Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NASSAU94
2007-01-24 21:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nassau
Cable title:  

BAHAMAS MASS MIGRATION CONTINGENCY ASSESSMENT

Tags:  SMIG PREF PREL HA CU BF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBH #0094/01 0242154
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 242154Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3775
INFO RUEHBE/AMEMBASSY BELMOPAN 0024
RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN 5527
RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 3609
RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 8466
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0149
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE 3478
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 4637
RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO 2753
RUWDQAC/COMDT COGARD WASHDC//G-OPL/G-OCA//
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL
RUCOWCZ/COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA//AOA/AO/AI//
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0367
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L NASSAU 000094 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR RCBUDDEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: SMIG PREF PREL HA CU BF
SUBJECT: BAHAMAS MASS MIGRATION CONTINGENCY ASSESSMENT

REF: STATE 03439

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Brent Hardt for reasons 1.4(b) a
nd (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NASSAU 000094

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CAR RCBUDDEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: SMIG PREF PREL HA CU BF
SUBJECT: BAHAMAS MASS MIGRATION CONTINGENCY ASSESSMENT

REF: STATE 03439

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Brent Hardt for reasons 1.4(b) a
nd (d)


1. (C) The following information is provided in response to
reftel request, tracked to reftel questions:

a. (C) Would your host government be willing to establish a
camp to house at least 1,000 migrants interdicted by the U.S.
during a mass migration? Would they be willing if the U.S.
paid to build and run the camp?

The Bahamian Government would not be willing to establih a
camp unless the U.S. agreed to bear the cost to build and
operate the camp. The USCG has prviously approached the
Bahamian government as pat of planning for Operation
Vigilant Sentry -- the USCG mass migration plan. During
these discussions, the Director of Immigration expressed a
willingness to provide temporary housing in The Bahamas as
part of a response to mass migration. The Director expressed
concern, however, regarding lack of Bahamian resources,
budgeting, or planning for mass migration, and indicated that
he would welcome U.S. involvement. During previous
discussions with Poloff regarding mass migration planning,
immigration officials openly acknowledged the lack of
Bahamian planning and capacity to handle a mass migration,
stating directly that the Bahamian government would rely
almost entirely on significant assistance from the U.S. and
the UN. At the political level, constructing a camp that
housed people for long periods of time could be problematic.
Moving migrants back to their home countries expeditiously
would be a key ingredient for a successful cooperative effort.

b. (C) Would the country be willing to establish such a camp
if the U.S. is not taking any migrants, or only a few
thousand, at GTMO? Would they be willing to have their camp
act as a substitute to GTMO? Or would they only be willing
to consider overflow at GTMO?

It is unlikely that the Bahamas would want to be seen as a
detention point of first resort. They would be much more
willing to be able to cooperate with us in establishing a
camp if it was clear to the Bahamian public that we were

doing all we could to accommodate refugees and had maximized
the capacity of our potential holding points. Bahamians
recognize that their location between Haiti, Cuba and the
U.S. could involve them willingly or unwillingly in any mass
migration scenario in the Caribbean. The Bahamian
government's likely need to turn to the US for assistance in
the event of such a scenario could give the U.S. some
leverage in securing cooperation on mass migration planning.
The Bahamian government would likely face a some public
backlash for accepting migrants captured in international or
U.S. waters by the U.S. To overcome such potential local
political sensitivities, advance planning and negotiation
with the Bahamian government would be critical.

c. (C) Would they be willing to take any migrants or only
those from certain countries?

The Bahamas would be more likely to accept migrants from
Cuba, which they would view as more likely to pass through
and not have any intention to remain. Haitian migrants would
be less welcome, as Haitian migration is a politically
charged issue in this country of only 315,000 persons with
approximately 50,000 legal and illegal Haitians. Cuban
migrants are currently governed by a bilateral agreement
between The Bahamas and Cuba requiring repatriation within a
short time frame.

d. (C) Would their willingness to accept Cuban migrants
interdicted by the U.S. be greater in a post-Fidel
environment?

