DEBY PEACE ACCORD WITH FUC'S NOUR -- ONE LESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000018

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2017
TAGS: CD MOPS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: DEBY PEACE ACCORD WITH FUC'S NOUR -- ONE LESS
REBEL GROUP IN THE FRAY


Classified By: POLOFF DAN VERNON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: The withdrawal of Sudanese government
support and an alleged payment of $5.5 million from Libyan
President Moammar Gadaffi may have combined to induce Chadian
rebel leader Mahamat Nour to sign a peace agreement with the
Deby government in Tripoli December 24. The significance of
the accord appears to be largely symbolic in military terms
as the FUC was largely a spent force from heavy losses during
its failed assault on N'Djamena last April and from
subsequent defections to other rebel groups. Although
battered by the Chadian Army in last month's fighting, other
rebel groups appear to be nursing their wounds and readying
themselves to renew the fight within months. End summary.

The Peace Accord
--------------


2. (U) GOC infrastructure minister, Adoum Younousmi and
United Front for Change (FUC) leader Mahamat Nour signed a
peace agreement December 24 that provides for an immediate
cessation of combat, release of all prisoners, an amnesty for
FUC fighters and their cantonment pending integration into
ANT within three months of the signing of the agreement, FUC
representation in the government and a one-month window for
FUC "allies" to join the accord. Representatives of the AU,
Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Congo, Egypt,
Eritrea and Sudan witnessed the signing in Tripoli. Nour
returned to N'Djamena with President Deby and attended the
sixteenth anniversary celebration of Deby's 1990 assumption
of power on December 29.

What brought Mohamat Nour to the Table
--------------


3. (C) There are varying interpretations of Nour's motives
in agreeing to the peace deal. Mahamoud Bechir, Chad's
Ambassador in Washington told Ambassador January 5 that
Khartoum's decision to withdraw support for Nour was behind
his decision to throw in the towel and join with Deby while
Abdelwahid Yacoub, a former embassy political assistant and
current national representative of FEWSNET (Famine Early
Warning System Network),told embassy officer January 4 that
the peace agreement was largely driven by Mouammar Gadaffi
who paid Nour $5.5 million to sign the accord.

Nour,s FUC a spent force
--------------


4. (C) Abdelwahid Yacoub described Nour as a spent force
with few options. He said Nour was a strong, but militarily
incompetent rebel leader who, because of his incompetence,
never posed a military threat to the Deby regime. Nour's
April attack on N'djamena was tactical folly. Nour rounded
up his fighters in the East and traveled secondary roads to
N'djamena with no regard to adequacy of supply lines,
reinforcement or the consequences of failure. As a result,
his ranks were gutted in a failed "suicidal" attack. Nour
lacked substance, he was "never serious and will never be
serious," Yacoub concluded.


Deby,s Motives
--------------


5. In contrast, Yacoub said Deby was clever, and would try
to implement the provisions of the peace accord to good
advantage. Having Nour in the tent as a minister would
remove him from his fighters; integrating his fighters into
the Chadian Army, and then dispersing them in units
throughout the country, would neutralize them as a threat.
Yacoub added that Deby also derived immediate benefits from
the accord in that Nour's fighters had now assumed a role in
protecting the Ouadifira region border with Sudan from
attacks by other rebel groups.


6. (C) If Nour comes into the Deby government, Yacoub
believed that he would seek to rally political support in
order to challenge Deby, but dismissed his prospects of
success -- without "fighters, he is nothing." Yacoub alleged
that other adversaries with whom Deby had reconciled were
ultimately murdered.


7. (C) In the meantime, the UFDD and RaFD response to the
December reversals is their announced intention to coordinate
military operations. During his January 5 meeting with the
Ambassador, Bechir described a secret agreement reached
between RaFD leader Timan Erdimi and UFDD leader Mahamat
Nouri to allow Nouri to become president and Erdimi vice
president when (or if) they take power in N'Djamena. The
agreement, however, was said to be "secret," because Erdimi
knows that many of his supporters would never agree to such

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an arrangement. While they are prepared to coordinate their
military operations with Nouri, they would never tolerate him
in the presidency. Erdimi is nonetheless ready to work with
Nouri because he knows he can't win on his own. As for
Nouri, Bechir said Deby has asked Gadaffi to help arrange a
rapprochement, but Nouri has thus far refused the overtures.
In Bechir's view, he is completely manipulated by Khartoum
and continues to receive their full support.


8. (C) Comment: Formed in late 2005, Nour's rebel group was
badly mauled during the FUC's failed assault on N'Djamena in
April 2006. His ranks were further depleted by defections to
the Erdimi brothers' Rally of Democratic Forces (RaFD) and
other rebel groups. As recently as mid-November, the Chief of
Defense claimed that the FUC was still the largest rebel
group with between 2,000 to 3,000 fighters. Current
estimates of a remnant of some 600 to 800 fighters suggests
that the FUC represented a much reduced threat to the regime.
Combined with the Chadian Army's successes in December
against UFDD (Union of Forces for Democracy) and RaFD forces,
the overall rebel threat appears to have diminished to a
point that it may be several months before new offensives can
be mounted. End comment.


WALL