C-130'S FOR CHAD?

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000043

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2009
TAGS: BEXP EFIN KDEM PGOV PHUM PREL CD
SUBJECT: C-130'S FOR CHAD?

REF: ASHRAF-SARDAR EMAIL MESSAGE OF 12/20/06

Classified By: Ambassador Marc M. Wall for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Chad wants to buy four C-130 aircraft at a
cost of over USD 300 million. Whether Chad needs or can
afford so many new aircraft is questionable. Also an issue
is how they will be used. Chad wants to buy them primarily
to defend the regime against a backlash provoked by its
refusal so far to open its political system and provide for a
peaceful democratic transition. We nevertheless would concur
in allowing the sale to go forward, or at least a scaled-down
version of it. The decision should be the result of an
interagency review that takes a hard look at the
justification for the sale and at its political and financial
implications for Chad. We do not need to cut any corners to
accelerate approval or delivery of the aircraft. END SUMMARY

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Chad's Request
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2. (SBU) Chad's air force chief, its ambassador to
Washington, and Lockheed Martin's representatives have
approached us in recent weeks with Chad's request to buy four
C-130's. Chad hopes to purchase three of the newer model
C-130J aircraft for delivery when available and one of the
older C-130H versions for delivery this year. The total
transaction, including spare parts and training, would exceed
USD 300 million. The financing would be repaid over a period
of as long 12 years. Chad had originally proposed a
commercial sale, but we understand the transaction would now
be handled under the Foreign Military Sales program.


3. (SBU) Until recently Chad had been operating two C-130's
purchased in the 1980's. One was destroyed in a crash
landing in Abeche last June; the other has frequently had to
undergo repairs and is too long to land on most of the dirt
strips that pass for runways in much of Chad. In recent
months the Chadian army has been relying on leased aircraft
from Azerbaijan and various East European contractors, as
well as support from the French military. Flush with oil tax
payments, Chad has been busy shopping around for other
aircraft in recent months. It bought one Pilatus from
Switzerland and sought more, but the Swiss government turned
down the request because of concerns over the use of the
aircraft in the fighting in eastern Chad. It received two
Marchetti's (one of which was shot down in eastern Chad in
November) as well as two Antanov-24's as "gifts" from Libya.
It acquired two MI-17 helicopters from Ukraine and hired
contract pilots from Mexico to fly them.

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An Appraisal
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4. (C) The sale of the C-130's would provide a healthy
boost to U.S. exports to Chad. It would strengthen U.S.
military cooperation and cement links to Chad's fledgling air
force. It would signal to Khartoum our determination to work
with Chad in the face of a deteriorating situation in Darfur.
Over time it may enhance Chad's capabilities in fighting
terrorism and participating in future UN or AU regional
airlift operations. Also an issue would be President Deby's
extremely negative reaction if it were turned down. Deby
remembers fondly his visits to Washington in the eighties as
former President Habre's top military advisor responsible for
purchasing the C-130 aircraft then. He has taken a personal
interest in acquiring the four new aircraft now.


5. (C) Arguments against the sale focus on whether Chad can
afford so many new airplanes. A transaction of this scale
would call into question its commitment to its agreement with
the World Bank to spend 70 percent of its revenues on poverty
alleviation.


6. (C) Also of concern is how Chad intends to use the
aircraft. Despite claims to the contrary, they will not be
used to go after terrorists or help refugees. Chad wants to
buy the aircraft because it needs them to support combat
operations against the armed rebellion in eastern Chad. This
rebellion has received support from Khartoum, but is not its
invention. Its leaders are Chadian (including respected
members of President Deby's family as well as a former
defense minister); its foot soldiers are Chadian; and their
grievances have Chadian roots, i.e., Deby's refusal to reach
out convincingly to his opponents and his determination to
manipulate the political system to stay in power for the rest
of his life. A decision to approve the sale would be met
with dismay by many Chadian supporters of peaceful democratic
change.

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Our Recommendation
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7. (C) Our conclusion is that, like it or not, our
interests line up in favor of allowing the sale in some form
to go forward. We should do so, however, with a clear
understanding of how the sale will be perceived by Chadians
and with a strategy to counter these perceptions. We believe
the decision merits a DAS-level interagency review. We
should examine whether Chad really needs four new aircraft.
We should consult with the IMF and World Bank to ensure the
sale is consistent with Chad's commitments to the World Bank
on managing its oil revenues. We should accompany any
announcements of the sale to a renewed effort to encourage
political reform in Chad and respect for its commitments on
poverty alleviation. Finally, we should resist appeals to
speed up approval or delivery of the aircraft. While the
troubled political and security environment in Chad may
become more favorable to the sale in future years, it appears
problematic now.
WALL