SUDAN REBEL LEADER SEEKS DARFUR PEACE TALKS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000396

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL UNSC CD
SUBJECT: SUDAN REBEL LEADER SEEKS DARFUR PEACE TALKS

REF: A. FRAZER-WALL EMAIL MESSAGE OF 22 APRIL 2007

B. HONIGSTEIN-WALL EMAIL MESSAGE FROM OF 24 APRIL
2007

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1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is
ready to start Darfur peace talks tomorrow and wants to
cooperate with the United States, JEM Chairman Khalil Ibrahim
stressed in a meeting on May 5. Khalil expressed support for
the United Nation's mediation effort, a Darfur ceasefire, a
commitment not to permit the militarization of the refugee or
internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, and a statement
renouncing plans for regime change in Khartoum. He said the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) could be considered in new
talks, but would not agree to relying on it as their "basis."
He described self-government for Darfur as the main goal of
the rebel movements. He eschewed plans for seeking Darfur
self-determination or a change in the leadership or governing
system in Khartoum. He objected to singling out the DPA's
opponents as obstacles to peace, arguing instead that they
were representing the near unanimous opinion of the Darfur
people. He expressed disappointment over the failure of
efforts to unite the rebel groups behind a common negotiating
position. Perhaps surprisingly for a Sudanese rebel leader
not known for patience or diplomacy, he took pains to counsel
the need for all sides to practice more of both. END SUMMARY


2. (U) On May 5, in a meeting that coincidentally took
place on the first anniversary of the signing of the Darfur
Peace Agreement in Abuja, Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
Chairman Khalil Ibrahim and his top advisors called on the
Ambassador and Poloff to discuss Darfur and next steps in
bringing the Sudanese Government and the Darfur rebel
factions to negotiations. Khalil was accompanied by other
JEM representatives, including Vice Chairman Bahir Idriss,
Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Chief Negotiator Ahmed

SIPDIS
Tougoud, Chad-based political representative Taljadine Niam,
Deputy Secretary for Darfur Timan Diro, and Deputy Secretary
for Presidential Affairs Azadine Yousif.

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SLM Factions "Like Opposing Magnetic Poles"
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3. (SBU) Asked for his assessment of the different rebel
groups, Khalil confessed that efforts to unite them within
the National Redemption Front (NRF) have failed. The Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM) continues to fracture. It now
comprises many movements using the same name, in his view.
&Everyone is on their own, everyone is going their own
way,8 he rued. The harder they try to unify, the more they
repel each other, he observed, adding wryly that they are
"like opposing magnetic poles." Khalil said that SLM leader
Sharif Harir has now organized his own group with its own
army. He believed Sharif's efforts are contributing to the
divisions and making it even harder to promote a unified
position among the groups.

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The Key Goal: Darfur Self-Government
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4. (SBU) Khalil stressed that the key political goal remains
self-government for Darfur within a unified Sudan. Darfur
should have the status of one unified region, he argued. It
should be treated like the South is in the CPA, though
without the option of self-determination. Darfur
self-government would not conflict with the CPA, he stated.
But it does mean that Darfur should have authority to govern
itself administratively and financially. Khalil enumerated
other concerns, including more representative participation
for Darfur in the central government, compensation, and
access to basic services.


5. (SBU) Khalil maintained that JEM is not seeking a new
governing system in Khartoum. "We accept Bashir" as
President, he asserted. "Minni can stay," he added. But
what is not acceptable, he continued, is that Darfur should
be under the control of a small ethnic group holding power in
Khartoum.

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Common Views on Some Key Issues
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6. (SBU) The Ambassador presented the points in ref B;
Khalil responded in turn. JEM accepts the mediation process
led by the United Nations, he said. It is prepared to work
with the African Union as long as Salim Salim and his
negotiating team in Abuja are replaced. Khalil concurred

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that there can be no military solution to the crisis in
Darfur. He agreed that mediation is the only way to achieve
peace. He took note of the point that realism and compromise
will be necessary by all sides.