Probably. The Bahamas is vulnerable to Cuban diplomatic
pressure on migration issues out of fear of Cuba's future
refusal to accept repatriated migrants and the threat of
Cuba-directed migration to The Bahamas. If that threat was
lower in a post-Castro Cuba, The Bahamas would be more likely
to fully cooperate with the U.S. on Cuban migration issues.

e. (C) Are there any political or bilateral issues that
would be negatively impacted if we approach the country?

No. U.S.-Bahamas cooperation on migration issues has been
outstanding. The USCG has already approached the Director of
Immigration on mass-migration issues, as have the UNHCR and
Poloff. Approaching the Minister of Immigration and/or
Foreign Ministry would be necessary to ensure adequate
Cabinet support for potential cooperation. However, any such
approach should be mindful of upcoming elections in The
Bahamas, constitutionally due to be called by May, and the
importance of illegal Haitian migration as a major issue in
those elections. It is unlikely that the government would
agree to host Haitian migrants not caught in Bahamian waters
during a political campaign.

f. (C) What size camp, in terms of numbers of migrants, do
you think your host government would be willing to establish?
If the U.S. is paying? If the government is paying?

The Bahamas' immigration detention facility in Nassau can
hold 500 persons in permanent housing and an additional 500
migrants in temporary tents. Permanent housing is at or near
capacity simply in managing regular migration flows.
Conditions in temporary tent facilities are substandard.
Post estimates The Bahamas would be willing to house the
additional 500 in tents in substandard conditions in Nassau
for 2-3 weeks without U.S. support, provided those migrants
were caught in Bahamian waters. According to the Director of
Immigration, The Bahamas would also be willing to host an
additional camp of approximately 1000 migrants, most likely
on remote Great Inagua island, but would be able to do so
only for a very short time without significant support.
Conditions in Inagua would likely be substandard absent
significant investment. Post believes The Bahamas could host
a maximum of 2,000 on Great Inagua with considerable U.S.
support.

Securing Bahamian concurrence to house migrants not caught in
Bahamian waters presents political problems, but these might
be surmountable if the U.S. were willing to invest in
long-sought upgrades to the harbor in Great Inagua. The
Bahamian government has been eager to expand its maritime
presence on its southern border near Haiti, and has
repeatedly approached Post and U.S. military representatives
for support in expanding the Royal Bahamas Defense Force base
on Great Inagua, particularly including improvements to
Matthew Town Harbor. If the US agreed to expand the harbor,
and if the U.S. appropriately leveraged much needed
assistance for mass migration through Bahamian waters,
Bahamian support for holding of migrants not captured in
Bahamian waters would be more likely.

g. (C) Would the country want to run the camp or have the
U.S. run it? If they run it, can we be confident that they
will run it in accordance with international standards
regarding treatment of migrants? Would they be willing to
let the US run the camp.

The Bahamas lacks the manpower or funding to run a camp
independently to required standards. While The Bahamas would
make every effort to run the camp in accordance with
international standards, Post's observation of temporary
housing at the Carmichael Road Immigrant Detention Center
indicates that it would be unable to do so. The Bahamas
would expect and welcome U.S. assistance, but would likely
want to ensure Bahamian control and oversight of any
operation on Bahamian soil. The solution is likely to be a
cooperative operation, an option made possible by excellent
U.S.-Bahamas law enforcement and defense relationships.

h. (C) If the U.S. builds and runs the camp, would the host
country expect/insist that we take in any migrants that land
on their territory directly, in addition to those we
interdict and transship to their land?

Probably not. The Bahamian government would continue to
operate its own detention center and interdiction activities.
As noted, the U.S. and The Bahamas have a well-established
and long-practiced agreement allowing U.S. migrant
interdiction operations in Bahamian waters. Under that
agreement, the Bahamian government is responsible for
migrants caught in its waters and the USG is responsible for
those caught outside Bahamian waters.


2. (C) COMMENT: Post understands that the USCG has completed
one mass migration practice exercise involving The Bahamas,
with a second planned for February. It also appears that
UNHCR is independently developing a mass migration plan
involving The Bahamas that may not have been coordinated with
USCG or other US plans. END COMMENT.
HARDT