.
10. (SBU) COMMENT: Shogar, one of the most guileless of
prominent SLM figures, is turning into one of their most
uncompromising. His comments highlight the continuing
disarray in the SLM's ranks. For the main contenders, the
struggle for leadership of a unified movement is taking
precedence over the search for peace in Darfur. The Center
for Humanitarian Dialogue will have its work cut out for it
in seeking to bring Shogar's people on board at the
conference in Nairobi. END COMMENT
10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
WALL