CHAD'S ROLE IN PEACE IN DARFUR: IS THIS THE RIGHT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000046

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD'S ROLE IN PEACE IN DARFUR: IS THIS THE RIGHT
PATH?

Classified By: ECONOMIC/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
) AND (D)


1. (C) AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTION: This is an important
piece on our engagement with Chad and its role in peace
efforts in Darfur. It was prepared by Jitu Sardar, who is
completing an impressive tour here after having contributed
significantly to our reporting on eastern Chad and our Darfur
rebel contacts over the last two eventful years. While it
may in part give too little weight to what we have been doing
and too much to our ability to achieve the results we seek,
it nonetheless presents an assessment well worth Washington's
careful attention. Those working on Chad and Darfur will
benefit from reading it. We are sending it through open
channels to allow it to have the readership it deserves. END
AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTION


2. (C) SUMMARY: Discussions of an international force along
the Chad-Sudan border, the "Plan B" option that uses Chad as
a launching pad for relief operations, and proposals for a
C-130 sale to Chad, point to Chad's importance in any policy
equation in bringing peace to Darfur. However, bringing
peace to Darfur should not come at the expense of bringing
peace to Chad. While we view our policy in Chad through the
lens of Darfur for good reason, we cannot ignore the root
causes of instability in Chad. Moving forward on engagement
with Chad in Darfur must entail a robust effort to work with
France and other key international partners to pressure the
Deby regime to reform the political and economic fabric of
the country. If we push forward with our approach of working
with the Deby regime, and not make some significant demands
on him to engage in substantive reforms in his country, we
not only risk exacerbating the conflict in Chad, but also
shatter any hopes of helping the victims of Darfur. END
SUMMARY.

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THE ROOTS OF CHAD'S INSTABILITY
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3. (C) The attacks on N'Djamena by Chadian rebels on April
13, 2006 demonstrated the vulnerability of President Idriss
Deby Itno's regime. As long as rebel groups operate against
the regime, insecurity threatens humanitarian activities and
the Sudanese refugee populations. While we have publicly
opposed the taking of power by force, and expressed concern
of reports of Sudanese support for Chadian rebel groups, we
have done little to publicly highlight the fundamental
problem generating the instability in Chad: the lack of good
governance by the Deby regime.


4. (C) Following the announcement of President Deby's
victory on May 14, we did little to highlight the glaring
irregularities in the electoral process, and our muted
response was viewed by many in the Chadian public as an
acceptance of the Deby regime. This was a theme that began
in May 2005, when we said little after a highly suspect
national referendum guaranteeing President Deby the
constitutional right to run for a third term as president
(the only apparent message, which came from the Ambassador
during a fourth of July celebration speech calling for
transparent national elections, resulted in a sharp rebuke
from President Deby and his advisors).


5. (C) The Chadian rebellion has been actively supported by
the Sudanese, but it is a Chadian rebellion. It consists of
individuals who are dissatisfied with this regime, for a host
of reasons, some of which are personal, but many of which are
principled. Embassy contacts, who include former advisors
and confidants to Deby, have pointed out a fundamental fact
on the ground: after sixteen years in power, President Deby
has failed to improve the lives of Chadians. There are
practically no working social services, even as the
Government garners millions in oil royalty payments and is
expected to receive hundreds of millions of dollars in tax
revenues this year. Corruption is rampant, and is mostly
perpetuated by the President and his family. Deby's reneging
on his promise to not run for a third term, and his
unwillingness to have a genuine political dialogue and engage
in a substantive political transition, reveal that he has no
plans to give up his power. Indeed, one can argue that the
problems described require long-term solutions that are
greater than Deby himself. But, as a World Bank official
told us earlier in the year, reform requires commitments from
the top, and thus far, Deby has committed to nothing.


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REFORM IN CHAD IS CRUCIAL FOR DARFUR
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6. (C) As long as President Deby fails to initiate political
and economic reform, the Chadian rebellion will continue, and
feed off the dissatisfaction of the Chadian people. While
the Chadian president has signed an agreement with one of the
rebel movement's leaders, the main personalities of the rebel
movement, Mahamat Nouri, Deby's former ambassador to Saudi
Arabia, and Timan Erdimi, Deby's former chief of staff and
Zaghawa elder, are still bent on removing Deby from power,
and have the means and support to actively engage with the
Chadian national army in the coming months.


7. (C) A resurgence in civil war in Chad is disastrous for
our policy initiatives, both in the short-run and long-run.
In the near future, combat between the Chadian national army
and rebel movements threatens the safety of humanitarian
workers, refugees, and Chadians in the East, and disrupts
humanitarian operations. It puts members of any proposed
international force along the Chad-Sudan border in harm's
way. And it feeds the violence in Darfur, as Deby and
loyalists in his government will make the strategic decision
to continue support to Sudanese rebels to retaliate against
Chadian rebels and their supporters in Khartoum.


8. (C) As long as the regime in Khartoum remains
recalcitrant, we will probably need Chadian support for our
security and humanitarian relief efforts. If we do decide to
continue to cooperate closely with this regime on Darfur, we
must be aware of the long-term risks to our image in Chad.
The Chadian government may claim that C-130s will be used for
humanitarian efforts in eastern Chad and Darfur. But the
most likely scenario is that C-130s will be used to transport
troops, military equipment, and weapons to the eastern border
for combat operations, combat operations that will
undoubtedly result in casualties. A strong engagement with
this regime, without any strong push for change, will give
Deby the impression that he can continue on his current track
without opposition from us, and will be perceived by Chadians
as U.S. support for an undemocratic regime that has alienated
many of its constituents, and is conducting a war in eastern
Chad that is killing and disrupting the lives of Chadians.

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WHAT SHOULD WE DO?
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9. (C) We must establish the position that we can only be an
active ally with President Deby if he will commit to
political and economic reforms. This can be accomplished
through a series of steps. First, we must convince the
French to pressure Deby to begin a transition process, have a
real dialogue with the opposition, and begin a reform
process. While we have heard rumblings of French intentions
to push the Chadian president to begin reforms, the French
perspective in recent months still appears to be that Chad is
not ready for a transition, and Deby's position must be
supported. This patronizing approach is short-sighted, and
will ultimately fail to bring progress and stability in Chad.
If we work aggressively to convince the French that a
multilateral approach, which would include the European
Union, the United Nations, the Chinese, Arab states, and the
African Union, is necessary to pressure Deby to change the
system, we will take a crucial step for progress.


10. (C) Our diplomatic efforts must be coupled with public
statements at the highest levels of the U.S. and foreign
governments to call on Deby to make substantive reforms, for
the sake of Chad's and the region's stability. If we are
forced to roll out the "Plan B" option and enhance our
cooperation with the Chadians, Deby should be aware that we
expect him to demonstrate intentions to implement reforms at
home. We should also be clear that while reform efforts will
be rewarded, a failure to do so will be seen negatively by
our leadership. As observers close to the President have
told us, Deby is not a statesman, nor a diplomat; he is a
nomadic warrior at heart who focuses on his immediate
survival, and only pays attention to tough talk from the
highest levels of power.


11. (C) Chad is, and should be, a strategic ally to the
United States. While peace in Darfur is the most pressing
objective, Chad and the United States share other important
policy goals, such as combating trans-national terrorism, and
allowing American-led oil interests to continue operations in
southern Chad. In order to preserve these goals, we must
review our current policy approach in Chad, and actively seek
to push Deby to move forward with crucial reforms. If we
couple our future engagement with the regime with strong
calls for reform, we can reach a durable, lasting solution to
bring peace not only to Darfur, but to the region.


12. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.

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