DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE MEETS CHADIAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000341

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2017
TAGS: PGOV OVIP PREL PREF UNSC CD SU
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE MEETS CHADIAN
PRESIDENT DEBY ITNO

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MARC M. WALL FOR REASONS 1.4(B)
AND (D)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Deputy Secretary Negroponte met President
Idriss Deby Itno and Foreign Minister (FM) Alam-mi late
Monday afternoon April 16, in the Chadian capital of
N'Djamena. In both meetings the Deputy Secretary discussed
regional peace and stability, the ongoing humanitarian crisis
in Darfur and eastern Chad, and the possibility of a United
Nations military presence on Chad's eastern border with
Sudan. He delivered a message that the United States
supports a robust hybrid United Nations force for Darfur, and
requested that Chad keep the possibility of a U.N. military
force for eastern Chad under active consideration. The
Deputy Secretary received a read-out of recent Janjaweed
attacks inside Chad's eastern border from the FM, and heard a
lengthy history of the Darfur crisis from President Deby, who
also expressed his continued reluctance to accept a full U.N.
force for fear of further destabilizing his already fragile
regime. The President and the Deputy Secretary agreed to
continue dialogue on Chad's request to purchase C-130
military transport aircraft from the United States, and the
U.S. request for overflight clearance for U.S. planes to
gather information on the Sudan border region. END SUMMARY

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Foreign Minister: Recent Events on the Border
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2. (SBU) Deputy Secretary Negroponte met President Idriss
Deby Itno and Foreign Minister Ahmat Alam-mi (FM) in separate
meetings on the afternoon of April 16. The Deputy Secretary
was accompanied to both meetings by the Ambassador, Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer, National

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Security Council Senior Director for African Affairs Bobby
Pittman, USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator William
Garvelink, Colonel Cecil Dennis Giddens from the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, and Embassy N'Djamena PAO
(notetaker). The Deputy Secretary delivered a message to
both the President and the Foreign Minister that the United
States is committed to working with all parties on a
diplomatic solution to the regional crisis surrounding
Darfur, keeping pressure on the Government of Sudan to accept
a robust hybrid U.N. peacekeeping force, and he encouraged
the Government of Chad to continue to actively consider
accepting a large U.N. peacekeeping force for eastern Chad.


3. (SBU) The Deputy Secretary met first with Chadian Foreign
Minister Alam-mi, who had returned on April 15 from Khartoum,
where he had "expressed his regret" but "not apologized"
about Chadian army attacks on Sudanese army forces in the
eastern border area, in which 17 Sudanese soldiers were
killed, following what the FM described as attacks by Chadian
mercenaries and Sudanese army forces. The FM informed The
Deputy Secretary of tentative plans for a Presidential
meeting April 26-27 between Deby and President Bechir. The
FM blamed the recent attacks in Eastern Chad on Saleh Gosh,
who, according to the FM, is manipulating President Bechir
for his own personal advantage. The FM said that Chad is
still holding many of the prisoners from last week's attacks,
and that they are "not regular soldiers" but rather "spies"
supported fully by Sudan. Summarizing his
frequently-repeated message, the FM said "we are the victims,
and we want peace."

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Foreign Minister: Hybrid Force for Sudan and U.N. in Chad
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4. (SBU) The Deputy Secretary told the FM that the U.S.
supports a hybrid African Union/United Nations force with a
single, unified command for Darfur. While President Bechir
essentially wants the U.N. to give money to the A.U., the
United States supports a significant increase up to 17,000
troops for the region. On Chad, the Deputy Secretary
delivered the message that the U.S. supports a robust U.N.
military presence to be deployed along the eastern border,
and that a police and gendarmes force will not suffice. The
FM expressed the view that Chad does not want to risk further
complicating the situation and upsetting their neighbors, in
particular Sudan and Libya. The FM said that it will likely
take six to eight months for a U.N. force to be put in place,
implying that Sudan would have ample time to further
destabilize Chad following Chad's acceptance of a force, but
before such a force could be deployed. "Who will stand by
us," the FM wondered aloud? "France is here but they are
hesitating," he said, and "you (the United States) are not
there to back us." "We want heavily-armed gendarmes with a
clear humanitarian mandate," the FM said.

