Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NDJAMENA171
2007-02-26 14:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

EXPLAINING UN FORCE TO PRESIDENT DEBY:FRENCH ADVICE

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL UNSC SU CD 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0171/01 0571417
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 261417Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4969
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000171 

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PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: EXPLAINING UN FORCE TO PRESIDENT DEBY:FRENCH ADVICE


Classified By: DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000171

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: EXPLAINING UN FORCE TO PRESIDENT DEBY:FRENCH ADVICE


Classified By: DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. Chad's unqualified support for UN operation
in eastern Chad should not be assumed, according to French
Ambassador Foucher. In a meeting with the Ambassador,
Foucher emphasized that the UN peacekeeping operation needed
to be carefully explained to President Deby as humanitarian
in nature, and not intended to legitimize the Chadian
rebellion. According to Foucher, the Chadians are
particularly sensitive to the need to avoid any presence
which might appear "hostile" to Libya. End Summary


2. (C) French Ambassador Bruno Foucher met with Ambassador
Wall and DCM (notetaker) January 23 to discuss the recently
issued report of the UN Secretary General laying out
different peacekeeping options in eastern Chad. Foucher noted
that the French position was very similar to that of the
United States: the force must be robust and able to protect
civilians (IDPs, refugees, humanitarian workers and the
affected population.) However, the question of what role the
force would play on the border and the extent to which the UN
presence might elevate the stature of Chadian rebels was a
sensitive one.



3. (C) Foucher elaborated that, based on conversations with
Foreign Minister Allam-mi, he understood that President Deby
was still reticent and had two major concerns. First, the UN
presence and the "peace process" referred to in the SYG's
report must refer to the relations between Chad, Sudan and
CAR, and not to a process between Chad and Chadian rebels.
President Deby would never agree to UN pressure to talk to
Chadian rebels; any operation with this mandate would be
rejected. Secondly, President Deby was very sensitive to
Libya's objection to a military presence in the region and
any effort which would be seen as competing with Libya as the
region's chief "mediator."


4. (C) Foucher cautioned that if President Deby did not see
his interests clearly spelled out in the force, he would

reject the package. Therefore, the operation needed to be
"sold" to Deby as a humanitarian activity, done in the
context of improving overall Chad-Sudanese relations, and not
intended to legitimize the Chadian rebellion. He urged the
Ambassador to be aware of GOC concerns and bear in mind the
need to consult closely with the Chadians on the mandate, the
composition and the control of any proposed operation.


5. (C) Foucher reported that Foreign Minister Allam-mi had
told him that if Sudan took the first step - and if it was
verifiable - to cease from supporting Chadian rebels, then
Chad would stop support to Darfur rebels. Pressed by the
Ambassador as to whether it was in President Deby's power to
do so, Foucher acknowledged that there would be other
entities in Chad who would still seek to supply the rebels
(such as the President's half-brother, Daoussa Deby). But,
Foucher noted that the President was finding the JEM presence
to be a mixed blessing. Although the JEM had rendered
important support to the Chadian National Army (ANT) in
fighting in 2005 (Adre) and 2006 (Guereda),they were causing
problems with ANT soldiers and had become a problematic
presence. Foucher added that previously President Deby had
truly needed JEM; with the current security situation better
under control, he was not as needy.


6. (C) Queried by the Ambassador as to how best to approach
President Deby, Foucher warned against a joint approach by UN
Security Council members in N'djamena. He pointed out that
President Deby would see that as pressure and he never agreed
under pressure. Rather, he needed to have the situation
carefully explained to him. The humanitarian aspect needed
to be highlighted, as well as the point that the operation
was in the overall context of improving relations between
Chad and Sudan. It also needed to be explained to him that
the operation was not trying to impose a political settlement
between Deby and the Chadian rebels.


7. (C) Finally, Foucher noted that Foreign Minister Allam-mi
needed to travel to New York to understand the issues at
stake. He notedthat the Chadian Permanent Representative
was no very good and failed to keep the GOC updated on
vents in New York.

COMMENT:
--------------

8. (C Post agrees that we must not assume Chadian
acqiescence to a UN operation here -- their December
letter to the UN Security Council notwithstandig. They are
still of the view that a civilian foce is preferred, and --
particularly after the recent summit in Tripoli -- are

NDJAMENA 00000171 002 OF 002


probably more concerned about Libyan reactions to the
operation. We believe that a letter to President Deby from
the Secretary laying out the mandate and rationale for a
force would be helpful in addressing President Deby's
concerns.


9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
WALL