LET'S TAKE THIS YES FOR AN ANSWER: NEXT STEPS ON A

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000205

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KPKO PGOV PHUM PREF PREL UNSC CD
SUBJECT: LET'S TAKE THIS YES FOR AN ANSWER: NEXT STEPS ON A
UN BORDER FORCE IN EASTERN CHAD

REF: NDJAMENA 189 AND PREVIOUS


1. (SBU) SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION: President Deby's
rejection of the UN border force proposed by the UN's
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) leaves an
opening for bringing in a smaller force tasked with
protecting humanitarian operations in eastern Chad. We
believe we should pursue this option. We urge consideration
of immediately dispatching a UNDPKO team to consult with the
Chadians on the mandate and deployment of such a force. END
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION


2. (SBU) After sending mixed signals for months, Chad has
now said no to the UNDPKO's proposals for a force of as many
as 11,000 personnel on its eastern border with Sudan. Having
agreed in principle to a border force, President Deby has now
sent word that he never intended to accept military personnel
nor to authorize it to do more than protect refugees,
displaced persons, and humanitarian workers.


3. (SBU) His stance stems from his determination to keep
defense of his border in his own hands. He may be wary of a
move that appears provocatively like a potential cross-border
force into neighboring Sudan. He is likely reluctant to go
against Qadhafi by accepting international troops in
Qadhafi's backyard. Nor is he eager to expose what he or his
people are doing to arm tribal militias loyal to him. He may
be looking to use his position on accepting a UN border force
as leverage to get the UN Security Council to back him more
resolutely against Sudan or to gain other favors (e.g., state
visits, military purchases). For whatever reason, he has now
staked out a position that will not be easy for him to back
out of.


4. (SBU) This rejection of the UNDPKO's proposals
nonetheless leave the door open to a force with a more
limited mandate and a lighter footprint. In the statement
clarifying Chad's position, the acting foreign minister spoke
in favor of a force composed of gendarmes and police officers
tasked with protecting civilian populations and humanitarian
workers. He raised the possibility of accepting logistics
support that would include monitoring and surveillance. In
his meeting with the Ambassador, he agreed that aerial
support could be part of the mission.


5. (SBU) We believe we should take Chad up on this offer.
Such an operation would be able to take action to address the
urgent and necessary challenge of protecting civilian
populations. While it would not have an explicit mandate of
deterring cross-border attacks, its presence would help
dissuade those activities. A smaller force with a mandate
focused on humanitarian protection would reduce the risk of
getting caught in the crossfire of Chad's complex internal
conflicts. Recruiting police and gendarmes was never going
to be easy, but at least the hurdles to staffing and
financing this more limited operation should be lower.


6. (SBU) During his recent visits to Chad UNDPKO Assistant
Secretary Annabi raised concerns that any peacekeeping

SIPDIS
operation would require significant military elements. It
would be important to ensure that any gendarmes units were
sufficiently armed for the protection of civilians at risk.
In the end it may not be possible to reach agreement with
Chadian authorities on an effective force. But at least we
have an opening, and we should make the most of it. We
recommend dispatching a UNDPKO team to test Chad's expressed
willingness to accept a humanitarian protection force in
eastern Chad and explore with them the terms for its rapid
deployment.
WALL