7. (SBU) Khalil reiterated that JEM does not seek regime
change in Khartoum. It has held off announcing this position
publicly out of deference to the other groups involved in the
unification effort under the NRF. If JEM loses hope of
achieving a consensus on this issue with these groups, it
would consider issuing such a statement on its own.


8. (SBU) Khalil said JEM wants a ceasefire, even though no
ceasefire now exists on the ground. He accused the regime in
Khartoum of responsibility for violating the ceasefire
agreements. Taljadine Niam added that the African Union also
bears responsibility for the breakdown in the ceasefire. The
mechanism for monitoring it through the Joint Ceasefire
Commission is not working, he alleged.


9. (SBU) Ahmed Tougoud spoke up to express agreement on the
point about refraining from militarizing the refugee and IDP
camps. He claimed that JEM does not allow its military
forces into the camps. Only those visiting their families
are allowed into the camps, he explained. They must have
permission to do so, and they must be in civilian dress, he
added.

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Taking Issue with the DPA as "the Basis" for Talks
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10. (SBU) Khalil took issue with the point about the DPA
serving as the basis for negotiations. He emphasized that
JEM &will not agree to what we rejected in Abuja.8 The
Ambassador said that it would be a step backwards if the
rebels insist on starting negotiations from scratch. They
should instead agree to start from the parts of the DPA that
were not at issue and proceed to negotiate appropriate
modifications on other aspects. Khalil responded that it
would be possible to "consider" the DPA in the context of new
talks. Ahmad Togoud added that the DPA's Declaration of
Principles is fully acceptable, but advised against insisting
on formal acceptance of the DPA as the basis for new talks as
a precondition for launching them.

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Who Is the Real Obstacle to Peace?
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11. (SBU) The Ambassador alerted Khalil to the U.S. intention
to take action against any party seen to be an obstacle to
peace in Darfur. Khalil questioned how such a determination
would be made. He urged the United States not to be
overbearing in using its influence. He said the agreement
negotiated in Abuja was a mistake. It had been rejected by
the people of Darfur. Those who others may see as obstacles
to peace are merely &going along with what the people of
Darfur want.8 The United States should realize, he said,
who is really impeding the peace process ) the Sudanese
government.


12. (SBU) The Ambassador responded that our overriding goal
is peace in Darfur. We may have differences over how to
pursue that goal, but we need to find a way to work together.
He objected to the characterization of the DPA as a mistake,
though acknowledged that it was now recognized as needing
modifications. He encouraged Khalil to join in the effort to
advance the peace process.


13. (SBU) Softening his tone, Khalil said JEM is ready to
start peace talks tomorrow. He stated that JEM is not an
obstacle to resuming talks. He believed it would be better
if the movements could come together before entering into new
talks. But he also wondered how long JEM will have to wait
before the other rebel groups are ready. He speculated that
perhaps it will eventually be necessary for JEM to enter into
talks without the others. Taljadine Niam noted that the
other groups would likely end up following the JEM's lead.
If the agreement eventually negotiated is satisfactory,
Khalil said, it is more likely to be accepted by them.

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An Appeal for Cooperation
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14. (SBU) Turning to JEM's relationship with the United
States, Khalil stressed its interest in cooperation. "We can
help you more than you realize," he said. He mentioned his

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hopes one day to visit the United States. He believed that
patience and diplomacy could accomplish much and pointed to
the need to have a better understanding of the psychology of
the rebel movements. Carrots were more effective in dealing
with them, in his view. Friendly treatment brings better
results, he concluded.

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Comment
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15. (SBU) Khalil was in substantial agreement with many of
the key points in ref B. The main exception was in
acceptance of the DPA as the basis of future Darfur peace
talks. He would only concede a willingness to consider it in
new discussions. He also qualified support for the UN-led
mediation effort by saying the AU's role would be accepted
only if it named a new negotiating team. Predictably he was
defensive on the point about our intentions to take action
against those seen as obstacles to peace. In an otherwise
cordial and productive exchange, he became heated only in
urging the United States not to be overbearing in condemning
DPA opponents who he argued were representing the views of
the Darfur people. At the same time, he took pains to stress
his interest in entering into new talks and working closely
with the United States.


16. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
WALL