CHAD INTERETHNIC CONFLICT: "A POLITICAL CRISIS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000163

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PREF CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD INTERETHNIC CONFLICT: "A POLITICAL CRISIS
- FOR NOW"



1. (SBU) Summary: Leading "Chad watcher" Roland Marchal
emphasized that resolving the Darfur crisis required
pressure on President Deby - pressure on Khartoum was
not enough. President Deby's calculated pitting of
ethnic group against ethnic group in eastern Chad (for
the sake of regime survival) risked seriously damaging
Chad's social fabric. Marchal cautioned that what is
now "just a political crisis" in Chad could well become
something much more serious. End summary.


2. (SBU) The Ambassador and DCM met with Roland
Marchal, Senior Research Fellow at the Paris-based
Center for International Studies and Research on
February 18 to discuss political developments in Chad.
Marchal sees President Deby destroying the gains of the
last 15 years of peace by fostering corruption,
appointing family members to high-ranking positions and
degrading the professional army through undeserved
promotions and use of militias. Most pernicious,
according to Marchal, is the destruction of the social
and civil fabric by a policy of setting ethnic group
against ethnic group - all for the sake of regime
survival.

HOW TO CREATE A FAILED STATE: SET GROUP AGAINST GROUP.
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3. (SBU) Marchal pointed to the conflict between
Zaghawa and Tama in the vicinity of Guereda in Dar Tama
(the traditional home of the Tama ethnic group).
Conflict had already broken out between these two
groups (with the Tama at the receiving end) well before
the signing of a peace agreement between Tama leader
Mahamat Nour and the Government of Chad (GOC). The
situation has further deteriorated: a full-blown feud
between Mahamat Nour and Zaghawas of the Kobe sub-group
appears to be in the works with Zaghawa pitted against
demobilized FUC rebels (the latter now empowered by the
recent peace accord). Although the government has
recently taken steps to move the FUC troops elsewhere
in Chad, the President was not stepping in to support
the Zaghawa, according to Marchal, because he suspects
them of supporting the Erdimi brothers against him.


4. (SBU) Another example offered by Marchal was that
of the arming of the Dadjo tribes in Dar Sila to take
on Chadian Arabs suspected of being aligned with
Chadian rebels. Marchal recalled that in 2004 the
Government of Chad had armed the Arabs because the
Dadjo themselves were seen as "a problem." Now the
situation was reversed ("the mirror image of Darfur")
and Deby was fighting his wars by assembling militias
and arming citizens to fight each other. (Comment: An
International Red Cross Delegate based in Goz Beida
informed DCM as well that the government had been
arming Dadjo militias. End comment).

.AND STAND BACK
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5. (SBU) Marchal underscored that by these acts, the
Chadian state could no longer be seen as able to
impartially maintain security or administer justice. In
setting tribe against tribe, Deby was "undoing the
social bonds" which held Chad together. Furthermore,
according to Marchal, by their unwavering support of
President Deby, the French were complicit in helping
Deby destroy the Chadian state

DARFUR: "NATIONALIZE" THE CRISIS AND THEN RESOLVE
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6. (SBU) Recognizing that the Chadian roots of the
Darfur crisis run deep, Marchal argued that solving
that crisis required a two step solution. First, the
crisis must be "nationalized" - i.e. understood and
dealt with according to the different circumstances in
Chad and Sudan. While this approach might appear more
time-consuming, two crises were in fact easier to deal
with than one regional one according to Marchal.


7. (SBU) In Chad, Marchal singled out the importance of
targeting those groups which are responsible for
"transnationalizing" the conflict. He explained that
JEM was the most dangerous Darfur rebel group - not for
military reasons -- but for political reasons. JEM
embodies the political and nationalist aspirations of
the Kobe sub-group of the Zaghawa (note: President Deby
is from the Bideyat sub-group). According to Marchal,
the Kobe needed to be pressured - and at the same time
reassured that they will not be eradicated by Khartoum.
If Chadian support for JEM could be reduced, JEM's
ability to operate in Darfur would be curtailed - its

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credibility with the Darfur people called into
question, and there would be greater pressure to return

to the negotiating table. In sum: Darfurians need to
be more realistic - and the only way to do this is to
limit their resources and power.

WAY FORWARD FOR CHAD?
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8. (SBU) In the meantime, a creditable political
process was needed in Chad which would bring in the
Chadian armed opposition, and reduce President Deby's
need to support his regime through Darfur rebel groups.
By allowing greater political space, this process would
also give Zaghawa Kobe "aspirants to the throne" a
legitimate political process in which to engage. To
clear the way, the international community should make
it clear that it would not accept a Khartoum-staged
regime change in Chad.


9. (SBU) In Marchal's view, a credible political
process would include:

-- an agreed division of power between the President
and the Government;
-- a process of national reconciliation - reaching to
the communal level and including demobilization of
militias;
-- steps to ensure equitable allocation of oil
resources;
-- steps to improve delivery of government services;
-- decentralization and empowerment of ministries;
-- electoral reform (Marchal suggested that most
political parties would be satisfied with an agreement
on political party and campaign financing); and
-- a clear understanding of the fate of the Head of
State once he left office.


10. (SBU) And finally, the GOC needed to talk to the
armed opposition - many of whose "preconditions" (such
as Deby stepping down) were negotiating strategies
which would be discarded under pressure.

Comment
--------------

11. (SBU) Marchal has looked closely at the Chadian
roots of the Darfur conflict, and is one of the best-
informed "Chad watchers" on this subject. Post concurs
that the situation in Chad cannot simply be understood
as spillover from Darfur - rather, Chad's own political
crisis feeds the Darfur crisis. A Chad-focused
approach can assist in giving momentum to the Darfur
peace process.


12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
Wall