Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NDJAMENA331
2007-04-18 08:25:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

DEPUTY SECRETARY MEETING WITH DARFUR REBELS

Tags:  PREL PREF PGOV SU CD 
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VZCZCXRO8949
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0331/01 1080825
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 180825Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5155
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000331 

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LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV SU CD
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY MEETING WITH DARFUR REBELS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000331

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SENSITIVE
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LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV SU CD
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY MEETING WITH DARFUR REBELS


1. (SBU) Summary: Representatives of Sudanese rebel
movements from JEM, NMRD and SLA met with Deputy Secretary
Negroponte in Ndjamena, April 17. The movements explained
that three months of meetings in Chad had failed to unify the
movements, but that they were still trying. The effort by
GNU Vice-President Salva Kiir to unify the movements was
deemed helpful but still in the early stages. Movement
leaders stated that the Government of Sudan (GOS) was
re-arming the janjaweed with stronger weapons, and reiterated
that they would not deal with members of the AU's Abuja
negotiating team. A JEM representative stressed the need for
a mechanism to allow non-signatories to participate in
Cease-Fire Commission meetings and argued that UN
peace-keepers should only come to Darfur once a real peace
had been signed. Deputy Secretary Negroponte noted that - in
fact - Darfurians on the ground wanted peace-keepers now to
stabilize the situation. He urged the movements to find
unity in order to return to the negotiating table. End
summary.


2. (SBU) Deputy Secretary John D. Negroponte met with
members of Sudanese rebel groups in Ndjamena, Chad on April

17. Assistant Secretary Frazer, NSC Director Pittman, USAID
Deputy Assistant Administrator Garvelink, Colonel Giddens of
the Office of the Defense Secretary and DCM (notetaker)
attended the hour and a half discussion at the Ambassador's
residence. On the rebel side, representatives of three major
non-signatory factions attended: Khamis Abdullah, Chairman of
the SLA and member of the National Redemption Front (NRF),
Tadjadine Bechir Niam, NRF Coordinator and Representative of
the JEM Executive Bureau and Khalill Abdulah of the NMRD.


3. (SBU) The Deputy Secretary explained that he had just
returned from visiting Darfur and eastern Chad and wanted to
hear from the rebels how best to advance the cause of peace
in the region. Speaking for SLA, Chairman Khamis Abdullah
thanked the United States for its support for Darfurians, and
for having been the first to have identified the problem in
Darfur as "ethnic cleansing." Bachar Idriss, speaking for
the JEM, explained that the movements had been in Chad for

about three months seeking to unify. He acknowledged that
despite some good discussions, they had not yet succeeded in
unifying. He thought that a couple more months might be
necessary. Bachar Idriss seconded the points made by Khamis
Abdullah concerning the importance of the United States,
noting that the United States was pressing the issue in the
Security Council. Bachar Idriss explained that the root
cause of the Darfur conflict was the marginalization of the
Darfur people. The movements sought fair representation for
all the Darfur people.


4. (SBU) Tadjadine Niam (JEM) explained that the movements
were ready to cooperate with United States; peace had been
near at Abuja, but the imposition of an artificial deadline
had made it impossible to achieve a just agreement. He
stressed the importance of a functioning Cease Fire
Commission (CFC) to document violations and recommend
sanctions to the AU Peace and Security Council. Since August
2006, non-signatories had not attended the CFC sessions and
the security situation had deteriorated. He explained that
different modalities could allow their delegates to attend:
either create a new Commission, or allow different meetings
for signatories and non-signatories. He called the AU
"directly responsible" for the deterioration of the security
situation and noted that movements were now documenting
violations on their own. Tadjadine also related the three
concerns of the movements: equal representation at the
central level, wealth sharing and compensations, and
arrangements whereby Darfurians -- who constitute some 75% of
the Government of Sudan armed forces -- would be fairly
represented in the top military leadership.


5. (SBU) Speaking last, Khalil Abdullah (NMRD) explained how
his group had been denied a place at the table in Abuja. He
stated that all of the movements were ready to discuss -- but
pressure needed to be put on the GOS. The current meeting of
Field Commanders in Darfur was not helping unity.


6. (SBU) The Deputy Secretary described the U.S. position
concerning the proposed hybrid force with up to 20,,00
peacekeepers and under UN command and control. He agreed with
the movements that their speaking with one voice was key to
returning to the negotiating table. He explained that the
United States fully supported the efforts of Jan Eliasson and
Salim Salim to advance peace in Darfur.


7. (SBU) In response, Bachar Idriss (JEM) agreed that no
less than 20,000 peacekeepers on the ground were needed. But
he argued that the peacekeepers should only come once a new
peace agreement was signed. He stressed that a political

NDJAMENA 00000331 002 OF 002


settlement was needed first, before the troops. The Deputy
Secretary pointed out that Darfurians on the ground saw it

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differently and were calling for forces now to stabilize the
situation. Bachar Idriss responded that the GOS and the AU
were complicating the situation: The GOS was re-arming the
janjaweed with heavier weapons and artillery, and with cars
rather than camels. All this had happened under the eyes of
the AU. Furthermore, the AU had tried to split the movements
and create many factions. He concluded that the movements
would cooperate with the AU, but would not work with anyone
who had been on the Abuja team.


8. (SBU) Concerning the recent visit of Salva Kiir to
Ndjamena, Bachar Idriss stated that cooperation between north
and south was the only solution. He stated that Salva Kiir
did not have the same "stature" as John Garang, but that
discussions were ongoing. Bachar Idriss expressed
unhappiness with Salva Kiir's initial approach, saying that
he had arrived in Chad without doing any ground work. But
talks were continuing, and the movements were now planning on
going to see him. In sum, his initiative was helpful.


9. (U) Deputy Secretary Negroponte cleared this cable.


10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
WALL