Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NDJAMENA424
2007-05-18 17:49:00
SECRET
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

N'DJAMENA EAC FOR MAY 18, 2007

Tags:  ASEC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNJ #0424/01 1381749
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 181749Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5296
INFO RUEKJCS/NMCC
S E C R E T NDJAMENA 000424 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA, DS/CC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: N'DJAMENA EAC FOR MAY 18, 2007

REF: A. 06 NDJAMENA 01254

B. 06 NDJAMENA 01309

Classified By: RSO Brad Markwald, reason 1.5c

S E C R E T NDJAMENA 000424

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA, DS/CC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: N'DJAMENA EAC FOR MAY 18, 2007

REF: A. 06 NDJAMENA 01254

B. 06 NDJAMENA 01309

Classified By: RSO Brad Markwald, reason 1.5c


1. (S) On May 18, 2007 at 0950 hours the N,djamena EAC to
discuss recent threat information from SIMO regarding an RPG
attack on the US Embassy and apparent kidnapping plans by
Islamic extremists for Americans, French and Italian citizens
living in Chad. Those present were the Ambassador, DCM, DAO,
RSO, MO, POL/MIL.


2. (S) SIMO has received information from another external
Chadian source that has reported similar information to last
year,s late threat detailed in REFTEL A. In summary: A
loosely organized radical Islamic group with ties to Al Qaeda
has been planning an attack on the US Embassy facilities and
has stepped up its goals to include kidnapping Americans.
Also mentioned was the possibility they would try and kidnap
French and Italian citizens. Specifically planned was a
Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) attack on the US Embassy
compound and how to avoid capture upon completion. The
suspects noted that the front of the US Embassy was too well
protected and after surveillance of the area, decided the
rear of the Embassy was a better target.


3. (S) The source warned that the former US Embassy employee,
Issa Daoud PALKOUBOU was no longer to be trusted and they
would have to rely on other sources. No information was
mentioned as to why. Reference was made to a July timeframe
for the attack on the Embassy and that the surveillance of
teh US Embassy and other alternate targets was also
completed.

4. (S) RSO has noted an increase in Surveillance Detection
reporting of Red Zone activity behind the Embassy. In
particular, a slight covered position about 100 meters from
the Embassy compound wall and 200 meters from the Chancery.
These incidents have previously been entered into SIMAS and
started a few months ago. RSO walked to the location with the
SD supervisor and noted that the position could be approached
via a small depression from the river with little problem. An
approach at night followed by lying below the depression,
completely out of sight of the guards, police and cameras
would allow for very little warning should the site be used
for an attack. At the very least a weapons cache could be
set up at night and retrieved later in the day. The site

offers a clear 200 meter shot to the Ambassador,s office.
At this time the logical escape route would include about a
750 meter run to the river. They would never make it now but
during the rainy season in July, the river comes up to within
yards of the location. SD will continue to observe the area
diligently as it is a Red Zone. RSO will institute a roving
patrol with the Embassy LGF and Armed Police Escort that
includes daily inspection of this area as well as other zones
in the rear of the Embassy.


5. (S) RSO has been aware of the squatter camp located at the
South West corner of the Embassy by the Ambassador,s
residence. It has been reported in previous cables ) REFTEL

B. At times, small huts can be as close as 25 meters from
the corner of the Embassy wall. Jersey barriers set up
behind the Embassy keep the camp from spreading directly
behind the Embassy. It has been the subject of numerous
complaints by RSO to the Chadian National Police who,ve by
responded by raiding and eventually burning down the camp,
affectionately known as &Hyena Town8 by the locals, several
times. Because the land is owned by the State and therefore
no landlords complain, eventually, the camp regenerates. RSO
will engage the Director General of the Chadian National
Police with request that it may be time to remove the camp
again. If possible, monthly raids will be set up to keep the
camp small and manageable.


6. (S) The EAC discussed the need for defensive training or
reminders about personal safety regarding kidnapping and
hijacking. RSO holds regular OSAC meetings in N,djamena. A
meeting will be scheduled as soon as possible to include a
personal safety brief by the RSO concerning
Kidnapping/Hijacking. In addition an Embassy Town Hall will
be organized with the same topic as its subject. Of note was
a recent kidnapping of a French Cultural center worker by a
uniformed Police officer. She was eventually released
unharmed. Earlier this year, an NGO female was also hijacked
by a uniformed Chadian soldier. She too was eventually
released unharmed but both situations occurred as a result of
what at first appeared to be a legitimate vehicle stop. RSO
will coordinate with the Chadian Police and arrange that US
Embassy personnel will proceed directly to the Embassy,
slowly and carefully should they be directed to stop their
vehicle for police in a traffic situation. Embassy employees
already carry E&E radios and cell phones as mandatory
equipment when moving about town. If they should be directed
to stop, Post 1 will immediately be notified of the situation.


7. (S) Despite no information concerning the Embassy,s
morning jogging/running program being reported as a possible
attack venue, the program will be modified to include more
Embassy assigned police, SD and LGF presence as well as
movement to an alternate site on random days. The site was
initially chosen for it proximity to the French and Chadian
Army bases. The road is heavily traveled by military
convoy,s and Gendarme patrols. It,s as good as it gets in
Chad and would be a very poor attack site.


8. (S) The EAC agreed with the RSO proposals and will
reconvene should new information become available. RSO and
SIMO have been cooperatively investigating since last fall.
The meeting ended at 1040 hours.
WALL