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President Deby: C-130s

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5. (SBU) In his meeting with President Idriss Deby Itno,
the Deputy Secretary raised Chad's request to purchase a
number of C-130 military transport aircraft from the U.S.
The Deputy Secretary said that the U.S. is prepared to send a
team from the Pentagon as soon as May to talk about different
options, including possible purchase of other types of
aircraft that might meet Chad's needs, and be available much
sooner than the C-130s. The President responded positively,
recalling nostalgically his own role in purchasing two C-130s
from the U.S. when he was a minister in Hissein Habre's
government in the late 1980s. Deby expressed his personal
thanks to President Bush, and said that Chad is certainly
interested in exploring all possibilities.

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Darfur and Eastern Chad: 3 Key Elements
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6. (SBU) The Deputy Secretary outlined the United States'
view on three key elements to the Darfur crisis:
humanitarian, security, and political. The Deputy Secretary
said that the humanitarian situation is relatively stable,
with refugees and internally-displaced persons (IDPs)
receiving adequate food, water, medical care, etc. In terms
of security, the crisis is worsening, with refugees and IDPs
continuing to arrive in camps. The Government of Sudan is
not helping matters as it has thus far refused to disarm the
Janjaweed militias. The political situation surrounding the
humanitarian crisis is also worsening. The non-signatories
of the Darfur peace accords have thus far refused to sit at
the negotiating table, and Khartoum continues to actively
resist diplomatic efforts towards peace, trying to divide the
non-signatories even more amongst themselves. The Deputy
Secretary said that the United States is especially concerned

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with 1) improving security in the border region and 2)
encouraging the non-signatories to come to the negotiating
table. The Deputy Secretary told President Deby that Sudan
has expressed a desire for improved relations with the U.S.,
but that we have made it clear that our bilateral relations
with Sudan cannot improve until the situation in Darfur
improves.

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President Deby's view of Darfur
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7. (SBU) The President expressed his view that the Darfur
crisis has been poorly managed from its beginnings in 2003,
and that it continues to affect the whole region, despite
Chad's significant efforts to sound the alarm. The President
said that, as early as 2004, he told leaders at an African
Union summit that Chad could not handle the crisis alone and
that the United Nations should take over. The President
characterized the GOS strategy in Darfur as simple: to move
all of the black Africans out, either to Chad or to somewhere
else in Sudan, and to bring in people of "Arab origin." The
President said that the international community must take
things in hand, before the situation spills over into
Nigeria, Niger, Mali, and the whole sub-region. The GOS has
promised to disarm the Janjaweed, he said, but in fact
continues to arm, train, and support them, and even to pay
them monthly salaries. If the GOS is refusing a U.N. force,
it is because they are hiding the atrocities they have
committed in Darfur, the President said. The Deputy
Secretary responded that the U.S. fully agrees that something

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decisive needs to be done. The Deputy Secretary requested
that the President "continue to actively consider bringing
peacekeeping forces to your side of the border." The
President echoed the FM's concerns of further destabilizing
the region by agreeing to a U.N. military force in Chad.
Sudan, Libya, and "many other countries in the African Union"
do not want such a force, the President added. "The
situation calls for a realistic solution that fits the
context," he said.


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President Deby: Moving Refugee Camps
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8. (SBU) The President raised the possibility of moving some
of the more vulnerable camps -- those located close to the
border -- to other parts of Chad, saying that such a move
would help to stabilize the border region and also reduce
tensions with Sudan, since Sudanese rebels could no longer
recruit from and operate in refugee camps located far from
the border. The Deputy Secretary responded that this is
something the United Nations and humanitarian partners would
have to study very carefully.


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Overflight
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9. (S) The Deputy Secretary closed with a discussion of the
letter from the Secretary to President Deby, and in
particular the request for United States overflight of
Chadian territory to gather information on the situation on
the border region. The President said that this was "a very
interesting issue and a very important offer" that the GOC
was considering, and that he would provide an answer to the
request in the days to come.

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Terrorism and Regional Stability
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10. (SBU) The President closed with a brief discussion of
his views on Chad's bilateral relations with the United
States, saying that while he was satisfied with our military,
security and intelligence cooperation, he hoped to see it
grow in the coming years. Our two countries need to continue
to work together to stop the spread of terrorist groups in
the region, the President said. The President fondly
remembered the 1980s as a time of very rich cooperation
between the United States and Chad, and although "it is
difficult to ask for the return of USAID," he appeared to be
doing just that when he asked for "better support and help
from the United States."


11. (U) The Deputy Secretary cleared on this cable.


12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
WALL