PRESIDENT DEBY BACKTRACKING ON UN FORCE IN EASTERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000122

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: PREF PREL KPKO CD SU SCRS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT DEBY BACKTRACKING ON UN FORCE IN EASTERN
CHAD


Classified By: S/CRS Charles Wintermeyer for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) UN Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations
Hedi Annabi told the Ambassador in meetings February 5 and 6 that
President Deby seems to have backtracked on deployment of a UN
military peacekeeping force to eastern Chad. Instead, Deby's
preference remains a civilian police (civpol) contingent, though
he expresses a willingness to consider other modalities. Annabi
said that Deby's position is a retreat from his December 9 letter
to the Secretary General soliciting UN peacekeepers. Annabi stated
that a civilian police presence absent a military component is not
operationally viable. Asked whether Deby might be more receptive
were the peacekeeping mandate limited to refugee camp protection,
Annabi responded that Deby's current position is opposed to any UN
blue helmets. In discussions with Annabi and other representatives
of the diplomatic community in N'Djamena, suggestions floated for
persuading Deby included a high-level intervention with him at the
upcoming Franco-African Summit in Paris, a visit by the UN
Secretary General or African Union President Kufor, or a combined

SIPDIS
demarche in N,Djamena by ambassadors of Security Council member
states or a combined demarche by "friends of Chad" ambassadors to
include the EU and Arab states. END SUMMARY


2. (U) ASG Annabi briefed the diplomatic community in N'Djamena
February 5 on the outcome of the Technical Assessment Mission(TAM)
in Chad. Accompanied by his special assistant Peter N. Due, he met
with the Ambassador the following day before his departure for New
York to seek the Ambassador's thoughts on how to proceed. The TAM
team had visited Abeche, Adre, Farshana and Goz Beida. Annabi met
with President Deby in Amtiman earlier in the day on February 5.
In November, due to security concerns, the TAM team had not been
able to travel to eastern Chad.

Goals and Possible Force Composition
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3. (C) Annabi articulated two goals for a UN force in eastern
Chad. The first would be to protect civilian populations
(including refugees, IDPs and local civilians). The second
would be to dissuade and report on cross-border activities.
He anticipated either a brigade size (5,000 soldiers) or a
division size (10,000 soldiers) force composition. The
force would also contain 1,000 civilian police (civpol),
consisting of 200 UN police trainers and 800 Chadian police
and gendarmes. Due to the difficulty in recruiting
Francophone civpols for UN missions, he recommended that
500 Chadian police and 300 gendarmes be trained for a month.

President Deby Now Backtracking
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4. (C) Annabi expressed concern about his February 5 meeting
with President Deby. In contrast to the unanimous support for
a strong UN force expressed in meetings with officials during
their travels through eastern Chad, Annabi observed, Deby was
even more hesitant than he was in their meeting last November.
According to Annabi, Deby now claimed it was the international
community had asked for a UN force in Chad not the Government
of Chad. Deby said the force he had in mind would only include
civpols, not a military force. He feigned ignorance of the 9
December 2006 letter from the GoC to the UN requesting a
multi-dimensional UN force for Chad. He reiterated that he
had only agreed in principle to a UN force, but he nevertheless
remains willing to continue discussions on the matter.

Why The Backtracking?
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5. (C) Annabi was not able to explain Deby,s retreat on the
positioning of a UN force in eastern Chad, other than to note
Deby,s pique over what he perceives as unequal treatment by
the international community. Annabi described Deby as miffed
over the attention the conflict in Darfur has received in
comparison with Chad's own plight. He seemed to feel that the
UN Security Council has not taken seriously Chad's complaints
about attacks coming from Sudan.


6. (C) In discussions with Annabi and other diplomatic
representatives, several other reasons were posited for
Deby's reluctance on the UN force. For one, he perceives himself
to hold the upper hand now. His forces in the East are now
equipped with armed helicopters and night vision capability, plus
he has a solid stream of oil revenues. Deby is also prickly about
protecting Chad's sovereignty, fears provoking Sudan or Libya, and

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lacks an understanding of peacekeeping operations (PKO).
Although the GoS has agreed to a UN force in Chad, Qaddafi's
opinion is still relevant for Deby. Also part of Deby,s strategy
could be an attempt to get the UN Security Council to side with
him in condemning Sudan and thus gaining its backing for his case
that his problems originate entirely from his hostile neighbor.

Could The Diplomatic Community Help Change Deby's Mind?
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7. (C) Both during the general meeting with the diplomatic
community (including representatives from France, China, the
EU, and South Africa),and the follow-up meeting with the
Ambassador, several ideas for making a UN force more acceptable
to Deby were discussed. One was to deploy just a civpol force
here without a military component. Annabi felt that was not
realistic. The civpol had to have some kind of military protection.
The only cases of which he was aware where civpols did not deploy
with a UN military force were where there was some other military
force deployed (such as NATO troops in Kosovo). Another proposal
was to focus the PKO,s mandate on protecting refugees and IDP's,
rather than on dealing with cross-border movements. Annabi did
not believe that this would get much traction with Deby, since
Deby seemed unreceptive to the whole ideal of a PKO that included
military elements.


8. (C) Also discussed were steps that the international
community could take to persuade Deby. One was a joint demarche,
either from UNSC member-states represented in Chad, or from a
larger group of friends of Chad to include the EU and Arab states
represented here. Another was a visit to Chad by the UN Secretary
General (which Annabi felt was unlikely) or by AU President Kufor.
Perhaps the best starting point would be for the French and fellow
African leaders to try to convince Deby at the Franco-African
Summit next week. The French CDA agreed to raise this option
with Paris.

Contacts with Chadian Rebel Groups
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9. (C) During the TAM's visit, the team met with the political
opposition, but had no personal contact with rebel groups.
However, in a telephone conversation, one rebel leader told a
TAM member that they did not want a UN force, and would consider
it as bolstering Deby,s position. However, the rebel leader made
no threats. The TAM team expressed interest in pursuing contacts
with Chadian rebel representatives, though it considered the
matter less of a concern in view of the improvement in the
security situation since its visit in November.

Comment
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10. (C) ASG Annabi's report is due to the Security Council
by 15 February. In our view, the quickest way to get to Deby on
this issue would be at the Franco-African Summit. The other
measures discussed in para 8 have merit and should be explored as
well.
WALL