CHAD EXPLAINS RESERVATIONS ON UN BORDER FORCE

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000245

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KPKO PGOV PHUM PREF PREL UNSC CD
SUBJECT: CHAD EXPLAINS RESERVATIONS ON UN BORDER FORCE

REF: NDJAMENA 205 AND PREVIOUS


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Chad supports a UN force of police and
gendarmes to protect refugees, displaced Chadians, and
humanitarian workers on its border with Sudan, but not
proposals for a much larger military force, Chad's Foreign
Minister told the Ambassador March 20. He said a "massive"
force ran the risk of provoking Chad's neighbors, had no
political role to play or peacekeeping mission to pursue in
Chad, and is not necessary anyway. As suggested in ref, we
hope consideration will be given to taking up the offer for a
force that addresses the urgent need to assure humanitarian
security in eastern Chad. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) On March 20, on the eve of Foreign Minister
Allam-mi's departure for consultations in New York, the
Ambassador met with him to discuss proposals for a UN force
on Chad's eastern border with Sudan. The Ambassador stressed
U.S. concern over violence in eastern Chad. He highlighted
U.S. support for rapid deployment of an international force
with a mandate to protect civilians and deter cross-border
attacks.


3. (SBU) Allam-mi said he is traveling to New York to clear
up misunderstandings with the United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). He said Chad had asked for
help in protecting Sudanese refugees, displaced Chadians, and
humanitarian workers in eastern Chad. It had sought a light
force of police and gendarmes. The force would include
Chadians, other Africans, and representatives from other
countries. It would be well equipped, including necessary
military and air support capabilities. It could receive
back-up support from the Chadian and French military.


4. (SBU) Instead, Allam-mi stated, the DPKO had proposed
deploying a much larger military force. Such a "massive"
force ran the risk of "internationalizing" the conflict in
Darfur and further destabilizing Chad. A force with as many
as 10,000 soldiers could trigger further pressures on Chad if
Sudan and Libya decided to allow terrorists and rebels to
stage assaults across their borders into Chad. He doubted
that a force could be deployed rapidly enough to fend off
such attacks. He also questioned whether it should be
conducted as a UN peacekeeping mission. How can there be
such an operation, he asked, if there is no ceasefire to
enforce or agreement with Chadian rebels or with Sudan to
defend. It is not the UN's place anyway, he asserted, to
negotiate with the Chadian rebels or to encourage an internal
political dialogue.


5. (SBU) Allam-mi stressed that Chad is not against
accepting an international force. But, he argued, one as
large as the DPKO has proposed is not necessary. He urged
proceeding gradually. If this first phase worked -- and if
it did not provoke Sudan or Libya -- it could be expanded in
later stages. Pressed on whether Chad is under pressure from
Libya on this matter, Allam-mi recalled Tripoli's position
opposing a UN force in Darfur. He said Tripoli's position on
a force inside Chad is less clear. He expressed concern that
Tripoli has the means to open its border to groups seeking to
destabilize Chad. Chad has to go slowly, he reiterated. It
is in the middle of Africa and has no choice but to try to
balance its relations with its neighbors.


6. (SBU) Comment: Allam-mi's comments on a UN force in
eastern Chad bring to light fears about the reaction of its
neighbors and suspicions about any UN role in addressing
Chad's internal political failures. They also provide the
opening to explore the terms for a force that would be
acceptable to the Chadians, but also effective in meeting the
urgent requirements for humanitarian security. Once such a
force is in place, it will be possible to build from there.
As suggested in ref, we hope such an approach will be
considered.
TAMLYN