Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NDJAMENA251
2007-03-21 16:14:00
SECRET
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:
AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE IN SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN
how-toVZCZCXRO1560 PP RUEHTRO DE RUEHNJ #0251 0801614 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 211614Z MAR 07 FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1377 RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0173 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0006 RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0421 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1667 RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2927 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2133 RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0390 RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0086 RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1498 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RHMFIUU/USEUCOM
S E C R E T NDJAMENA 000251
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017
TAGS: MARR PBTS PINR PREL GR LI SU CD
SUBJECT: AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE IN SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS -- DARFUR
REF: STATE 30472
Classified By: Ambassador Marc Wall for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
S E C R E T NDJAMENA 000251
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017
TAGS: MARR PBTS PINR PREL GR LI SU CD
SUBJECT: AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE IN SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS -- DARFUR
REF: STATE 30472
Classified By: Ambassador Marc Wall for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) The Ambassador presented points in ref to Foreign
Minister Allam-mi in a meeting on March 20.
2. (S) The Foreign Minister responded that the United
States will require Libya's approval for the request for
overflights even before Chad's. He said Chad prefers to
solve its problems with Sudan through diplomatic means and
has no hostile intentions toward its neighbor. He repeated
the point several times that the proposed overflights could
upset efforts to ease tensions with Sudan and thus could
cause difficulties for Chad. He observed that the
international community is welcome to intervene in Darfur, if
it chooses to, but that Chad does not want to be an
instrument for destabilizing Sudan. He added that Chad
already knows what is happening in Darfur better from the
ground than can be learned from aerial surveillance. He
noted finally that the French are responsible for Chadian
airspace and recalled the bungled mission in July 2005 when a
U.S.-French team landed in Abeche in eastern Chad without the
approval or even awareness of Chadian authorities.
3. (C) The Foreign Minister asked to receive the details of
our request in the form of a diplomatic note.
4. (C) Comment: The Foreign Minister's comments were not a
definitive rejection of the our request, but they accurately
present the reasons why Chad will be extremely loathe to
agree to it. One point in particular is worth highlighting:
Chad has little interest in being a party to an effort that
could lead to exacerbating its tense relations with Sudan
even further.
5. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
WALL
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017
TAGS: MARR PBTS PINR PREL GR LI SU CD
SUBJECT: AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE IN SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS -- DARFUR
REF: STATE 30472
Classified By: Ambassador Marc Wall for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) The Ambassador presented points in ref to Foreign
Minister Allam-mi in a meeting on March 20.
2. (S) The Foreign Minister responded that the United
States will require Libya's approval for the request for
overflights even before Chad's. He said Chad prefers to
solve its problems with Sudan through diplomatic means and
has no hostile intentions toward its neighbor. He repeated
the point several times that the proposed overflights could
upset efforts to ease tensions with Sudan and thus could
cause difficulties for Chad. He observed that the
international community is welcome to intervene in Darfur, if
it chooses to, but that Chad does not want to be an
instrument for destabilizing Sudan. He added that Chad
already knows what is happening in Darfur better from the
ground than can be learned from aerial surveillance. He
noted finally that the French are responsible for Chadian
airspace and recalled the bungled mission in July 2005 when a
U.S.-French team landed in Abeche in eastern Chad without the
approval or even awareness of Chadian authorities.
3. (C) The Foreign Minister asked to receive the details of
our request in the form of a diplomatic note.
4. (C) Comment: The Foreign Minister's comments were not a
definitive rejection of the our request, but they accurately
present the reasons why Chad will be extremely loathe to
agree to it. One point in particular is worth highlighting:
Chad has little interest in being a party to an effort that
could lead to exacerbating its tense relations with Sudan
even further.
5. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
WALL